Going Nuclear in the Middle East - In search of an European Middle East Policy



In search of a European Union Policy for the Middle East
Panel

Jean François-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - We are now going to resume our discussions and we are now moving into the last panel, where we will be looking at European Middle East Policy. It is out good fortune to have with us to address the issue Jean-Dominique Giuliani, who will be the first speaker. He is the Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation. I will remind you that this symposium has been co-organized by the Foundation with the Senate. Then we will hear from Dr Muriel Asseburg who will speak on behalf of Germany and then Claire Spencer, who will give us the UK viewpoint and my job will simply be to listen to them.

Jean-Dominique GIULIANI, Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation - Thank you very much, Minister. Let me start by expressing thanks to you, Mr President de Rohan and the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee, Mrs Cerisier ben-Guiga and President Gérard Larcher who agreed to associate the Robert Schuman Foundation in the organization of this symposium. We feel extremely honoured. We do not consider ourselves to be Middle East experts, perhaps a little bit more when it comes to European matters, but I am well aware of the difficulty of the task you have given to our modest panel. We will be speaking to eminent experts like yourself who was involved in drafting the Treaty of Rome, or like Mr Javier Solana who embodies, in our eyes, all the European efforts to support a Common Defence and Security Policy in Europe in recent years. I was in Brussels a few days ago and Mr Secretary General you are already missed because you had a difficult job to do in a Europe of changing institutions, thanks notably to the Lisbon Treaty that has now come into force. Our task is difficult because I believe at the same time Secretary of State Clinton is going to be speaking here across town at the Ecole Militaire on the important subject of Security in Europe. We see here how wise in its choices the Senate is. We are talking about Middle East in the Senate and at the same time European security is being talked about at the Ecole militaire .

We will try to speak openly, forthrightly, and have a real debate because the question of a common European Middle East policy is very relevant. We will try to see if it is possible, if it exists already, what the necessary pre-conditions might be and what it could consist of. I say this in front of Javier Solana which means that, as of course we will have to acknowledge everything that has already been done.

Up to date, Europe's role in a regional settlement for stability in the Middle East has been fairly restricted. Nonetheless, the EU is increasingly involved in the Middle East. Europe is devoting more and more of its financial resources to the region and it reportedly covers most of the financial requirements of the Palestinian Authority. Member states and EU contributions to the Palestinian Authority amount to EUR 1 billion. It was said that rather than a global player, Europe is a global payer. It seemed to pay more than it actually played in the political outcome of the difficult Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Europe is a neighbour of the Middle East. Can it define its interests independently? Can it define, conduct and implement a different policy compared to that implemented until now? To say that Europe is a player and a stakeholder in the Middle East, its nearest neighbour, needs to be specified somewhat. What is obvious to observers is that this geographic and cultural proximity, human links and the trade links, have proceeded to grow over recent years. This obviously has political effects. Europe is called upon to enhance its political presence. You wrote, in your report, that 50% of oil in Europe comes from this region; 20% of imports in the Middle East come from the EU; 35% of trade exchange (imports and exports) from and to Israel are with the European Union; Iran is the sixth largest energy supplier to the EU; European exports to the Middle East come to $188 billion and our imports $125 billion. For example, this may be temporary because of specific contracts, but I have noticed in the statistics that in 2008 the United Arab Emirates had become the eight largest customer of the EU on a footing with India, but larger than Brazil or Canada and South Korea. It is clear that these links are strengthening and that that has tangible consequences, the result being that the European Union has become more involved in the Middle East.

At the Schuman Foundation, we have found that about 6,000 European soldiers are present and involved in various policing or peace-keeping operations in the Middle East; there are two operations in Israel and one in Iraq. Commercial and partnership agreements between the EU and amongst all the countries in the regions have been signed or are in the course of discussion - including with Iran because there is a dialogue process there. The demographics are of importance to the EU because when you compare population growth of the Middle East and Europe's immigration problems, you see a very clear correlation. It is quite obvious that the question of radical Islam concerns Europe and that relations of the 27 EU member states with the various countries of the region depend on the resolution of conflicts or crises. The Iranian question, when it comes to the area of non-proliferation, is a specific issue that obviously impacts Europe's strategic thinking, particularly in the nuclear area.

In the Middle East, more than elsewhere, the EU is looking at its own image. It has tried to change its institutions with the Lisbon Treaty now in force since the 1 st December so as to increase its intervention capacity around the world, enhance its international presence. The first tangible applications of the Lisbon Treaty, of which we can engage the effectiveness of provisions of Lisbon Treaty, will probably one way or another be related to the situation in the Near and Middle East. Obviously, the absence of a common foreign policy over recent years has always weakened the Union's position in the Middle East. Diplomats within the EU have not always have the same point of view and there have been strong divides between positions of neutral countries, those who have clear, partisan choices with stakeholders in the Middle East, the countries for whom trade or economic links are important, and between global visions of stability in the region that are not always shared within the Union. This did not helped Mr Solana and will not make it easier for those who will be in charge of the common foreign policy going forward.

As a modest observer I would say that the transatlantic alliance and the way that it has been put together has not made it easier to generate a real European foreign policy and this is something we find in other relationships with Russia or China for example. It is hard for Europe to define its own specific interests. When you have the largest GDP in the world, which is what the EU has - 22% of global wealth - you do have specific interests. Jean-Claude Casanova wrote a very interesting article in Le Monde a few weeks ago: «the vulgate of the transatlantic discourse has been more like a stream of lukewarm water and has prevented Europe from defining its specific interests». This is particularly true of Middle East policy.

Third thing, the European Union is the champion of soft power. When you have Europe's history, and over the last 60 years when you have been able to turn things around, we understand that imperialist tendencies should be part of the past. There is no desire to revert to that. However, European soft power seems to be a sort of substitute foreign policy and it is not overstating the fact to say that European public opinion has the impression often that in the Middle East it is better to pay than to play. It saves your conscience, you feel you are taking part in solving a number of humanitarian problems, but that does not give you either a diplomatic or foreign policy and it is not necessarily serving the EU's long-term interest. The EU is the leading provider of credit, subsidy and all kinds of aid in the region. There is general support for that among diplomats and populations, and it also developed quite a number of programs. But the UE obviously suffers from a lack of credibility in foreign policy that might be explained by the lack of military credibility due to the lack of a real common defence policy.

