Going nuclear in the Middle East

CONCLUSION

The Middle East is complicated, but no more so than Europe. And, unlike Europe, it is undergoing fast demographic, cultural, economic and political change.

The Middle East has areas of fragility, including Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon. Questions remain about Al Qaeda, Egypt and Syria but positive trends are under way in Saudi Arabia and nearly everywhere in the Gulf. Little except good things is said about Jordan and Oman. Happy are peoples who have no history, Hegel said.

The French have a sometimes-approximate vision of the Middle East based on poorly known history and cut-and-dried judgments. We see these peoples and their culture as irremediably different from us, in particular because of religion, reducing them to that dimension too often, which masks a search for their identity. Religion has also forged identity and shaped history in Europe, leaving traces of blood and iron there. Are the tensions between Shiites and Sunnis so different from those that once existed between Catholic and Protestants?

The Middle East is as far from Europe as eastern Russia. Its history is much more connected to ours than that of Asia. Its future concerns us more directly than that of South America or Oceania. It would be a mistake to be uninterested in it.

If the West reveals itself incapable of ensuring a future for the Palestinian people, the East will remember, considering it Israel's protector. If the West reveals itself incapable of preventing Iran's nuclear program from leading to a military arsenal, the entire region will certainly go nuclear, which would not be a factor of stability.

The United States embodies the West in the Middle East's eyes. They are omnipresent but their image is murky. America was hated under George W. Bush but is attractive with Barack Obama. The new president has a big part of the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran in his hands. But he will not manage to make peace alone. The Europeans can help him if they finally decide to let the Union play its part as a great power.

The two problems, Palestine and Iran, are not connected but feed off one another and serve as an excuse for procrastination. Europe has an interest in working together with the United States on finding a peaceful settlement in both cases.

It is also important to keep Yemen from falling into anarchy and to help Iraq in its difficult rebirth.

Hopefully, this report will help meet those diplomatic challenges.

Reports before the committee on trips to the Middle East

First trip - Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar
from October 19 to 30, 2008
(report of January 12, 2009)

First, Monique Cerisier-ben Guiga recalled the various trips to the Arabian Peninsula, which successively brought the delegation to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. She said the mission had been preceded by 19 hearings of diplomats, researchers and intelligence officials. The delegation complemented the 46 interviews with readings that shed light on the issues, in particular the political balance in Saudi Arabia and how the Saud family imposed its legitimacy on the tribes. She wanted to contribute sociological, geographical and historical details to round out remarks by Jean François-Poncet.

When Didier Boulaud asked her about Usama bin Laden's origins, she said he was from a wealthy, prominent Yemeni business family, allied with families in the Hedjaz area, with roots in the Hadramaout region bordering Saudi Arabia.

She said that although the Arabian Peninsula is rife with regional idiosyncrasies and mistrust, it is viewed as a whole. Two countries are highly populated: Saudi Arabia, which is very rich, and Yemen, which is very poor. The population in the other States is mainly foreign. There are just 800,000 native-born Dubaians in Dubai; the majority of the rest of the population is made up of Indians, Vietnamese and Nepalese, which poses a real problem of identity and national existence.

The region's other big challenge is lack of water. In Yemen, not even the main cities have fresh supplies of clean drinking water. Dubai has no water purification plants, which leads to some rather frightful situations.

Yemen has the fastest-growing population, which is one reason the Saudis are considering building a wall along the border.

Chairman de Rohan said Yemen looks like a perfect prey for Islamists.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said Yemen, a recently unified State where the government is at the end of its rope, could turn into another Afghanistan. The president keeps the country under control with a "checkbook" policy. Refugees pouring in from neighboring Eritrea and Somalia are an additional source of destabilization.

Mr. François-Poncet said one of the mission's main goals was to publish a report on the Middle East situation, which would be followed by a symposium. The report must focus on the region's main problems and prospects, keeping what European policy should be and France's position and interests in mind. He said that in addition to four trips to the region, a mission was planned for the United States, whose policy is one of the unknowns for the Middle East's future.

Mentioning the many hearings the rapporteurs held, he said he was struck by the competence of the people working on the issues in France. He added that travel to the Arabian Peninsula met two needs: getting an idea of what its problems are and finding out how its leaders see the Middle East.

He said that although many of the analysts heard described Saudi Arabia's situation as pre-revolutionary, that was not the delegation's feeling. After the period of great uncertainty following the events of 2003, Saudi Arabia has remained the region's pillar and most populous State, whose regional and global role, in particular as the world's leading oil producer, is still considerable. King Abdallah, who as crown prince exercised the reality of power for a long time, is a firm, cautious man and a determined reformer. In 2006 he had a succession law passed setting up an allegiance council that includes King Abdelaziz Ibn Saud's children or their descendents. Its 35 members are in charge of naming the king's successor. It is assisted by a medical committee, which can declare whether or not the king is incapacitated. It is a stabilizing body, which is necessary because the generational transition to King Abdelaziz's grandchildren is a potential source of destabilization.

Effective, intelligent police work and political reinsertion of people involved in terrorist attacks, a program financed by rising oil prices, have restored domestic security.

Saudi Arabia, which has huge financial resources--$550 billion in reserves--is pursuing a smarter economic development policy, including diversifying and building infrastructure, than it did during the first two oil crises.

Nevertheless, it has some weak points.

The country has seven million foreign workers, a Shiite minority in the oil-producing areas and an Ismailian minority on the border with Yemen.

The middle classes consider themselves ignored compared to the clerics and youth unemployment is high. But society, in particular the situation of women, who play a growing part in companies and government offices, is changing.

