II. DOING BETTER AT A EUROPEAN LEVEL: LOOKING FOR EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE
Scenario 4 in the Commissions White Paper on the future of Europe, envisages Doing Less More Efficiently . This ambition is to be welcomed given that is should help increase the visibility of the European Union and improve the clarity surrounding its interventions. In it the Commission details the areas in which the European Union could intensify its action. It mainly focuses on innovation, trade, security, migration, border management and defence. The monitoring group on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and the rebuilding of the European Union, in its report on the referendum published in February 2017, retained the same objectives 17 ( * ) .
Research into European added value does not necessarily imply reaching 27. Enhanced cooperation was under-utilised since it was introduced into European law by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Only three cases reached the implementation stage. These involved the common rules regarding the applicable law on divorce for binational couples (2010), the European Union patent (2011) and the financial transaction tax (2013).
|
Enhanced cooperation Articles 43 to 45 of the Treaty on the European Union and Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, revised at the time of the Treaty of Lisbon, detailing the implementation arrangements for enhanced cooperation. The authors of the Treaty of Lisbon wanted to facilitate the use of this measure, which can be applied to all the domains of European action, provided that at least nine Member States participate. Permission to proceed with enhanced cooperation is granted by the Council of Ministers, which shall take a decision by qualified majority on the proposal of the Commission and after obtaining approval by the European Parliament. In the area of foreign and security policy, permission is granted by the Council of Ministers acting unanimously. The Commission and the Member States participating in enhanced cooperation are encouraging as many Member States as possible to become part of this cooperation, however only participating Member States can adopt acts. |
Enhanced cooperation should make it possible to combine all the available good willand guarantee a genuine knock-on effect. It can act as a framework which can demonstrate the reaction capability of Member States, united in the face of crises of all kinds - financial, economic, military, migratory - and highlight, to the general public, the added value of common action in this area. As noted by the monitoring group in February 2017, it appears to be destined for success, as long as it reflects the interests of European action and ultimately appeals to those initially reluctant Member States. They carry with them the relaunch of the European project and also its fulfilment throughout the European Union as a whole. It is therefore necessary to proceed in favour of the development of this Europe based on variable geometryand concentric circles .
A. MOVING TOWARDS A POWERFUL EUROPE
The debate on European added value should be placed within the framework of a more general reflection on the ambitions that we intend to be assigned to the European Union. If our citizens do not accept a European Union that is too interventionist in daily life, they may prefer a Europe that asserts itself on the world stage, in particular in order to respond to security challenges. A Powerful Europe or a Europe that protectscovers several areas such as defence, security, management of the migration crisis and trade negotiations. Achieving its goal should be one of the main objectives of our thinking on a better division of powers between the European Union and the Member States.
1. The fight against terrorism
In the face of a cross-border terrorist threat, the interconnection of intelligence services and cooperation between the police and judicial authorities are clearly key priorities. They would give meaning to the objective of European added value. The European Commission expects the creation of a European agency dedicated to the fight against terrorism, designed to deter and prevent serious attacks in European cities through the systematic identification and reporting of suspects. It also intends to provide easier access to European databases containing biometric information on offenders.
While recalling that the Union would only intervene in this area with the support of the Member States, this ambition deserves support but also requires further exploration. In particular, your rapporteurs desire that European judicial cooperation is accomplished through the strengthening of Eurojust. It involves the creation of a genuine European registry allowing for an overlap between the court proceedings initiated in the various member states. At the same time, it is essential to extend the missions of the future European Public Prosecutors Office to cross-border crime, with a focus on terrorism. It appears that the Commission still wishes to advance in this area by 2025 18 ( * ) .
2. What outlines for European defence?
European added value should also be established in the area of defence. The European Commission expects, in its baseline scenario, the enhancement of common defence capabilities. Your rapporteurs share this opinion. It is also essential to remember that defence policy by nature remains intergovernmental and that the announced enhancement of common defence capacities comes down to better pooling of funding.
The provisions of the Treaties should initially be fully implemented, already allowing for the development of European financing of stabilisation operations and training in security sectors in countries emerging from crisis. It is also legally possible to create a permanent planning, command and conduct structure for military operations related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Beyond that, the question of common defence capabilities requires some reflection on its funding. Consideration might also be given to a reform of the funding mechanism of the military operations of the CSDP (Athena), through an expansion of the European part. It is also about securing and increasing the European funding for defence research and the development of common capacities with the creation of a European defence fund. Increasing the resources and responsibilities of the European defence agency as a European armament programme development tool and the definition of standards for equipment is another option. The involvement of the European Investment Bank in defence funding, in particular in favour of SMEs, should not be overlooked.