With the ATALANTA operation off the coast of Somalia we saw that that does not have to be the way and that Europe is perfectly capable of mobilising and responding to specific needs. The EU is a driving force behind that international operation. China has decided to get involved in the international maritime force, which consists mainly of European forces under a British Admiral which shows that things can change there too. Even if this operation is very difficult, it has recorded some successes. There are currently 12 common foreign and security policy operations going on in the world which shows this level of involvement.

The EU is seeking to gain influence and clout in the Middle East. I would not venture to talk about Iran from the European viewpoint given that Mr Solana is here; he is the person running that show. I would say that Mr Solana's mission, supported by the trio of UK, France and Germany, has been very useful in the overall diplomatic effort. EU has shown that it can play a significant role in this difficult global strategic matter that affects, not just the region, but the whole planet.

You are aware of the EU positions since the Declaration of Venice and the right to self-determination for the Palestinians, since 1999, the right to statehood for Palestinians and the various recent positions expressed: in 2008 condemnation of the attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, condemnation in February 2009 of the Israeli settlements, and also of the Gaza operation in January 2009.

What one comes up with is that the EU pays more than it acts and when it does, it acts more on the side of victims. It does not act like a State, as it is not a State which has to act differently. That is the fundamental difference between the American and European positions.

In the light of all that, what might the outlook be? Is there a specific European message in the Middle East? On terrorism Europeans tend to suggest that there is a specific position and that they do not want to be stripped naked by a scanner because there is a terrorist risk in an airport. This is the whole question on the «war on terror» concept the Europeans do not accept and that even the Obama administration seems not to accept it now. Is there a European position that is specific in the Middle East? If so, which? What resources are they willing to dedicate to it?

Before looking at the content, one should look also at the means. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, clearly Europe wants to be involved in the settlement of that conflict. It provides financial resources but is it politically credible? It is more appreciated on the Palestinian side, whereas it is stymied, blocked on the Israeli side. As you saw during your trip, you were told that as you met the Hamas leaders you would not meet the people you wanted to meet in Israel. The the first problem for the EU is to have respect and credibility on both sides. I think that for the EU this is a vital point. Does the EU see itself as a growing power that is in the process of constitution? Or does it sees itself as a sort of customs union, Euro-driven? I think the EU has no choice: it must conceive itself as a power and it needs respect and credibility, not just from Palestinians but from Israelis as well.

I think that this should lead us to revise positions in some aspects of European Middle East policy. I am very struck by the German position. Obviously for certain reasons there are things that they cannot do there but Germany now has a presence in the maritime force off the coast of Lebanon and it has been involved in all the hostage problems. The German authorities were trusted by the Israelis and the Palestinians and we need to look at this example because the Shoah - the Jewish Holocaust - was committed in Europe and not just on the territory of what was Germany then. Therefore, it is the European Union's specific duty for the Jewish people.

Is the EU willing to commit militarily and provide guarantees? There can be doubts about that; however, it is a vital question on the table for the credibility of all our diplomatic actions.

Iran's nuclear bomb developments represent a challenge for the EU, as it would affect recent regional stability, increase the possibility of new conflicts and lead to regional proliferation. From a purely European viewpoint, I would say that the non-proliferation treaty is now in the spotlight again. 2010 has to be an opportunity for rethinking. There are two nuclear powers in Europe: UK and France. Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East would also result in weakened credibility of the French and UK nuclear deterrents. To date they are the only ones who have actually tried to cut their nuclear forces ahead of what the Russians and the Americans are thinking of, that is their arsenals reduction.

I do not make this linkage between military presence and deterrents of two independent European powers, that tend to stay independent. But do not forget that both President Chirac and President Sarkozy said the same, which is that France's vital interests are linked to those of European partners. It means that France remains nuclearly independent but considers that its vital interests are shared with its partners in the EU. France has just started operations in Abu Dhabi, opposite Iran. Therefore it claims its interests on behalf of France but also of a European position that might be shared.

As for Yemen, it is perhaps there that we can experiment with hopefully some success Europe soft power. Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the world that is not yet a failed state. There is a major financial program within the EU called the Stability Instrument which is very well funded. Migration problems between Somalia and Yemen are growing substantially. We have a presence in the region; we have our ships there. There are possible links between the situation in Yemen and international terrorism. This has to be one of the EU's priorities and the EU should get more involved in Yemen.

The new American's political scene means that for the EU there are opportunities to take initiatives. As for the resources involved, there has to be a pioneering group of nations that take initiatives that must be open to the other member states that are like-minded but we must not wait for the EU's normal procedures, even under the Lisbon Treaty, to produce a decision. The Lisbon Treaty makes it possible to make rather bold decisions.

We are working on this at the Foundation. This is one of our conclusions that the EU must conceive of itself as a global power with its strengths and weaknesses in the Middle East and elsewhere. Its credibility is under threat and with a little bit of courage and moving a little bit outside the normal European box it can have positive clout and contribute to solving the problems I've mentioned.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - Thank you, Mr Giuliani. You are a true silversmith, so to speak on this European material. Sometimes I wonder, Mr Giuliani, if European unity has progressed very much since the Venice Declaration. I am not entirely convinced of that. At the time it was not very difficult to define a common European position. Subsequently there was the Berlin Declaration. I do not know if in the interim we have made much progress. I am not at all sure. I get the impression that sometimes Europe is staying in place and having a hard time moving beyond a certain limit. If we could go beyond that frontier, then Europe could bring much more weight to bear than is currently the case.

I would like to give the floor now to Dr Muriel Asseburg. She heads the Middle East and Africa Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. You have the floor, Madam.