Saudi Arabia's oil, financial wealth and role as the guardian of holy places give it considerable regional and global power. Its international positions are taken very seriously. King Abdallah's peace plan proposed Israel's return to its 1967 borders in exchange for the normalization of relations with all the Arab States. At President Karzai's request, Saudi Arabia has started acting as a mediator with the Taliban.

Mr. François-Poncet said small indigenous populations are one of the Gulf States' most significant features. Qatar is the world's leading natural gas producer and has proportionate financial resources. The country's political and security role has less to do with its own military means than with the presence of US forces in the region and its diplomacy, which contributes to negotiations on regional crises. France has stepped up its role in the Emirates, where Abu Dhabi is its main ally. In 1996 France and Abu Dhabi signed a defense accord leading to the opening of a French military base.

Mr. François-Poncet said Saudi Arabia views Yemen as a failed State, which is not yet the case. Whole regions lie outside the central government's control. Government forces have failed to put down the Houti rebellion in the Zaydite north. The south, which was autonomous for a very long time, has virtually seceded. The rest of the country is made up of high valleys populated by very autonomous tribes. Hostage-taking and attacks have occurred. The US embassy came under assault in March 2008. Bin Laden's general staff and some Yemeni groups seem to be communicating on a regular basis, but there is no sign of relations with Iran.

Yemen, which has a very high birth rate, is the Achilles heel of regional security. It needs our attention. Saudi Arabia is weary of financing the country, where corruption is rampant, and has decided to build an electronic border fence.

President Saleh has been voted into office twice by universal suffrage in free and fair elections but his authority barely stretches beyond the capital, which does not give a very reassuring image of Yemen.

Mr. François-Poncet said that although the Arabian Peninsula's States stress the Palestinian question, the issue they care about most is the nuclearization of Iran. Saudi Arabia is closely following the events in Lebanon with the feeling that Iran will not give up its influence and drag out the negotiations. Questioned on what to do, officials said they oppose strikes on Iran, whereas think tanks believe that Iran is in no way inclined to give up its military nuclear program.

All of them think Iraq will not break up and are extremely critical of President Bush. None considers the withdrawal of US troops a serious possibility.

Second trip - Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine,
January 18 to 31, 2009.
(report of February 3, 2009)

First, Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga mentioned the delegation's visit to Syria, which is made up of several communities, including a Sunni majority and Christian, Alawite, Druse and Kurd minorities. The government manages to keep the country together with an iron fist while at the same time seeking a certain degree of economic openness.

Hard-line opposition to Israel helps the Syrian regime ensure its cohesiveness and win support from public opinion, but its diplomacy actually tries to keep several balls in the air: the Golan Heights, Lebanon, support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and relations with Turkey and France, with which it has a complex history of attraction and hard feelings crystallizing around the Lebanese question.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga reported on the interview with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Damascus, specifying that the initiative came from the mission's members and was organized without any help from the French embassy. Hamas has become a key player in the region and, however one might feel about the organization, hearing what its main leader has to say seemed to make sense.

In a long interview, Mr. Meshaal presented himself as a political leader to be reckoned with. At no time was his discourse religious or ideological.

With regard to Israel's recent military intervention in Gaza, he said the Gaza Strip's inhabitants reaped no benefits from the truce Hamas had managed to impose on its troops from August to December 2008 because Israel did not lift the blockade in exchange. In that context, he said, Hamas had no choice but to break the truce.

He said the scale and brutality of Israel's reaction took Hamas by surprise. The UN put the Palestinian death toll at 1,300, half of them women and children.

Mr. Meshaal said Hamas, which only lost around 50 fighters during the Israeli offensive, actually emerged stronger from the operation. It not only still controls the Gaza and can launch rockets into Israel, but also put up resistance he called "legendary". Hamas has gained genuine legitimacy on three occasions: the first time by becoming a national Palestinian movement, the second by winning elections and the third by resisting Israel's offensive. Mr. Meshaal said Hamas must therefore be recognized as an interlocutor and a key player in the Palestinian arena, especially since Fatah and PLO have lost the Palestinian people's respect by collaborating with Israel during the conflict.

He said the Hamas Charter, which contains many anti-Semitic references, could be abandoned when Israel recognizes the Palestinian State in its 1967 borders. Until now, he said, neither Yasser Arafat nor Abu Mazen have obtained anything in exchange for recognizing the State of Israel.

Mr. Meshaal said Hamas wants recognition of the Palestinian people's national rights and that Europe can a have a part to play since the United States has failed in its role as mediator.

Then Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga discussed the situation in Lebanon, where all the political parties are focusing on next June's elections.

Lebanon has three separate communities. It is one-third Sunni, led by Rafik Hariri's son, Saad; one-third Shiite, with the Amal militia, which hardly matters anymore, and Hezbollah, led by Nassan Nazrallah; and one-third Christian divided into two camps: the Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geaga and his ally Michel Murr, who are allied with the Sunnis, and General Aoun, who, with the other half of the Christians, is allied with Hezbollah and Syria. Walid Jumblatt's Druzes protect their interests the best they can.

In these conditions, it looks as though the Christians will determine the next elections' results by joining one or the other of the dominant communities, enabling the formation of a coalition government.

The fact that Hezbollah stayed on the sidelines during Israel's Gaza offensive shows that it may not be Iran's or Syria's "puppet", as some people think, but that Lebanese politics is its top priority.

UNIFIL has managed to enforce a certain degree of order in southern Lebanon despite the Israeli air force's daily violations of Lebanese airspace.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said no Israeli official except Haim Oron, leader of Meretz, the Zionist left party, agreed to see the mission's members because they had met Mr. Meshaal. However, the mission did meet some interesting figures, including Avi Primor, Israel's former ambassador in Germany, and representatives of think tanks.

