COMMITTEE EXAMINATION
Meeting on Wednesday 15 July 2020, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee, chaired by Mr Christian Cambon, Chairman, examined the information report by Mr Ronan Le Gleut and Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret on the future combat aircraft (FCAS).
Mr Ronan Le Gleut . - With the FCAS, the goal is not just to make a new Rafale or Eurofighter. By 2040, our adversaries will have formidable anti-air systems with a network of sensors, platforms and carriers that will allow for immediate responses, powerful cyber resources and high-velocity missiles. To this systemic threat, the FCAS will bring a system of systems. It will include a combat aircraft, the Next Generation Fighter (NGF), capable of carrying more missiles and of flying for longer with greater stealth and handling than the Rafale. It will be bigger and heavier, which implies a bigger aircraft carrier, as our colleagues Cigolotti and Roger have pointed out. It will also include an entire range of "remote carriers". These are drones entrusted with a wide variety of missions, from decoying to shooting, jamming to intelligence gathering. The third element of the FCAS is invisible but is the true heart of the system. This is the combat cloud: the interconnection of platforms with each other and with databases. Finally, there will be what I will refer to as a transversal pillar, artificial intelligence and function automation, present on all platforms, which will boost the pilot's effectiveness in collaborative combat.
Thus, I arrive at the first of our recommendations: if we do not want the FCAS to be obsolete as soon as it is commissioned in 2040 nor in the four decades that follow, we must not get the project wrong.
Of course, the combat aircraft, the first pillar of industrial cooperation in phase 1A that began in February, is very important. We can take pride in Dassault and Safran being the industrial leaders on the aircraft and its engine, respectively. However, the innovation needed lies just as much, if not more, in the combat cloud and AI.
Here, I would like to make a comparison. The Germans have understood that, with the development of autonomous vehicles, the added value risks shifting from the "car object" to artificial intelligence and data. It is exactly the same thing for the FCAS. For the moment, it is planned that the NGF be only optionally "unmanned", in particular because there are doubts about the capabilities of an autonomous AI in a highly complex tactical situation. However, we cannot exclude decisive progress by 2040 and beyond. We know that the Chinese and Russians are investing massively. The United States will also have an AI-equipped drone fight against a manned aircraft next year. We must not find ourselves in the same situation as the best chess players in the world who can no longer beat a computer! Reducing the debate on the use of artificial intelligence to lethal autonomous weapons would be a caricature: the main challenge is the interface between people and AI to relieve the pilot's mental load and allow them to maximise all the platforms' contributions. Thus, we recommend that the development of AI be at the centre of the programme.
Another challenge for our capacity for innovation: the new engine. We have fallen behind the Americans, who make hotter, and therefore more powerful, engines than us. We must also develop the variable cycle technique to have a power profile that can adapt to different missions. Another key issue is the demonstrator's engine which is expected to be completed in 2026. It seems to us imperative to use the Rafale's engine, the Safran M88, instead of the Eurofighter's J200. It would be more coherent with the distribution confirmed by France and German, which made Safran the prime contractor for the engine.
Finally, breakthroughs are also needed on sensor technology. In this regard, choosing Spain as the prime contractor of the "sensors" pillar via INDRA is a good signal sent to this country who joined the cooperation with a slight delay over France and Germany, but who should now be integrated on an equal footing.
Now, I come to the issue of industrial cooperation. Remember that, after long negotiations, an initial contract of €155 million was agreed this past February with the major manufacturers by the DGA, the international leader of the programme, for the phase 1A of the demonstrator.
To avoid making the same errors as in the past--and here, everyone is thinking of the A400M--we must balance the best athlete principle, i.e. that each manufacturer does what it knows how to do best, with the principle of geographic return.
After difficult negotiations, France succeeded in implementing a strong organisation with a prime contractor and a main partner in charge of orchestrating the subcontractors' work for each of the programme's seven pillars. I will not go into detail on the Safran/MTU negotiations nor on the parallels that Germany requested with the future tank (MGCS), which was blocked for a time due to Rheinmetall. These episodes show us that we must remain extremely vigilant of several issues:
First, we must not let our German friends be told that they have been "poorly served". German companies are heavily represented on all pillars. Obtaining the prime contractorship of the combat cloud pillar over Thales is not insignificant for Airbus DS.
Next, we must not be content with the place obtained by our leading manufacturers, and we must make sure that our subcontractors are truly put to work by the German and Spanish prime contractors.
The third imperative: industrial property must be protected. In addition to the intangible protection of the background, i.e. the intellectual property already acquired on past programs, Dassault, Airbus and Safran must remain in control of what they invent during development while making available to the others that which necessary to maintain and develop the product. The Bundestag made its agreement to last February's contract conditional upon the German government's definition of the "key national technologies" that will have to be fully available to Germany. We know that this country wants to become more powerful in aviation and space, but the philosophy of such a programme does not allow for technological catch-up. Discussions must result in an agreement on industrial protection that is strong and balanced.