Dr Muriel ASSEBURG, Head of the Middle East and Africa Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs - Thank you very much. I want to point out that I am not speaking for Germany here. It is a German perspective, of course, but not an official stance that I will be taking. I would also like to say that I have enjoyed this event tremendously and I have enjoyed that we have gone into the details that characterise the region at this point in time and that characterise European relations with the region at this point in time. I also enjoyed reading the report a lot and I share a lot of the analysis and the general outlook that is presented in the report. What I would like to do now is to go through some of the recommendations that are given in the report and say where I would beg to differ with regard to the details but, as I say, not with regard to the general outlook that the report has offered. I would like to start by following one of the recommendations that is given in the report: to look at the region and taking into account the inter linkages between the different conflicts, between the different sub-regions, but at the same time, when we are trying to address the conflicts, then to tackle them separately and go one-by-one. In my intervention, I would like to concentrate on the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than addressing all of the conflicts we have been speaking about during this conference.

I would like to make five main points. The first remark is on the EU and how the EU could approach the problem institutionally - what you have termed `the framework' in your recommendations. The other four remarks are on the content of the approach and how I think it needs to be changed so as to make European action more effective in view of developments in the region and so as to allow the Europeans to move from conflict management - which is what we have been doing over the last 15 years or so - to conflict resolution.

Let me start with the first remark on the European framework. I share your pessimism with regard to positive changes that would come through the Lisbon Treaty. The institutional framework that has been set up does not automatically increase European unity and empower the Europeans to move forward with regard to foreign policy issues. To date, individual EU member States retain strong and diverging interests - in particular with regards to the Middle East. These differing interests persist, and therefore I very much support the idea that is put forward in the report: to have a small group of member states trying to flesh out policies on the Middle East, trying to not only define common interests but then to come up with a strategy on how to go about realising these interests. We should admit, however, that this is not a completely new idea because we have seen what has been called the Quint of Europeans working in exactly that kind of fashion. We have also seen that this has not solved the problem, i.e ., the architecture has not helped to solve the differences between the member States on important issues. It also has not helped to create the will among these member states to, in fact, come up with a common position that would not only complement American policies, but rather to try and see where Europeans differ - for good reasons - from the American approaches and take a different line of action, rather than just trying to do the footwork for the Americans as we have witnessed during the Annapolis process and in the Obama administration's first year.

My second remark concerns the content of such an approach. We have been speaking about the urgency of a renewed international engagement in the Middle East and of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. I do not need to reiterate why it is so urgent to come to terms. It seem to me, however, that Europeans have accepted, so far, that they do not have the power to influence events in the Middle East and that they have reduced themselves to complementing US policies. They have also not made peace-making a priority of their policies towards partners in the regions. The proceedings of the German-Israeli joint cabinet meeting have illustrated that. Germany, in particular, has made it a priority to improve relations with Israel without using its very good relations with Israel sufficiently in order to push the peace process forward. The German government has rather emphasised improving the relations with Israel, and even with the current Israeli government, which does not have the peace process as a priority.

There is urgency and there is a need for Europeans to see that indeed they can have more of an influence. I do not want to be misunderstood here as saying that they could replace the United States as the main power broker in the region, they surely cannot. But Europeans have their own interests in moving the peace process forward and in avoiding what can be seen on the horizon, i.e . the two-State solution very quickly becoming impossible to be realised and the next round of violence. When I say there is urgency, I am not saying that we should start a process now for the sake of having a process. I am all in favour of having negotiations, but negotiations do not make sense if they are not led by a credible mediator. That means that the international community, and above all the Americans, need to move from a position where they facilitate talks to a situation where they mediate talks. That includes some important elements: one of them being that there needs to be a blueprint for a final status. We all know what the main elements of this blueprint are. There is no reason at all to waste time right now on rediscussing these elements and these principles. They must be there as terms of reference and they should be presented to the parties very quickly so as to move forward. There should also be a clear mechanism to monitor the progress on both sides, to monitor steps which will bring us to the final status. At the same time, Europeans, and even better if in accordance with Americans, should set very clear incentives for moving towards final status as well as disincentives so as to make reinforcing the occupation of Palestinian territories and violence less palatable. I think Europeans have not been consequential enough in the tangible signals to the conflicting parties. As has been said, we have been evolving our declaratory positions and we have had a clear line in this regard, but we have not followed up with our actions in a consistent manner.

My third remark concerns the need to urgently tackle the Gaza Strip and Hamas. It is a shame to see how Europeans have neglected the Gaza problem; how we have made available considerable sums for reconstruction, but no reconstruction has happened due to the blockade. How, with our policies, we have contributed to strengthening rather than weakening Hamas. It is Hamas that has profited from the blockade - by means of taxation of the tunnel trade and from the isolation imposed on the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip. However, there is no way to tackle the blockade and to engage in reconstruction in Gaza without involving Hamas. Do we like them? Do we not like them? It does not matter. We do need them to be able to move forward and end the blockade and to allow for a life in Gaza that is up to acceptable human standards.

Let us be honest here: It is not as if we do not talk to Hamas. Of course we already talk to Hamas. And Israel is interested in us talking to Hamas to resolve some of the mutual issues. Also, we have seen over the last two years that more and more European politicians meet Hamas representatives. It would be much more useful if that would not just happen and we did not slowly soften our isolation of Hamas by accident -- but that we do so in a coordinated fashion and as an official policy with the goal of contributing to an end of the blockade, including to speak about what we need Hamas to do to allow that to happen. It also means that we should be talking about what needs to be done so as to allow the Palestinian institutions to get back their political legitimacy.