The mission came away from its visit to Israel with the overall impression that the country has never seemed safer, except in the center-west where people are traumatized by Hamas rockets, which strike and kill at random. In those conditions, the remaining insecurity seems all the more intolerable.

Israelis are frustrated and have the feeling that they were paid back for handing over Gaza with rocket strikes on southern Israel, killing 25 people in eight years, and that Hamas deserved a "good lesson". The delegation met Franco-Israelis in Ashkelon, who were directly targeted by the rockets and movingly told us about the difficulties of their daily lives.

According to polls, it looks as though Benyamin Netanyahu will lead the right to power in the next legislative elections and form a coalition with Ehud Barak's Labor Party, the far-right leader Avigdor Lieberman and the ultra-orthodox Shaas Party. The center-right Kadima Party and Tzipi Livni will probably be the elections' losers.

The Israeli army's Gaza intervention seems to have further widened the gap between the economically and socially marginalized Israeli Arabs and the rest of the population.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga then talked about the trip to the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza.

First the mission went to the Palestinian Authority's headquarters in Ramallah, on the West Bank, where it held several interviews, in particular with Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad.

Then the mission went to the Gaza Strip, where it observed the destruction Israel's military intervention caused. The events in Gaza cannot, strictly speaking, be called a "war" because there were no armed clashes with Hamas fighters, who avoid combat, but the offensive began with massive, targeted air raids followed by an invasion of tanks.

Gaza is not Dresden and most of the city's buildings are still standing. The Israeli strikes were extremely targeted so it is hard to assess the "collateral damage". But the Israeli army seems to have deliberately targeted the American school, Palestinian Red Crescent hospital, UNWRA warehouse, which contained seven million euros worth of food and medicine, industrial zone (324 factories) and mosques.

The delegation can attest that the Israelis used phosphorus bombs in at least two cases, on the Red Cross hospital and the United Nations warehouse. Several non-governmental organizations have confirmed that Israeli soldiers massacred the Samouni family in Zeitoun.

The UN puts the death toll of operation "cast lead" at approximately 1,300 on the Palestinian side, half of them women and children, and three civilians and 10 soldiers on the Israeli side.

Israel seems politically too weak and militarily too strong to make peace.

Its political weakness comes from parliamentary system based on a unicameral legislative branch whose members are elected by full proportional representation, which means that the prime minister is constantly subject to blackmail by the small parties in his coalition upon which the government's survival depends, like the Fourth Republic in France during the Algerian War.

Israel's military might also discourages a political solution. The universally recognized effectiveness of Mossad and Israeli intelligence, and the superiority of the Israeli air force, which is bigger than its French counterpart, make the country invincible in a conventional war. Ben Gurion set up that strategy because of Israel's small size and the large populations of the countries surrounding it. Israel can and must never be taken by surprise.

The Palestinians are too isolated and divided to make peace. In Arab opinion, the Palestinian Authority looks like Israel's "collaborators" and Hamas like "resisters". That situation may considerably undermine the moderate Arab States, especially if they are facing succession problems at the top, which is the case in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Before the Gaza conflict, some people thought the Iranian question was the most important Middle East issue but events have shown that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is central. Israel's Gaza offensive has further complicated the peace process. Everybody agrees on the idea of two States within the 1967 borders, but the dismantling of Israeli settlements on the West Bank would probably cause a veritable civil war. Yet hope springs eternal. Israel's release of Marwan Barghouti could foster inter-Palestinian reconciliation.

Barack Obama's desire to become involved in the peace process, which he demonstrated the day after his inauguration by appointing a special envoy, Senator George J. Mitchell, is a good sign.

Europe can have significant influence if it remains united and speaks with a single voice.

Mr. François-Poncet made the following observations:

- It will be hard to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran because their opposition to Saddam Hussein in the past and to the Kurds and Israel in the present has forged strong ties between them.

Iran and Syria are likely to continue backing Hamas and Lebanon's Hezbollah unless Israel gives back the Golan Heights. Then Syria could consider loosening its ties Iran. For the moment the alliance between the two countries is strong.

- The interview with Khaled Meshaal left the feeling that Hamas is willing to negotiate with Israel in conditions close to those of the other Arab parties.

- In Lebanon, the Christians' division paradoxically contributes to their electoral strength because they will determine the next elections' outcome. The Shiites on one side and the Sunnis on the other probably have the highest number of potential votes as they can obtain in their respective constituencies and the Christians will tip the scales one way or the other.

- The delegation has the feeling that Israel is at a dead end. It rejects a viable Palestinian State within the 1967 borders as well as the alternative solution of a multiconfessional State integrating the Arab population. That raises questions about its medium and long-term strategy. In the absence of a clear strategy, Israel's rejection forces the country to pursue its current policy, which is heading straight into a wall.

- The development of the political situation in Israel, with the orthodox clerics' rising power, including in the army and its upper ranks, and the voters' swing to the right, if not the far right, is hardly reassuring. The Israeli Arabs' marginalization may create serious internal tensions that sooner or later will lead to a bold affirmative action policy.

- Israel's Gaza offensive was relatively successful militarily but, like the 2006 intervention in Lebanon, a political failure. Hamas emerged from the trial stronger. The real political loser is the Palestinian Authority: Israel has no veritable interlocutor to make peace. The release of Marwan Barghouti would help overcome that hurdle by encouraging inter-Palestinian reconciliation and helping to revive the peace process.

- The new US president's expressed willingness to become involved issue and his appointment of a special representative who knows the region well are positive signs that will force the United States to make headway in the peace process.

