SENAT
Report n° 117 (2007-2008) by M. Roland COURTEAU, Senator (for the parliament office for the evaluation of scientific and technological choices) - Appendix to the minutes of the 7 December 2007 session
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B. THE RECOMMENDATIONS
Taking into account what has already been said, your rapporteur would like to make two types of recommendation: structural recommendations that apply to all of the basins and which together constitute as many prerequisites to an effective French contribution to the setting up of a tsunami warning system, and basin-specific recommendations, which take into account the particularities of each sea or ocean and of the varying tsunami-vulnerability of the French coasts.
1. Two introductory remarks
Your rapporteur would first like to make two remarks, that the government should not only keep in mind while it considers the preferable structure for a tsunami warning system, but also communicate and comment upon.
The first remark concerns the particularities of the tsunami hazard and their consequences for risk management.
Tsunamis are rare phenomena which require the use of sophisticated detection devices and extremely reactive warning systems, considering the brevity of the reaction times and the risk of issuing false warnings. The choices made regarding the warning system's final structure will depend on weighing the system's costs against the frequency of the hazard. This arbitration must be finalized in a transparent manner and included in all of the early emergency-assistance plans.
The second remark underlines the limits of a warning system.
Contrary to popular opinion in France, there is no such thing as "zero risk". Even if an effective tsunami warning system is eventually set up, it will not be able to prevent the loss of human life under any and all circumstances. Indeed, while the impact of regional and tele-tsunamis can be greatly mitigated, the means available to protect against local tsunamis - which strike the coast only a few minutes after being generated - are more limited. The only effective course to take to protect against local tsunamis is to teach the concerned populations the correct reflexes. It is essential, therefore, that this message be communicated, in order to avoid any misunderstanding between the civil-protection authorities and the population.
2. The structural recommendations
The structural recommendations can be divided into four main lines: defining a coherent warning system; establishing a long-term, perennial budget; integrating the tsunami risk into a multi-risk approach for the acquisition of sea-level measuring devices; and experimenting (on a voluntary basis) with the management of local-tsunami warnings.
a) Defining a coherent warning system
There are five preconditions to setting up a coherent warning system: naming a general coordinator; using appropriate measuring devices; relying on a thorough understanding of the hazard; responding appropriately to the hazard; and raising public awareness.
(1) Naming a general coordinator
Designing a tsunami warning system necessitates a great many partners, with varied and sometimes contradictory operating structures, interests and concepts of the final tsunami warning system. A general coordinator is therefore doubly necessary.
The general coordinator would be responsible, firstly, for defining, along with the various bodies associated with the project, the project's main lines, in order to ensure its internal coherency. He/she would therefore have to finalize the content of and coordinate France's contributions in the four basins. He/she would also ensure, in collaboration with the National Committee of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, that France participates at the meetings of the 4 intergovernmental coordination groups and that it is represented in each working group. The National Committee must therefore enjoy sufficient funding to finance the participation of the French delegates at these meetings and assume the role of the secretariat.
Secondly, the general coordinator would be responsible for determining everyone's responsibilities and missions and establishing a project calendar.
There are two conceivable avenues of reflection:
- The creation of an interministerial delegation modeled after the Post-Tsunami Interministerial Delegation: this structure has proved effective in carrying out a concrete project involving a great many partners over a set period of time.
- The assignment of this managerial role to the Department of the Sea: several arguments could be made in favour of this solution. Firstly, this department is under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. This privileged position provides it with an indisputable authority over its partners and allows it to speed up arbitration in the event of a disagreement. Secondly, this department is used to working with several other bodies concerned with setting up a warning system (SHOM, IFREMER) and is therefore well familiar with how they operate. Finally, the success of Extraplac 70 ( * ) (coordinated by the Department of the Sea) testifies to its ability to manage a similar project. It appears likely that the government will choose this solution.
While it is not the role of your rapporteur to finalize all of the details of the final structure of France's future tsunami warning system, he nevertheless believes that it should include the creation of a national warning centre managed by CEA, whose short-term field of operations would cover warnings in the Mediterranean/northeast Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean in the event of a tsunami estimated to arrive 15 minutes or more after the detection of the tsunami-generating event. Once this system is up and smoothly running, a second stage could extend the mission of the national warning centre to cover local tsunamis in predefined zones equipped with the necessary measuring and warning devices.
Furthermore, this national warning centre will also have to act as a regional warning centre in the western Mediterranean, the Caribbean and the western Indian Ocean zone, in collaboration with the other regional centres.
* 70 Extraplac is the French programme to extend the continental shelf. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea applies to the world's oceans: the use of oceanic resources, navigation, prospecting and sea-bed mining. This convention authorizes, under certain conditions, coastal countries to extend the marine zones under their jurisdiction beyond the limits of their exclusive economic zones. Extension requests will be examined by a special UN commission before 13 May 2009. France has therefore decided, via the Extraplac project, to prepare its requests for all potential extension zones.