That brings me to my fourth point which is about institution building. Support for state and institution building is something that Europeans have prided themselves to be involved in for as long as the Palestinian Authority has existed in Gaza and the West Bank. In January 2010, we find ourselves in a situation where none of the Palestinian institutions has any kind of constitutional legitimacy. This makes it very difficult to keep pretending that we are building a democratic state in the Palestinian territories. We heard about the Fayyad Plan yesterday and about the idea of slowly building up a Palestinian State from the bottom and thereby de facto establishing this entity that would then be recognised by the international community. The Fayyad Plan has a lot of wonderful ideas with regards to setting up more efficient institutions and increasing the capacity of Palestinian governance. However, it lacks the answer to two of the difficult issues that have to be tackled if this plan is to be successful. The first challenge is: How can institutions be built in those areas where the Palestinian Authority does not have any authority or de facto control, i.e . in East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and in Area C of the West Bank. We have witnessed that there is an interest on the side of the Israeli government to support Fayyad's activities, at least as long as they do not conflict with Israeli interests. This support has also already been used as leverage for pressure. The second challenge that is not addressed in the Fayyad Plan is the question of how to deal with Hamas and the lack of Palestinian unity. Let me stress again, the Fayyad government will not be able to build legitimate and democratic institutions as long as political institutions lack constitutional legitimacy.

My fifth and last comment is on what you write in the report about the priority of the Israeli-Palestinian track. I absolutely agree that this should be the priority. At the same time, the question cannot be resolved if the regional dimension is not taken into account. You need the regional dimension for some of the final status issues: such as the refugee question, water management and security arrangements in the region. Also, if there were a successful parallel peace process between Syria and Israel that would have a positive effect on the Israeli-Palestinian dimension and on the Israeli-Lebanese dimension. And it might also have a positive effect with regard to the Syrian-Iranian relations - in the sense that we would like it to evolve.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - Listening to you, I begin to regret that the German Government does not follow your advice. I think that is well-informed advice indeed. Now I would like to give the floor to the Chatham House representative, Mrs Spencer.

Dr Claire SPENCER, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House - I think we agreed before we started this session we very much, on this occasion, want to hear your views, given that everyone is implicated in European policy and I would suggest, given your attendance here today and yesterday, very much implicated in this part of the world. So I will try to make my comments brief. I also, like my colleague, apologise for speaking English. I do wish to be quite frank and I am afraid if I try and do this in French I will be frank in the wrong way by the wrong choice of vocabulary. I am more than happy to respond to your questions in French, that is not a problem. I am one of those rare beasts, a francophone and hispanic British citizen and it is in that capacity I am speaking as an analyst and not as someone who can remotely explain British policy present and, I fear, forthcoming if we have a change of governments in the near future. We may find ourselves wasting time on debates which should be finished in Britain about Britain's role in Europe which I hope Chatham House can do something to kill off in the sense of being true and committed Europeans.

It is also a privilege to be here. I should have mentioned in my biography that I have acted twice in the capacity of Special Advisor to similar kinds of enquiries in the House of Lords in Britain. I greatly commend what you have done in this report because I think you can, in this kind of enquiry and by meeting people on the ground, be extremely frank and open and, if I may say, there are some very sensible things particularly about the wide-ranging changes in the region which you do not get unless you are actually there and talk to people on the ground.

My first European recommendation is since the most recent House of Lords enquiry into this area was on European Union policy and the European role within the Middle East peace process, that you actually find a way of liaising directly, I think you will find some of your findings and conclusions are very similar and it seems to me a bilateral forum indeed further afield if the Spanish Foreign Affairs Committee do similar things, actually strengthen the European Parliamentary reasoning for why policy has to change towards this region.

I am going to start with what sounds like a bit of a diversion. Just before I came here I had finished writing a chapter, at the request of the Director of Chatham House, on an assessment of Obama's first year as President of the US as it affects the Middle East. Very briefly there are six areas I think it is important for us to reflect on. We already heard yesterday from Rob Malley, Mike and other US perspectives, how the role of the US has changed. I think we should not think of the EU's role in the Middle East in isolation, not only the US primarily because the US role has changed the most, but obviously in distinction from the increasing role being played by China, India and states such as Malaysia. I think the politics of energy are now fundamentally changing the way regional actors engage in politics. Just look at the way Turkish policy has been changing just over the last few months. The givens about regional alliances are now changing in subtle and sometimes quite abrupt ways and I think this has a lot to do with these very brief conclusions. The way Obama has had to face the consequences of the US-led intervention - if I may use a neutral word here - intervention into Iraq in 2003 have changed things fundamentally for the US in the region in ways I do not think the US has quite come to terms with, although increasingly I think they are aware of their limitations and in ways I do not think have fully been recognised in European policy.

The first is until 2003 over a period stretching back to the first Gulf War in external terms, the second in regional terms, in otherwise Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the alliance which dispatched Saddam's forces out of Kuwait. There has been something loosely terms as Pax Americana . The US was forthwith, seen as the external arbiter, for people stepping out of line, shall we say, in the Middle East. Nobody was going to cross international boarders without paying a heavy price. Once that threat was fulfilled however, in the case of Iraq, suddenly the taboo of regime change, the taboo of moving across international boarders, of actors realigning themselves has now disappeared. I would argue that the most recent action we have seen of Saudi forces, admittedly in a defence posture, but nonetheless Saudi forces being active in Yemen, is a precedent we should certainly be aware would not, to my mind, have happened a decade before.

The US secondly is seen now as an actor in its own right within the region. We forget. We keep talking about US withdrawal as though it has already happened. The US is still in Iraq; it will be, in some capacity or other, present in Iraq to 2011. I should say that when we're looking at the future stability of Iraq I would also argue that the balance within Iraq would not stabilise until the US has finally gone. The US is still, in some sense, a local arbiter and a local player. This is the key point. The US is seen as an actor in the Middle East which, in turn, not only constraints what the US and US forces can do within Iraq, but elsewhere in the region precisely because they are bogged down and they have to at least take into account what happens to US forces in Iraq before they do anything else elsewhere.

The third conclusion which I think Rob Malley focused on most yesterday was this business of dividing the region into «us and them», «you're with us, you're against us». This has left repercussions in the region which falsifies the real debate, in other words, this has been imposed from outside but it has condition behaviour. People have, over the last seven years, been thinking in terms of whether what they do will be seen as reinforcing their position vis-à-vis the US or whether, in fact, it will be seen as buying into some of the popular resentments for US and other action in the region.