Furthermore, as Pascal Allizard and Michel Boutant noted in December, no place was made for ONERA, even though the German DLR is highly involved despite not necessarily being more experienced in military aviation. The minister has brought ONERA back into the game with a rather vague statement, and project leaders confirmed to us that they were working on it. ONERA could provide project management assistance to the DGA by analysing the future technological roadmaps from manufacturers, producing upstream studies on materials and combining its simulation capabilities with those of the DGA. Therefore, it is imperative that we clarify the last remaining ambiguities concerning ONERA's participation in the FCAS programme and encourage manufacturers to subcontract certain tasks to them.
Additionally, the FCAS programme could also contribute to our economy's recovery after the coronavirus crisis. Investment in defence can help to safeguard jobs in France in the supply chain of systems integrators and major equipment manufacturers. Also, the future combat aircraft will also take on the mission of dissuasion, which will necessarily bring activity to France. Additionally, as for health crises, we should not wait for a geopolitical crisis to invest! Thus, in our opinion, we and our two partners should think about accelerating the programme by planning for completion before 2040.
In conclusion, the FCAS programme is an exceptional opportunity for France, Germany, and Spain, for our strategic autonomy as well as for our defence industry. While many countries are content to develop new combat aircraft, we have chosen to stay at the forefront by developing not just a simple aircraft, but a system of systems. The recent setbacks of the F35, which cannot fly in lightning, shows that competition is healthy! However, the path forward is narrow. Let us hope that we have learned enough from former programmes to avoid making the same mistakes.
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret . - Why make the FCAS with several countries when French manufacturers say that they are capable of doing it alone?
First, with the FCAS, we have the opportunity of advancing European defence with a concrete project in a French-German-Spanish partnership. Above all, it is a political project. Our industrial interlocutors should have this in mind. This project will be completed because it matches a clearly defined desire.
The first goal is to make French-German-Spanish cooperation smoother so that a decisive step can be taken in 2021. The negotiations between manufacturers in 2019 were delicate, of course, because the Bundestag put conditions on the agreement between Safran and MTU. It also insisted on a parallel timetable with the MGCS to approve funding. You know all about this; I won't go over it again.
For the surplus, our approaches are different. Germany fears the influence and weight of an experienced French military-industrial complex. Even more, it seems that they do not have the same understanding as we do of the stakes of strategic autonomy. France, on the other hand, is interpreting Germany's attitude as the expression of a desire to develop their national industry as a priority and gain new skills to protect jobs and support their industrial fabric. This goes for Spain, as well. Thus, this gives rise to fears of ulterior motives on the part of the three partners concerned.
To overcome these misunderstandings, which are mainly due to historical and cultural differences, we must exchange and share more. That is why we recommend drawing up and publishing a joint industrial strategy, potentially accompanied by a joint programming of capabilities. This would shed light on the link between national strategic autonomy and European strategic autonomy. Let us explain everything clearly, again and again.
But we should also be clear with our partners: the programme will not withstand repeated stalls and delays. That is why we recommend signing a global framework agreement early next year to commit the funding needed for the upcoming demonstrator development stages which would result in making the programme nearly irreversible. The idea is to go from a magnitude of a hundred million to a billion euros. Of course, it would be preferable that this new commitment arrive before Germany's parliamentary elections, which adds an additional element of uncertainty. We must be aware of this.
For their part, after long negotiations, the contracts with Spain's manufacturers should be signed soon. This country's entry is excellent news, especially considering that it seems fully committed industrially and militarily. We were pleasantly surprised by the enthusiasm of our interlocutors. This is perhaps because it is a very "Europeanist" country when it comes to defence and strongly favours European solutions. Also, Spain allows France to assume its natural role as a mediator between a Northern European country and a Southern European country. One of our proposals is to invite Germany to sign a treaty on exports with Spain similar to the one signed by France and Germany on 23 October 2019. Indeed, Spain is encountering the same difficulties as we did on export restrictions.
We must also ask ourselves the question of expanding the programme to other European partners. If we choose cooperation instead of a strictly national--and thus narrower--option to build the FCAS, it is because we want to support the competitiveness of the European defence industry by lowering the cost of each additional system produced while sharing the costs of development--we are talking about €8 billion by 2030, which would allow us to export more easily--if the finished product is less expensive and ensure an initial market at the European level. It is always easier to convince a buyer when they have an interest as a producer in the object on the market!
There are potential points of convergence with European instruments of defence: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), and the European Defence Fund. Above all, the FCAS is a unique opportunity to develop our own standards of interoperability. In this regard, synergy with the European Union could be a launchpad, notably via the EcoWar programme initiated by France, selected in the PESCO and which brings together Belgium, Spain, Hungary, Romania, Spain and Sweden. Countries disappointed by the F35's lack of interoperability with their other aircraft are interested in this project. By offering them solutions that allow an operational dialogue between the F35 and previous generations of aircraft, we can attract them into the FCAS's "orbit". Therefore, we recommend preparing this enlargement for the post-demonstrator phase when the cooperation between the first three countries has become sufficiently stable and sustainable.