- The dismantling of Israel's West Bank settlements and the question of Jerusalem will be the peace process's main stumbling blocks.

- Iran, which has more influence on Hezbollah and Hamas than Syria, has become a key player in the region.

Specifying that she was speaking in a personal capacity, Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said she was extremely shocked by the Israeli army's brutality in Gaza, which looked like a collective punishment inflicted on a people and challenged the international community.

She said Europe has a special responsibility to investigate those acts and, if need be, condemn them, and that it must use all its influence to help the parties reach a lasting peace in the region.

Chairman de Rohan thanked Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga and Mr. François-Poncet for their report before recalling that the president of the Republic and the government conduct France's foreign policy but parliament is free to make all the contacts it deems necessary to inform itself as completely as possible before everyone can make their own political conclusions in the respect of the principle of responsibility.

Nathalie Goulet voiced regret over the French government's passivity during Israel's military intervention in Gaza. Mr. de Rohan disputed that analysis, recalling that France had been very involved, with President Sarkozy and the foreign affairs minister making several trips to the region that led to a United Nations Security Council resolution and a peace plan jointly drafted with Egypt.

When Ms. Goulet asked what the mission's next step would be, Mr. de Rohan said it would write a report and organize a symposium on the situation in the Middle East.

Mr. de Rohan also recalled the debate on the issue in the National Assembly and Senate.

When Jean-Pierre Chevènement asked if the publication of a report would be timely, Mr. François-Poncet answered that a third trip to Egypt, Iraq and Iran was being considered, as well as a visit to the United States in order to meet representatives of the new administration, and that only afterwards would an overall report be written with the ambitious goal of summarizing the Middle East's present trends and prospects.

Robert del Picchia said that, considering Israel's electoral system, the victory of the right and of Benjamin Netanyahou was not a foregone conclusion. He added that he had recently met the assistant director-general of UNWRA, the United Nations agency in the Palestinian territories, who told him, with regard to the Israeli army's bombardment of the agency's premises in Gaza, that Hamas had never used the building's underground levels. Then he asked about the Israeli intervention's effects on the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga replied that the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt would remain as long as Israel did not lift the Gaza blockade because they are the only way for the Gaza Strip's Palestinian population to obtain food, goods and medicine.

She also mentioned Israeli polls, which indicate that the right is gaining ground, although the full proportional voting system is a factor of uncertainty.

Quoting several representatives of Israeli think tanks, according to whom the military intervention in Gaza was just an "experiment", she said that when terrorism hit France, in particular when the Drakkar building was destroyed in Beirut, it did not raze the Shiite villages in Bekaa and that the United Kingdom never bombed Dublin or Belfast to retaliate against Irish terrorism. She said that inflicting collective punishment on the Palestinian people was unacceptable.

Mr. François-Poncet said that if the Gaza conflict was an "experiment" that was mainly because it drew conclusions and learned lessons from Israel's asymmetrical war in Lebanon in 2006.

René Beaumont said he had recently gone to Lebanon with the Senate's France-Lebanon friendship group and left with the sense that Hezbollah has become a player to be reckoned in Lebanese politics. He wondered whether the divided Christian parties might determine the future elections' outcome.

Robert Badinter pointed out that elections were or would soon be taking place in most of the region's countries, with the notable exception of Syria. In addition, the power vacuum in the United States during the period of transition between the two administrations made that period the only one possible for an armed intervention in Gaza.

He said the State of Israel has felt that its very existence has been threatened since it was created in 1948, and that in foreign policy that anxiety translates into making the recognition of Israel's right to exist its policy's priority and ultimate aim in the region. Although Mr. Badinter has condemned Israeli policy, in particular settlements, on several occasions in the past, he said that Israel's anxiety must be taken into account.

Mr. Badinter also recalled that Hamas is on the European Union's list of terrorist groups and that it has always refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is continuously perfecting its rockets' precision and increasing their range, which means they may soon be able to hit Tel Aviv. He wondered what the Palestinians' national rights meant and whether that involved the movement's recognition of the State of Israel.

Mr. Badinter wondered whether Iran's influence on Hezbollah and Hamas is decisive, making it a key player in the region. Recalling that Iran's present leaders regularly call for Israel's destruction, he said there was a risk that Israel might try to face that threat of annihilation alone.

Mr. François-Poncet replied that during his interview with Khaled Meshaal in Damascus, the Hamas leader said there was not much difference between his movement's and Fatah's or the PLO's claims concerning Palestinian national rights: all of them demand a viable Palestinian State within the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for refugees. He had the feeling that Hamas was disposed to enter negotiations as soon as it was recognized as an interlocutor.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said that although Hamas does not officially recognize Israel's existence it demands the creation of a Palestinian State within the 1967 borders, which implies de facto recognition.

Mr. François-Poncet said that although most Israelis want peace and are ready to accept the idea of two States, the domestic political situation does not encourage optimism. Nor do Israeli West Bank settlements, which are so big that it is very hard to imagine dismantling them. A valid question is what the army's attitude would be if the Israeli government decided to do that.

Mr. François-Poncet said Hamas would implicitly recognize Israel as soon as it entered negotiations. The best way for Israel to guarantee its security and make peace would be to accept the existence of a Palestinian State.

About Iran, Mr. François-Poncet said the key question was knowing whether the United States, Europe, the Arab countries and Israel could accept the idea of its acquiring the atomic bomb. He added that Europe and the United States might eventually come to terms with that situation, but would Israel, considering the statements Iran's leaders have made? The nuclear issue will be central in the coming negotiations between the United States and Iran. The US administration will probably run out of patience with the stalling tactics of an Iran that is drawing closer to its nuclear objective day by day. An attempt to destroy Iran's nuclear sites cannot be totally ruled out if the talks fail.