This in turn is related to the fourth point which is the military presence of the US and others in the region - and this relates to the earlier session on Al-Qaeda - has raised the temperature on anti-colonial sentiments which were always just below the surface within the region, that somehow outside forces only get involved in the Middle East when they want something for themselves, when they wish to control resources, people and actually stop the local, the people of the region, developing at their own pace and controlling their own destiny. This, as we know, has been exploited not only by the Jihad Al-Qaeda manifestations but by Iran, by the Syrians in some capacity when they have been opposed to the US by Hamas and Hezbollah. I agree entirely with Rob Malley that this is a trap. Certainly viewing the region in these «us and them» terms we should no longer fall into. It is not the case that you can wean Syria away from the Iranians. The Syrians, it seems to me, quite rightly wish to expand the amount of leverage and alliances and options they have in the regions, so you may win them over but it doesn't mean to say they will stop their connections with Iran - any more than the Turks, perhaps being less than effusive about their relations with Israel this week, are going to immediately jump over the fence and get into bed with Iran or the Russians or an alternative. No, it seems to me Turkish policy is very intelligently maximising their options and looking to expand their interests in the region. We should take this into account.

I hope you will see that all of this is pertinent to the way Europe engages in future in the region. It's also the consequences of 2003 and Iraq has forced regional actors - particularly in the Gulf, particularly amongst those we usually as a shorthand characterise as `moderate states', so Saudi Arabia, Qatar, to the annoyance of some but to the delight of others, obviously the Egyptians who are frequently and continually trying to broker peace between Hamas and Fatah, the Turks have been involved - to try and resolve regional differences themselves. This has partly been a reaction to staving off the worst consequences of the logic of some US and other policies, certainly in damage limitation, in terms of also managing their public opinions. Because if you are allied at the national level with the US sometimes your public opinion does not follow you quite so fast. The problem with this and it is a good sign if it is starting, is the lack of institutional follow-through. Most of these states do not have fully-fledged foreign ministerial bureaucracies of the kind that can actually sustain these initiatives over the longer period. I think one of the successes of this has been the launching of the Arab Peace Initiative which regrettably not been taken up as fulsomely as it should be. It is still on the table but I believe we are being told it will not be on the table for long.

The final consequence, and I think others have touched on this, is that all regional issues are now inter-related in the way that while I sympathise as Muriel has said with the idea of ring-fencing the way you try to manage a single issue, like Israel/Palestine, I think it is no longer the case that you can actually isolate it from what is actually happening with and in your relations with Iran and anyone else for that matter because regional actors, State and non-State as we see with the greater activism recently of Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon, if Robert Fisk of The Independent to be believed, they are now repaving roads in Southern Lebanon. Why? Because they are getting ready to attack Israel again should Israel go in and bomb Iran as much of the talk has touched on recently. This means that you cannot isolate Israel and its immediate neighbourhoods from Israel/Iran, how the Iranians will react and how a whole series of State and non-State actors will react in the region.

Now I think in all these issues, and I am saying this to provoke a debate, I think the European Union recently, as the European Union, has been really behind the curve. I am not saying this in any way to reflect on any representative of the European Union. I think it is the individual member States who have not quite resolved the conundrum . Perhaps eventually the Treaty of Lisbon and a European Diplomatic Service will do this but I think in the interim we have seen more of a breakout of bilateralism, by which I mean individual States like Britain, France, Germany, those with the capacity to engage individually with states in the Middle East doing so, with a certain amount of coalition of the willing, if you like, certainly vis-à-vis policy towards Iran in the EU Troika and certainly in the efforts mentioned by Jean-Dominique in peace keeping forces. There have been some positives but the question I put on the table: is it any more realistic to think of an EU fully-fledged policy which can be implemented at the 27-member level, particularly if we carry on expanding the European Union? Will it necessarily depend on putting together some kind of common position? The EU's position on the two-State solution for Israel/Palestine is a case in point which has stood the test of time despite the aberration of individual heads of State within the European Union, we still hold to this. The problem has been at the 27-member level, how do you translate that into a policy which you can actually implement? I think we should make a distinction here between common positions and common actions that we can actually make a difference.

I have already mentioned that the region is changing. I do think it is high time for an EU-level strategic review. This is flavour of the month in Britain, this is a British contribution. We are having strategic defence reviews, strategic-everything review with the change of government. Well I think it is now time for a strategic regional review of the Middle East, to actually question whether the division of the region in UE terms - along the Mediterranean and the union for the Mediterranean and the GCC and dialogues which run in parallel but are not strongly inter-related and ad hoc policy towards Iran and Iraq - serve the purpose of Europe any more? Here I am stealing a bit the ideas of Muriel and my colleagues at Friday, the Spanish Institute, particularly Richard Young and his colleagues who have written quite passionately about how it is now time. I hope you can find it on the website. It is certainly a paper that they presented to a conference in Rome in December which argues quite strongly that now is the time the EU needs a joined-up strategy, in other words no more union for the Mediterranean on one side and GCC dialogues on the other. We have to think more clearly about putting these two together.

I will say this, as someone who spent quite a lot of last year and the previous year looking into the union of the Mediterranean. It struck me we seem to be running policies along two different lines which are not sufficiently matched. On the one hand we have had an excessive securitisation over the last few years of EU policy at the political level. Looking at North Africa, what matters is stopping terrorism and stopping migration and if you like the externalisation of justice and home affairs chapters to the Mediterranean region, that is a reflection of this. The most important public sector State-to-State cooperation with North Africa is in the field of security, intelligence sharing and hopefully also in the prevention of migration. Whereas the whole tenor of the union for the Mediterranean, in the wake of there not being new funding through the Barcelona Channels, the previous Euro-Mediterranean partnership, has been to rely on the private sector coming forward to implement what in principle are some extremely good ideas about de-pollution of the whole Mediterranean basin and of exploring and investing in solar energy. Will a private sector company really invest in a framework which consists, at the last count, of 54 different states and entities, in other words the Mediterranean basin, plus the European Union 27, plus the Balkans and the Palestinian Authority obviously as a nascent but not yet state? If I were the private sector I would probably be more interested in a bilateral deal with Morocco and get on with it and not make any reference whatsoever to the regional dimension immediately or indeed to Brussels' institution. I think rethinking some of these models is urgent.