At the same time, the intergovernmental dimension of defence policy should be expanded. Again, the Treaties allow for the implementation of new instruments, like a European Security and Defence Council, able to offer the political impetus required for fostering the emergence of a European Defence and Industrial market and base. Its meetings would be prepared by a Council of Defence Ministers. The use of permanent structured cooperation should also be considered.
3. Addressing the migration crisis
The European Commission is particularly ambitious as regards the management of the external borders of the Union. Scenario 4 provides that the European border-guard and coastguard agency (FRONTEX) is fully responsible for their control. Furthermore, all asylum applications would be processed by a single European asylum agency. It is also in line with the Senate monitoring groups desire calling for the rapid emergence of a real European border police force.
Your rapporteurs would like to elaborate on three particulars from a subsidiarity perspective.
Firstly, any strengthening of the response of the European Union in the area of migration must be combined with a debate on the governance of the Schengen area itself . Strategic management should be implemented within the framework of specific Interior Minister meetings, distinct from those of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. It is also important to reflect on the principle of responsibility of the first country of entry for the examination of asylum applications and to seek a fairer distribution of this burden. Although front-line countries continue to carry the burden of commitment in respect of the management of the external borders of the European Union, it does not appear necessary to incorporate a correcting mechanism into this system allowing for solidarity on a European scale in the case of exceptional migratory pressure, as with the relocation mechanism. At the same time, the question of a real European asylum law must be addressed, through the radical reform of the regulation known as the Dublin III, in terms of content and procedures 19 ( * ) .
With regard, secondly, to border management itself by FRONTEX, this means that Members States play a role in the training of the 1,500-strong Rapid Pool, while continuing to provide national personnel to meet ongoing operational requirements in a particular context where their resources in this area are limited, or even under pressure. Under these conditions it is essential to quickly address the recruitment challenge and the training of suitable candidates.
Lastly, it is vital to allow the Members States the flexibility to be able to control their internal borders in response to security and public order threats.
4. Can the European Union be described as a trading giant?
The European Commission, in reference to scenario 4, desires the European Union to be in a position to make timely decisions regarding the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements. Your rapporteurs share this position provided that it is guided by two principles: transparency surrounding any negotiations and the protection of the interests of the Member States.
In particular, the Unions trade policy must be subject to regular debates at as early a stage as possible, for example before the adoption of the Council of the negotiating mandate granted to the Commission for the launch of a free trade agreement. There must also be transparency during the negotiations with the transmission of translated documents and the dissemination of prior impact assessments, both in terms of the commencement of negotiations and the provisional implementation of agreements entered into. Similarly, a systematic policy of monitoring the application of these agreements, following a certain duration of application, is necessary. Scenario 4 emphasises the timeliness of decision making by the Commission on trade matters. This could lead to a renouncement of the principle of diversity of trade agreements, which requires a decision procedure involving the European Union on one site and the national parliaments on the other. The Court has recently ruled that the trade component of the agreement calls for an opinion from national representations whereas the investment component falls under the exclusive competence of the European Union 20 ( * ) . Any renunciation of diversity requires the prior involvement of the national parliaments in the definition of the mandate and, thereafter, in all stages of the negotiations.
At the same time, the European strategy on the issue should allow the Union to assert itself as a trading power , focused on the defence of its interests and therefore those of the Member States. Therefore, it should use the trade defence tools at its disposal, promoting its own standards and working towards well-balanced reciprocal access to public procurement markets. During a recent dialogue with your European Affairs Committee, the EU Trade Commissioner, Mrs Cecilia Malmström, indicated that she was considering ways of protecting Europe from harmful imports from an environmental perspective 21 ( * ) .
* 17 Above-mentioned report.
* 18 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and to the Committee of the Regions: Programme of work of the Commission for 2018: A programme for a more united, stronger and more democratic Europe (COM (2017) 650 final).
* 19 Regulation (EU) N° 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member States responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person.
* 20 Opinion 2/15 of the Court of 16 May 2017 on the Free Trade Agreement of the European Union and the Republic of Singapore.
* 21 2018, a new year of challenges for the European Union, information report N° 253 (20172018) by Mr Jean Bizet, Mr Philippe Bonnecarrère, Mr André Gattolin, Mrs Gisèle Jourda, Mrs Fabienne Keller and Mr Pierre Médevielle, on behalf of the Senate Committee on European Affairs, 25 January 2018.