Mr. Badinter said it is hard to know what Iran really wants.

Chairman de Rohan asked about the new US administration's policy in the region and the possibility for the European Union to become more involved. He added that Iran's goal is to be fully recognized as a great power.

Mr. François-Poncet replied that the earliest steps President Obama took show a genuine desire to become more involved in the region and that Europe could provide useful assistance if it is united and speaks with a single voice.

Third trip - Egypt, February 22 to 27, 2009

(report of March 11, 2009)

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said she is alarmed at the political situation in Egypt. The regime controls the domestic situation with an iron fist but the government's conciliatory diplomatic line towards Israel during the Gaza War strengthened its unpopularity just when the economic situation was deteriorating and the internal political situation is more frozen than ever.

Egypt looks like a blocked society. Despite tensions, which translate into a strong return of religion and higher risk of terrorism, the regime still has firm control of civil society as President Mubarak's succession draws near.

The economic outlook is bleak. Egypt has a population of 80 million, including 600,000 young people entering the labor market every year. Finance minister Youssef Boutros Ghali told the rapporteurs that 16% of the population live below the poverty line but the UNDP says that 58% live on less than two dollars a day.

The situation is bound to deteriorate owing to the global economic crisis. The finance minister said Egypt's three main sources of foreign revenue were expected to fall considerably in 2009:

- tourism receipts, at $11 billion a year the main source of revenue, would drop by 40%;

- oil and gas exports would also decrease by 40%;

- Suez Canal revenues are expected to go down by 25%.

Egypt's economic growth rate is expected to fall from 7% in 2008 to 4 or even 2% in 2009, whereas a minimum of 5% is necessary for newcomers to find jobs on the labor market. Despite a crackdown, social unrest, including strikes and demonstrations by professional groups, has already occurred and the finance minister expects it to increase.

In this context, the prospects for political change seem non-existent.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not unanimously popular and says it is not ready to take power. The mission met its parliamentary group's leader, who gave the impression that his organization is a "reasonable" opposition party comparable in many ways to the Christian Democratic parties in France and Europe. It would rather win votes with an active social program than win the elections, for fear of eliciting a reaction from the army and the international community.

Between the National Democratic Party in power and the Muslim Brotherhood, the centrist parties are fragmented. Some, like Al-Wasat, are banned. Charismatic centrist leaders, such as Ayman Nour, head of the Al-Ghad Party, are in jail. On December 24, 2005 Mr. Nour was sentenced to five years for fraud in the procedure to recognize his new liberal party created in October 2004. Everybody knows he was imprisoned for being President Mubarak's mail rival in the September 2005 presidential elections, when he won 7.3% of the votes, which is high in a country with low voter turnout (around 10% ). His recent release is probably the result of strong US pressure on the eve of Hillary Clinton's visit to Sharm el-Sheikh.

Egypt's foreign policy meets with incomprehension and silent opposition from Egyptians. They sympathized with the Palestinians' hardships during the Gaza events and considered the Mubarak government's management of the crisis as being too conciliatory towards Israel. The president's meeting with Tzipi Livni two days before the bombing began rightly or wrongly made people feel as though he "was in on it". The Egyptian authorities limited demonstrations and banned big rallies. The government did not let aid contributed by the Egyptian people (food, medicine, etc.) into Gaza until it was too late. It also apparently blocked the Rafah checkpoint, which people who are unaware of Israel's decisive role in controlling that point of passage in the framework of the 2005 accords did not understand.

The West's opposition to Iran's nuclear military program has aroused the Egyptians' sympathy for the Islamic Republic. To them Iran is a distant and not necessarily friendly country, but the fact that it stands up to the West alone, and the perception that the West has a double standard (it is acceptable for Israel to have nuclear weapons but not Iran), fuels a strong sense of "'injustice" in every part of the population.

The combination of these three tensions translates into a general uneasiness in the population. The people the mission met, in particular artists and intellectuals, spoke of a feeling of «shame» and powerlessness because police repression prevented them from demonstrating their solidarity with the Gazans. The Egyptian people, who are very resentful towards the government, feel that their national pride has been hurt. It is a simmering revolt.

It is not surprising that those conditions have led to a hardening of identity, which takes the form of stronger religious beliefs, and an increased risk of terrorist attacks.

The word «Islamization» is often used to describe this phenomenon but overlooks the fact that Egyptian society has always been deeply Muslim. It would be more accurate to speak of a return of religion, which must be understood as an assertion of identity and a way to distance society from the West. It would be more accurate to use the terms «de-Westernization» or «rejection of the West», understood to encompass Israel, the United States and Europe. For example, people perceive wearing an Islamic beard, which Westerners associate with extremism, as a sign of honesty and morality. They reject the West's values and Middle East policy but not its technology. It is common to see highly skilled professionals such as doctors, lawyers, engineers and computer scientists wearing outward signs of their Muslim faith. The Muslim Brotherhood even recruits most of its members and leaders in those circles.

The hardening of identity creates serious tensions in society. Clashes between Egyptian Christians and Muslims have been particularly violent in the past few years. Those confrontations are reflected by deliberate displays of membership in a religious community, in particular on vehicles, which the government prohibits.

The resurgence of religion has also cast discredit on the Western-style women's emancipation movement, which the urban bourgeoisie supported in the 1920s. But women work, study and are highly visible in public places. They are veiled, sometimes quite stylishly. The veil lets young women from the most conservative, patriarchal backgrounds leave the family to study and work.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said that, according to the information she received in Egypt, a small group of improvised terrorists committed the February 22 attack in Cairo. The bomb was homemade, the explosive weak. Nobody claimed responsibility for the blast.