I will just touch on the substance since I have talked mostly about process. I think we should start thinking more in the long term. I think a lot of our policy has been reactive and we know the reasons why, the shortermism of electoral cycles. I would just say - and this is an area on which I have commented and I have commented with Israeli interlocutors - that the unconditional support of Israel from European governments hardly backed-up by the unease of the European public is not something I think is sustainable nor in the long-term interests either of the European States themselves and the individual leaders who are leading on this policy, or indeed for Israel itself. I think the best support - and I say this as a supporter of Israel and I am tired of debates which suggest that if you are a little bit critical of either side, whether it is Palestinians or Israelis, you are somehow on one side or the other - I, as an analyst and someone whose business is to promote peace, dialogue and debate, wish to see both States flourish. I think we are kidding ourselves if we do not engage in ways drawing from our own experience. Here I think I will say controversially particularly the British and French are implicated. Over the last 50 years it is not just the Germans who are implicated in this. We are implicated in occupying territories, under our previous colonial policy, of individuals and nations who did not wish to be occupied by us and in different ways we resolved these issues. I do not think either Britain or France has been left without scares or unfinished business for having chosen to leave their various bits of empires at different times and in different ways. I think we can fully explain to Israeli decision makers and I think we should engage much more with Israeli public opinion over what this historical experience does not so much for those on the receiving end - I think we heard very fulsomely of how the Palestinians have been affected by this. I personally am more concerned by how the Israeli are affected by this and their sense of worth, their sense of values and I say this as someone who worked in a Kibbutz in the early 80s and having seen the changes and they have been quite dramatic, the changes within the internal divisions within Israel. I think it is incumbent on us to help, as Europeans with parallel experiences and having made some dreadful mistakes of our own, actually to empathise. I think our better way of helping Israel get out of the conundrum it is in is actually to share much more openly some of this experience. I know some of this is unpopular but I would ask you to consider what the longer term consequences of the alternative is. If we really do not think the Israelis are making enough of an effort I would suggest that relying on pressuring various Israeli governments to give up settlement activity is, with respect, the same as trying to pressure the Iranians to give up nuclear enrichments. These are both governments who are either unwilling to do what is requested and do not have a domestic constituent support for doing what is requested at them at the behest of an international community which is asking them to stop this activity so publicly. It is the equivalent of political suicide.

A lot of what I am suggesting should be done much more behind the scenes in terms of a debate with Israeli - in which Palestinians may or may not be included because things are not 100% perfect on the Palestinian side - where we ask Israelis to envisage where they think they will be in the next 10, 15 years if this untenable status quo continues. I throw that out as intentionally provocative because I have not entirely made up my mind about it, but I am afraid our current policy is neither good for Israel nor not good for ourselves.

I have already mentioned Iraq. I think we will not see the way Iraq settles otherwise until 2011 is over and the US finally withdraws. I would raise a question mark as to whether the US may delay their withdrawal if things deteriorate or whether, indeed, Europeans in any capacity can envisage some kind of role, military or otherwise, within Iraq. What would happen if the US leave and Iraq deteriorates would be something we would have to plan ahead for.

Regarding Yemen, I think we should look at Yemen as a potential test case for approaching an issue that clearly we are only primarily interested in because of the security considerations but I welcome very much Secretary of State Clinton's assessment that this is now a test case for the economic and wider development needs of Yemen because this is the only way we will stabilise it. It is not being seen primarily as a way of bombing, sending in more forces, using the militaristic way. Maybe this is a test case and here I am being very optimistic for soft power because I know there is some very hard power issues involved, including the gun trade between Yemen and Somalia - and do not forget major trading routes are not just going to be attacked by pirates in future years if Yemen fails.

Finally, the big elephant in the room is how is the European Union planning ahead for what I perceive as a series - it may not be «crises» - but a series of succession issues? There are a number of leaderships and we have relied very much in recent years on personalised relationships within individual leaders, particularly in the Arab world, who one way or another will possibly and probably no longer be there in five to 10 years. Where is our strategy given the lack of institutionalised relations? With much of the Arab world we rely on personal relations. Where is the European strategy for what comes next? Who are our interlocutors? Are we going to be tempted by the way we approached Eastern Central Europe at the fall of communism where Western Europe prepared the terrain by getting involved, getting in contact with some of the opposition movements, with the democratic movements in these States so that when the communists' leaderships finally fell we were able to assist those groups of people to set up an institutional transition to democracy? We will not get democracy in the Middle East or the Arab world without the institutional frameworks to support this and we will not get this if we rely on personalised leaderships to deliver something which I would argue they neither wish to do nor they have an interest in doing. Thank you.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - Thank you, very interesting presentation. Now, I would like to open up to the audience. Do you have questions?

From the floor - The topic for this panel discussion was «In search of a European Middle East policy». Do you really think we can have a European policy without changing our European mentality? We saw this through US intervention in Iraq. I apologise Dr Spencer, but the British are much more pro-American; the Spaniards and the Poles followed suit; France took another stance; Germany, due to its history has to be very cautious; and Sweden also followed Germany's suit. Then there are other new countries that could do something but do not dare try. There are four different opinions here. Do you really believe that there is any hope of having some sort of common European policy for these Middle Eastern countries? There is a debate going on right now in the German parliament dealing with sending 1,400 addition troops in Afghanistan. There is huge debate on that point. We do not all have the same options and possibilities.

Dr Claire SPENCER, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House - Just as you, I am fairly sceptical. I am not at all convinced but fortunately every four or five years there are changes in European leadership so things can certainly change. That is why I was talking about a strategic review, talking about where we stood now in the Middle East and talking about what the price would be. It is only through the logic of incentives that you can do things. I am very pragmatic. Recent policy has been based on fear. We are afraid of others, we are afraid of terrorism, we are afraid of illegal immigrants. However, that is not enough. We have to change the rationale saying we need energy from the region, we need labour, we need a much more subtle policy that is in everyone's interest. Business can sometimes change a bit the speeches... I went to an interesting conference on energy policy in the region last week and I can say there is quite a difference from what the oil companies like BP or Italian ENI and so forth, and the experts on terrorism say. Our priorities are completely different from theirs. I am not saying leave everything up to the business world, but I am saying that you are talking about strategic interests for all that deals with climate change, solar power and so forth. It is all about striking a balance among the vested interests and going beyond preconceived notions.

The region has changed so much and we in Europe do not fully realise that. We feel it is enough to support yesterday's friends in order to change everything. But it does not.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - Mr Giuliani, how would you respond?

Jean-Dominique GIULANI, Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation - Well that is why I took the liberty of fielding the question in advance, in talking about principles. I think EU member states have shared interests very clearly in that region but the people in charge, due to reasons of domestic policy, economic and immediate considerations do not always have the courage to actually move from short-term interests to long-term interests. That is what has often happened in Europe. Europe has managed to make progress in the past because sometimes there were people who managed to get things going, who triggered movement and produced effects. Often they had to go against the national diplomacies and immediate short-term interests. Think of the 1950s and the steel industry. So you have to have the circumstances right and top level men and women in charge who are able to then move forward and bring everyone else with them. I honestly believe that is precisely the problem with the European Union and that is exactly why right now we are in a trough of things in the EU. We are managing things in a diplomatic fashion and yet these are political considerations, politics at the highest level in the highest sense of the term are required here. President François-Poncet would say this better than I but European's history is not written this way. It has always been about the right people during the right circumstances, including General De Gaulle who initially was not in favour of the community method but he changed tack and ended up coming on board entirely. When he came back to power he was actually pleased at the idea of the common market because it would teach liberalism to French business people. It is not at all what can be read in the press or what we can hear, that is to say the voice of political leaders.

When it comes to common foreign policy, unfortunately the first signs after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty are not good signals. Not because the right people are not in power - that is certainly not what I would be saying and certainly not publicly, even if conceivably I would have my own opinions - but because the motivation of decision makers that appointed them is to stay in charge and continue business as usual. I think that is not the right way to do things.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - Don't you think Mr Van Rompuy would be able to change this, to craft with a whip a single unified European policy?

Jean-Dominique GIULANI, Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation - We have to give him credit and he can prove very capable. It is a huge task. As to Mrs Ashton, I would be more categorical and negative, though.

Georges SACIN, Lebanese journalist - I have a very specific but not theoretical question about the European policy for the region. A few weeks ago the European consuls in Jerusalem drafted a remarkable report. It has now been shelved. What would you suggest to actually implement proposals made by the European consuls, for this to actually be implemented in the field? There were 12 proposals made which would be quite achievable fairly easily if there was the requisite political will. What would you suggest, Ladies and Gentleman?

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - Well, let me say that usually when you have this type of document that is drafted, it usually ends up on a shelf somewhere, on the backburner. If anybody thinks otherwise they are complete optimists.

Dr Muriel ASSEBURG, Head of the Middle East and Africa Research Division at the Germany Institute for International and Security Affairs - The Heads of Mission report that you have alluded to is an account of settlement activity in East Jerusalem, of house destructions in the Eastern part of the city and of the lack of progress with regards to Palestinian institutions there. Actually the report backs European positions and international policies as the roadmap. In a sense, we are back to phase 1 of the roadmap. If we are serious about Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem and if we consider, as we have done in the Council Conclusions in December 2009, that Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian State, then we should act accordingly and have an active policy according to which we meet Palestinian officials in East Jerusalem (as often as feasible). It would make a lot of sense to insist on meeting Palestinians in East Jerusalem, even it this is just a symbolic policy.

In the same vein, it would also make sense to be much more consistent on the settlement issue - we discussed yesterday in detail as to how that could be handled. In Europe, we have treated the issue of settlement products as a bureaucratic problem. It is not a bureaucratic problem, it is a political problem and we need to treat it as a political problem. Still, I would say the priority should be to get back to peace making and then, while getting back to peace making, insist on the terms of reference and they are, of course, the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Dr Claire SPENCER, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House - One way of getting this type of document discussed is to ask for the Senators or members of Parliament in the European Parliament of Brussels, but also within parliaments throughout Europe, to ask questions about this and to discuss this. We have the Prime Minister's Question Time that we can use for this. I would call the office of my member of Parliament to have him ask such questions as «Where is this report?» so that this can be discussed because it is an urgent matter. If you have been to Jerusalem recently you know that there is increased tension. We cannot just forget about this and let things wait another six months or a year. Things are very explosive. There are two very different views of history opposing each other. The frontline of the conflict is right there in the holy places in the ancient city of Jerusalem and it is a very serious matter. This is why we have got to really place pressure on the politicians. I agree with Muriel Asseburg entirely, it is a question of politics, not red-tape or management of individual settlements. Again, it is dangerous for Israel, for us and for the Palestinians.

Last time I was there I went to Tel Aviv and I saw that they do not want to know anything about what is going on in Jerusalem, they are sick of it. I get the impression almost that there are almost two separate societies. What is going in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem is completely different, they are very separate. That is very serious because people systematically talk about Israel and Israeli interests but actually who exactly do we mean there? It is a highly divided society and that is very dangerous. It is a question of field reality.

General Christian QUESNOT - I have a question for Dr Spencer on Israel specifically. I remember the most recent war with Hezbollah. What really struck me back at that time though was what was going in Haifa: the military, political and civilian authorities withdrew. It was almost like the withdrawal 1939-1945. I felt the deep nature of the Israeli state was changing. The last immigrations from Russia have really changed the nature of Israeli state. At that time the sons of the Prime Minister avoided military service. You mentioned Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Tel Aviv is hedonistic; it is a case of `everyone for himself' there. It seems to me that the fighting spirit that used to be behind the Israeli state has now been reduced. Israelis that never wanted peace with Arabs - if they had people would have known about it - and their policy was to continue repressing Arabs and fighting with them every four or five years. They were good tacticians but not good at strategy. Currently, due to the changes that are taking place, how do you think the mindset of Israeli politicians, of all ilk, can be changed?