Egypt had already experienced a similar attack in 2005. They are carried out by small groups expressing widespread anger with violence. They do not seem to be part of an overall strategy to destabilize the regime, as was the case in the 1980s.

It seems likely that France was targeted because of the proclaimed friendship between Presidents Mubarak and Sarkozy and the deployment of the frigate Germinal off the coast of Gaza to end smuggling, but that cannot be proved, at least for now.

The question is whether Mr. Mubarak's regime has come out of the attacks weakened. The answer is no. Most people are appalled by the attacks, which shocks public opinion and damages tourism, the main source of revenue for a million Egyptian workers. Although this may sound like a stereotype, Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said Egyptians are kind and peaceful. The country has had few revolutions in two centuries. Those that did take place only lasted a few days (1919, 1952). However, daily hardship could lead to more social and political violence. Police repression does not explain everything. Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga preferred talking about the Egyptian people's resilience and ability to withstand unbearable living conditions with humor as their only outlet.

Egyptian society is tightly controlled. The security services are everywhere and keeping people in line is easy because the standard of living is so low: anything can be bought, especially information. The army and intelligence services work closely with the National Democratic Party (NDP) in power.

The Muslim Brotherhood is split into two main currents:

- the "conservatives", who can actually be called "radicals", advocate merging the religious and political authorities;

- the "progressives" or "liberals" espouse a strict separation between the religious and political authorities.

By systematically jailing the progressive wing's leaders the Mubarak government's strategy is to let the most hardline members of the Muslim Brotherhood monopolize the Islamic opposition, strengthening their role as scarecrows.

Moreover, by imprisoning charismatic centrist leaders Mr. Mubarak's government manages to create a political situation where the only choice is between him and "chaos".

The way has been cleared for the Egyptian president's son, Gamal Mubarak, a highly Westernized, enterprising businessman, to have real power in the NDP Nevertheless, his candidacy has come up against many stumbling blocks, starting with the fact that many Egyptians, in particular army officers, do not accept that Mubarak has handpicked his son to be his political heir, viewing this imitation of the Syrian model as an example of the decay of the republican spirit. The fact that Gamal Mubarak is not from the ranks of the military also weakens his chances. Lastly, some of the president's unpopularity rubs off on him.

It is certain that whomever is chosen, he will have to prove himself capable of maintaining stability. If constitutional procedures are followed, only a small number of people in the NDP are eligible to become president and a limited group of people will make the choice, which will not conflict with the army's orientations.

But the question of knowing who will be chosen actually matters little. The main thing is that the new president offer strong guarantees that he will be able to maintain order and the army's political and economic supremacy. Based on these assumptions, it seems that everything will depend on when the succession issue is settled. If it is during Mubarak's lifetime, his son Gamal has a good chance of becoming president. If not, the army will impose its man.

Since 1952 the army has been the only institution whose legitimacy is unquestioned in Egypt. It is a leading political and economic power, the country's biggest property owner, with military and civilian manufacturing sites, tourism investment programs and retired generals in parliament. The army controls diplomacy, which is not in the hands of a diplomat but of a military officer. The same is true of the economy. The army is a parallel society that supplies all its officers with housing, health care and holiday villages. It will undoubtedly resist any attempts to loosen its ties to power.

In those conditions, the likeliest hypothesis is that General Omar Souleiman, the minister of internal security, will become president. That is also the opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood leader the rapporteurs met.

In conclusion, Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said Egyptian society is like a pressure cooker. Freedom of expression, limited to a fringe of the population, acts as a safety valve, so an explosion will probably not occur. If destabilization takes place it will probably come from an external shock or a major regional crisis. The Arab world still looks up to Egypt because of its high population, excellent scientific, artistic, intellectual and medical elites and skilled diplomats, but its dependency on the United States and desire for peace with Israel weaken the country's position in the Middle East. Egypt's diplomatic influence is limited to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, which it wants to keep under its control.

To be effective, France's Middle East diplomacy must consider the multiplicity of power poles: Egypt, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The cold war within the Arab League must prompt us to be cautious in our alliances and public positions to avoid becoming alienated from some countries when we grow closer to others.

Then Mr. François-Poncet made three remarks. First, he said the economic crisis will or might shake Egypt to its very foundations. Although the country's economy is not very globalized, it has made much progress. A severe slowdown should be expected whose impact on society is unknown.

Second, Mr. François-Poncet said that he did not return with clear ideas on Mr. Mubarak's succession, which everybody in Cairo is talking about. The president's son is certainly campaigning. He is well educated and gives the impression of being modern but does not belong to the army, whose feelings towards him are not very clear. The Muslim Brotherhood says the next president will be General Omar Souleiman, the security minister, but he is 73 years old, although no other leader has his stature. His presidency could be an interim stage between Hosni and Gamal Mubarak.

Third, he said that, despite the criticism it draws, Egypt plays a very important part in the inter-Palestinian dialogue, whose meetings take place in Cairo.

In conclusion, Mr. François-Poncet said Egypt is an important country with two swords of Damocles over its head: the economic crisis and Mr. Mubarak's succession.

Fourth trip - Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait
March 28 to April 6, 2009 and fifth trip - Kurdistan, Turkey, May 6 to 12, 2009 (report of May 13, 2009)

Mr. François-Poncet, rapporteur, recalled that he and his colleague, Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga, went to Baghdad and returned by way of northern Iraq, or "Kurdistan", and Turkey. They were about to leave for the United States and would finish their mission with a trip to Brussels in June.