Dr Claire SPENCER, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House - It is a very complex matter and again I am not here to criticize Israel as such. I am just observing domestic divisions and, therefore, deciding that Europe has a responsibility to try to help the Israelis that really are looking for peace. They are still very much in the majority, according to all the polls. Some people would prefer a completely Jewish Israeli state from the West Bank to the sea but that is not realistic. We have to engage with Israeli society as opposed to imposing limits and preconditions because it has never worked with Israelis. You have to speak with them in terms of their long-term interest. We need to explain to them that «we are here to help them move on their long-term interests». If we just constantly criticise them it is not going to work. I am no Israeli but I am very pleased to see what the Israelis did. They were the first to arrive in Haiti; they did magnificent work there. The Israeli doctors and so forth were onsite in Haiti right away, very well organized. This just goes to show the very humanitarian side to Israelis whereas for the British, and I can say this as a British subject. My mother spent her childhood in India and I talked a lot with her about her time in India. I asked her about colonial times and what she was doing there then and she would say to me, «It was not all bad». We left in 1947; we understood the situation with Gandhi very well. She was young at the time and her father decided. Similarly in France and Algeria, people understood the situation and actually left in the end. This is a similar idea. We need to discuss this with the Israelis in terms of historical change in the Israeli state. It is a very young state. I am certainly not trying to criticize any internal workings and what impact immigration may have had. It did change the nature of Israel. We need to be addressing all of this, not just the political leaders.

All Israeli political leaders have continued with a policy of occupation and settlement of the West Bank. The political class will not be making the change. It is the Israeli society that will be making a change, saying, `That is enough, it is not in our interest'. We have to be engaging with civil society.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - I was glad to hear you compare British policy in India with French policy in Algeria.

Dr Claire SPENCER Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House - I just meant not policy, but the principles of occupation.

Philippe MIGNAVAL - Europe is an economic giant and a political dwarf. It does not exist in that respect. Mr Giuliani used the very true words to say that it was a question of will and courage. The word «courage» was used several times and it is very interesting and important. We actually accepted the situation because we turned Europe into a sort of extended free-trade area. The question therefore is: in a Europe with 27 members, operating on the basis of consensus, in other words, where political decisions are basically blocked, can we then really expect to make any progress? Is this realistic? Is this courageous? Or are there any alternative solutions? Specifically, would it be possible to make progress with a smaller number of countries to reach some truly political objectives so that we could end up having a Europe that is a political power as well?

Jean-Dominique GIULIANI, Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation - « When I examine myself I worry but when I compare myself I am reassured», said Plato. We must not be too hard on ourselves. The European Union is not a political dwarf. It does not have the political power that would be commiserate with its economic power, which is true. There are 70,000 European troops in external operations right now; they are ranked second after the United States. We have achieved with 501 million European inhabitants is to establish the biggest worldwide market. We had to begin with that. If just after the Second World War we had raised sovereignty issues, which are controversial and difficult, the answer would have been no. Maybe we would need to ask President Françoise-Poncet who is more familiar with this than me. In 50 years we have achieved results we could never have imagined. It was unimaginable really to break with 600 years of conflict - a period of 600 years during which France was in conflict at least once every 30 years with one of its neighbours or one of the European powers. That time is over. It has come to an end for quite some time, possibly forever. This is a unique success story in the history of mankind and an economic success. If you look at pictures of the post-war period and you look at statistics it was unimaginable for Europe to turn itself around like that, to re-establish itself. I share your impatience completely but we also have to realise that we have 2,000 years' history with different identities, collective memories, a collective way of interpreting history and then individual memories that are still marked by conflicts that have taken place. We still have survivors of the major European wars.

I share the impatience through the Schuman Foundation; we try modestly to act as a driving force of the European model. I said that really we are at a time of low tides, so to speak, in Europe. Europe has grown-up; it is experiencing the global economic crises and also its own crisis. Maybe right now we do not have the very excited major European leaders but it was a dream that has really been turned into reality. In today's world there is not any natural disaster, any conflict where Europe is not active and is not called on - in Indonesia, in Africa, in South America or Haiti. Now we are very much stakeholders, very much participating, not separately as French or British, not with the nostalgic view of an empire, but efficiently. Europe is different to what we have been accustomed to. We have to do everything to move forward and to become that. The Lisbon institutions, and not just them, make it more and more possible for us to make the decisions, not unanimously but using procedures based on a majority decision. It is the same procedure since 1950. It is through having shared interests, as we have to do locally to solve problems, that we can manage, not to reach consensus but agreement so that some can move forward faster than others. Do we need pioneer groups? Personally I say `yes' on global subjects of strategic importance like nuclear proliferation or the Middle East. I feel countries within the European Union that do have a global diplomatic network shoulder a special responsibility. Three or four of them could do a few things, and that is what they do. The European spirit is we must always leave the door open for any member states, including the smallest that want to join in on an initiative. Clearly when we are talking about nuclear issues with Iran or in the Security Council, we cannot do this with all 27 member States.

Jean FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Senator, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Co-author of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee's report on the situation in the Middle East - If you look at the history of European integration since May 9 th 1950, you can see various periods of time when Europe did not really move forward. You will not ever see times though when Europe actually backtracked. European integration has never gone backwards. It has continued to progress, sometimes very timidly and slowly; sometimes it even stagnated. Europeans such as myself and Mr Giuliani feel it is unfortunate that the pace is often quite slow. The Lisbon Treaty is an enormous step forward. What the actual achievements will be? We do not know yet. Will a European foreign policy actually come of this? The states have not given up their sovereign rights in terms of defining foreign policy. There can be some cacophony, though certainly a great deal of progress has been made.

Friends, it is time for conclusions, for the final fireworks, by the eminent European Mr Solana who, as you know, was in charge of European Foreign Policy. He did this with great diplomacy and great authority and he will be making the concluding comments for our symposium. It is a real pleasure for me to see that this symposium has been so interesting and that so many of you have attended, been here from the start to the end.

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