Mr. François-Poncet said he believes three issues dominate the situation in the Middle East: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran's military nuclear program and Iraq's future.

Iraq's future looked bleak until 2007. Since then, the tide has turned and one might wonder if the United States' "historic blunder" of invading Iraq will end up a success. Three questions remain: is the pacification real? Will it survive the pullout of US forces? How will the new Iraq fit into its new regional and international environment?

Everybody wonders whether security is a myth or a reality. Mr. François-Poncet clearly contributed a positive response in three areas: security, democratization and national unity.

First, he said the security situation has noticeably improved. That assertion is based on converging, overlapping information from the French embassy in Baghdad, Iraqi officials and US General Raymond T. Odierno. Fourteen out of 18 provinces are secure. Four are not yet but on their way to becoming so, including Mosul and Diyala, on the border with Iran. The death toll has dropped from 100 a day in 2008 to just ten today.

Second, Al Qaeda seems to have been defeated. Sleeper cells here and there do still have an offensive capacity but overall, the interlocutors said that Al Qaeda has lost in Iraq. When you take the road from Baghdad Airport to the Rasheed Hotel, which was terribly dangerous and which US forces had a great deal of difficulty securing, one drives through a besieged city without besiegers. The entire urban structure--walls, speed bumps and checkpoints--attests to the fighting. Members of the Groupement d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale (GIGN, a special gendarmerie task force) guard the embassy round the clock and the ambassador can only travel in a convoy. The mission spent the night in Baghdad under the watchful eyes of the GIGN; Mr. François-Poncet emphasized their tremendous courage, courtesy and professionalism. He said the mission never felt threatened or heard gunfire or an explosion.

The main explanation for this situation is the surge. The US increased their forces in Iraq from 110,000 to 150,000, which enabled them to occupy the ground and prevent the insurgents from taking places back after an intervention. The second factor is that Sunni tribes rallied to the United States in return for payment: 90,000 Sunni fighters paid $300 a day joined the "awakening councils" or sahwas . They probably turned against Al Qaeda because of its atrocities and blind attacks, which became unbearable. The awakening councils played a major part in eliminating Al Qaeda and pacifying Iraq.

Democratic stabilization is the second bright trend. Iraq, which has a unicameral parliamentary system, has held five genuine elections since 2005. Legislative elections are set to take place in December. The assembly is a lively forum where debates have replaced street clashes. That has resulted in particular from the split of Shiite movements into the al-Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council, Prime Minister al-Maliki's Da'wa Party and the Sadrist movement, which had its own militia, well known as the "Mahdi army". The scission resulted in parliamentary combinations between Shiites and Sunnis that have considerably opened up politics beyond ethnic or community divisions.

National stabilization is the third positive development. One of the main questions was whether the country will split into three parts: Kurdistan in the north, a Shiite State in the south and a Sunni State in the middle. Today it is possible to answer "no" to that question. That is due to one man, Prime Minister al-Maliki, whom the mission could not meet in Baghdad because he was attending the Doha Summit.

Mr. Maliki has gradually come into his own as a statesman. Two interventions against his fellow Shiites gave him that stature: the first was in Basra, in the south, when he put down a separatist uprising; the second was in a crowded Baghdad suburb, Sadr City, where he crushed the militant Mahdi Army. Those interventions by a Shiite leader against Shiites gave him a sort of national consecration, although the stature he has acquired, combined with his taste for power, has made him many enemies. He has defended Iraq's interests and contributed to the awakening of a national consciousness. Overall, a positive assessment of his action can be made.

The main question is what will happen after the Americans leave. One hundred and fifty thousand troops pulled out of the cities in late June 2009 and are set to leave the country completely by the end of November 2011. No bases will remain in Iraq. The mission met Great Britain's ambassador, who confirmed the plan but did not rule out the hypothesis that it might be modified at the request of the Iraqi government, which could ask the US forces to stay longer when the time comes.

Uncertainties remain involving political, security, economic and development issues as well as the Kurdish problem.

The main uncertainty is the political situation. Prime Minister al-Maliki has established his control, but his success and authoritarianism have met with strong opposition. The mission discerned a movement that could be called "anything but al-Maliki". General elections are set to take place in December 2009. Mr. al-Maliki will have to find a majority to back him up just when he may have to face a united front of his enemies: the Kurds, the Sunnis and the other Shiite factions.

The second uncertainty involves the 600,000-man armed and security forces, including the army, national police and local police. They have always operated with backup from US soldiers. Will they be capable of keeping order after the troops who trained and supported them leave? General Odierno says 75% of the Iraqi forces are considered reliable, 20% uncertain and 5% unreliable. The Sunni awakening councils are now bound to the Shiite majority government. Will that situation last? It would be disastrous if it does not. Some recent attacks have revealed dangerous fault lines.

The third uncertainty is the Kurds' attitude, which is probably the most serious problem. The Kurds are concentrated in the mountainous north. They played a considerable part in establishing the regime. Massoud Barzani, a charismatic leader, is the uncontested president of the Kurdish Regional Government, whereas Jalal Talabani, founder of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, is president of the Republic of Iraq. Kurdistan currently covers three regions and has sizeable oil resources. Since 1991 it has had a 300,000-man army (the Peshmergas), which does not have heavy arms but is remarkably successful at keeping the region safe. The peshmergas have been called to Baghdad several times to ensure the security of parliament and politicians, including the president, because they are reliable.

Kurdish leaders oppose a constitutional amendment that would strengthen central power and take away some of their autonomy. They have territorial demands, in particular in Kirkuk, that, if accepted would double Kurdistan's present area, which is approximately 40,000 square kilometers, the size of Switzerland. Kirkuk is an obsession. A city of 700,000, it is populated in equal parts by Kurds, Turkmen and Shiite Arabs that Saddam Hussein relocated there as part of a brutal policy of forced Arabization. Kurdistan has an international airport in Erbil.

The Kurds' demands meet with rejection in Baghdad and make the Turks jittery. The Kurdish representatives the mission met say they have given up on independence but not on Kirkuk. They oppose Baghdad and Prime Minister al-Maliki and demand application of article 140 of the Constitution, which calls for "normalization", in other words the Kurds' return to Kirkuk, a census and a referendum.

Those statements led the mission to visit Turkey and sound out the position of that country's officials on the issue. The Turks have forged excellent businesses relations with the Kurds since Massoud Barzani stopped backing the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). Twenty million Kurds live in Turkey, six in Iraq, six in Syria and twelve in Iran. The Kurdish problem may not necessarily led to a secession, but it is a threat to country's future.

The last problem is reconstruction, which has been overshadowed by security issues until now. It will take $60 billion to rebuild or repair Iraq's infrastructure. Oil output, which currently stands at just over two million barrels a day, could rise to six million if the oil infrastructure is updated, which assumes investments on the order of several tens of billions of dollars. But parliament has not passed the oil law yet. The army, which has no planes and few heavy weapons, also needs modernization and equipment. The Americans will leave equipment behind, but that will not solve the problem because it is very worn. Consequently there is a huge potential military equipment market.

None of that cancels out the positive aspects but it is too early to say whether Iraq is "out of the woods".

Lastly, Mr. François-Poncet addressed the issue of Iraq's future in its regional and international environment.

He said Iran is omnipresent in Iraq. The Iranian secret services have agents who have largely contributed to insecurity. Iran's leaders are hostile to the disengagement accord (SOFA) that the Iraqi government and the United States signed in December 2008. They would have preferred the United States to become paralyzed and bogged down in Iraq, leaving the country with their tail between their legs.

Does that mean Iran "pulls all the strings"? Probably not. The Iraqis do not want that, even though Iran is a big neighbor to be reckoned with. Nevertheless, Iran has a very strong influence in Iraq. The Shiite religion is a bond between the two countries. The holy places of Shiism, Nadjaf and Kerbala, are in Iraq. It is hard to say how things will unfold.

France has an important role to play in Iraq. President Sarkozy's visit was highly appreciated despite its brevity. France has a good image, although it is clouded by the fact that the French opposed the United States' intervention, which, after all, eliminated Saddam Hussein, who persecuted the Shiite majority. Iraq is an important country with considerable resources.

Mr. François-Poncet paid tribute to the highly motivated embassy staff. The ambassador, who has been living in very precarious conditions for several years, is remarkable.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga recalled the history of the Iraq's creation and the successive divisions resulting from the Treaties of Sèvres, San Remo and Lausanne. Dependant on the colonial powers' oil interests, Iraq is a geographical entity that is not based on a national reality. She said the country does not have a parliamentary system in the conventional sense of the term and that all the positions and ministries are distributed exclusively based on confessional criteria. When taking action against fellow Shiites, Mr. Maliki was probably more interested in weakening his rivals than in statesmanship. Allegiance is owed mainly to the family, village, tribe and region.

Mr. Boulaud asked about the size of Iraq's oil reserves.

Mr. François-Poncet replied that if Iraq's dilapidated oil industry undergoes extensive modernization, in the long term it would be able to produce six million barrels a day. In comparison, Saudi output is approximately ten million barrels a day.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said oil was also Iraq's curse because the country was created, and Kurdistan was not, despite the fact that it was stipulated in the Treaty of Sèvres, when it was found in the Kirkuk fields.

Mr. Boulaud asked about the motives of the US intervention in Iraq, and in particular whether oil was the reason.

Mr. François-Poncet said that only historians could determine why the United States decided to invade Iraq, which has taken the lives of over 4,000 US soldiers and cost hundreds of billions of dollars for a favorable outcome seven years later. The rapporteur stated that, personally, he did not believe oil was the main reason. According to him, the Americans genuinely thought they would be greeted as liberators and that Iraq's oil revenues would pay the intervention's costs. They were wrong on both counts, but the biggest blunder, which nobody disputes any longer, was made by Paul Bremer, the US administrator for Iraq, who fueled the insurrection by dismissing Iraqi army officers without pay, and dissolved the Baas Party, which structured the administration and made the country work. It is very likely that the history of the US intervention would have been different if those two unfortunate decisions had not been made.

Daniel Reiner asked both rapporteurs about the Iraqis' perception of President Obama's election and a possible change in policy. He also questioned them about the presence of civilians in the conflict.

Mr. François-Poncet recalled that the Bush administration had signed SOFA and Barack Obama had not changed course: the accord happens to match the pullout timetable the new president wanted. On the second point he recalled that American civilian advisors were very present in the ministries.

Ms. Cerisier-ben Guiga said private military companies employing almost only non-Americans are omnipresent in Iraq. If war crimes are tried it will be very hard to determine whether the sub-contractors or the people who gave the orders are responsible.

She also said Turkey is the region's only country that can talk to everybody, including Hamas and Israel, without disapproval. Turkey has a stabilizing diplomacy in the Middle East. It is in contact with Syria and trying to separate that country from its alliance with Iran.

Mr. François-Poncet answered a question by Christian Cambon about Syria's relations with Iraq by saying that Damascus was not involved in Baghdad's affairs but had infiltrated Al Qaeda jihadists, and that he did not have the sense Iraq was doing anything to prevent that. He added that none of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria, had an interest in the country's destabilization.