Now, I would like to discuss the FCAS's innovative aspect. We are talking about a weapons system that will be operational between 2040 and 2080, at least. I fully share my co-rapporteur's analysis: imagining the future of air combat through an analogy with its current characteristics would be a mistake. In particular, an unprecedented effort must be made in the field of connectivity and the combat cloud, where Thales must play a full role alongside Airbus. It is also necessary to begin studying an integration of this combat cloud with the Scorpion Command Information System (CIS) immediately. The FCAS must be an open system that can interoperate with all our land and naval forces. It must also be developed incrementally. Thus, a cooperative combat system could be developed even before 2030 within the framework of the Rafale F4 and the air force's Connect@aero programme. Then, in the early 2030s, features of collaboration between aircraft and between aircraft and carriers could be implemented via the Rafale F5 in France and the Typhoon LTE in Germany and Spain.
As concerns artificial intelligence--the influence of which this project will not escape--we must continue to promote our Western vision that accords with international law. I fully agree with the armed forces minister's statement that "France refuses to entrust the decision of life or death to a machine that could act fully autonomously and beyond any human control." We must restart international discussions to obtain a legal and ethical framework shared by all. Other countries that do not share our values are progressing very quickly in the field and could impose their standards. Meanwhile, the efforts of the agency for innovation, through its innovation acceleration and research projects, must be supported. We are also counting on the future "Red Team" with its science fiction authors to come up with truly original scenarios that will push our engineers to the limit! The FCAS is an upgradeable project. It is up to everyone to take advantage of this to promote fundamental research, innovation and creativity.
The search for very high performance must go hand in hand with concern for the environment. We consider that innovation must also happen in the field of energy savings, in continuity with the "energy strategy" the armed forces minister presented on 3 July.
The FCAS's innovative, perhaps revolutionary, character will be one of the conditions that will make it exportable, an imperative that we do not ever want to lose sight of. To stand out, the FCAS must have exclusive and unprecedented "technological bricks".
However, this exportability is partially threatened by the British programme that it would be dangerous to lose sight of, the Tempest, the successor to the abandoned Franco-British FCAS project. Italy and Sweden are associated with this project; Turkey, Japan, and Saudi Arabia have been approached with a view to financial cooperation. It is expected that the programme will be completed in 2035, 5 years before the FCAS, even if this deadline seems ambitious to us. This project is carried by true political will since the British share our desire to maintain their expertise in combat aviation. For the moment, it is difficult to imagine how the two programmes could converge. This poses a challenge to gradually unifying the European defence industry and technology base if it were to be confirmed that the Europeans were separating into two competing groups. This opposition, or rather this rivalry, would be amplified by a convergence with the American system being developed which is very similar to the FCAS and the Tempest.
In conclusion, for us the FCAS is both an unprecedented occasion--the first of this scale, but also the last if it fails--to build a true EDTIB and a possibility of maintaining a complete model of armies. Despite a rather slow start in 2019, the negotiations progressed well and resulted in agreements. The coming months will be decisive, with Spain's full integration and, we hope, a new pluriannual framework agreement that will give a definitive momentum to the programme. Therefore, this report hopes to contribute to its success, because it has the potential to change the era and dimension of European defence cooperation!
Mr Olivier Cigolotti . - Your report is very clear, precise and complete. I would like to ask you two questions. The first is related to ONERA: the Senate had called for it to be integrated into France's team in charge of the FCAS. Where does that stand? Were you able to clarify this issue during your hearings, and did you obtain the assurance that ONERA would be involved in upstream studies? Should we be concerned that its intervention will only be piecemeal in the overall definition of the project?
My second question relates to the next generation aircraft carrier (PANG), the subject of a report which I recently presented to our committee with our colleague Gilbert Roger. The FCAS project and the PANG project are very much related in their technological compatibility and in their schedule. The FCAS's demonstrator must be ready not later than 2026 to not delay the PANG project. You support using the Rafale's engine, and I fully agree. In the context of the pandemic that we have experienced, Safran was heavily impacted, as witnessed by the announced closure of 25 sites and the heavy use of partial unemployment. Do you think that the demonstrator could really be ready in 2025-2026? If not, that would have real consequences for the PANG.
Mr Jean-Pierre Vial . - Your report on the FCAS, like the previous report on the PANG, established that our future weapons must participate in European defence. We can only agree, but it is essential to defend our expertise. In this field, France has a head start, true mastery of the technology and renowned expertise. There is no question of our total support for the idea of European defence, but we must also defend our industry. I remember a hearing with the Chief of Staff of the Army on the future tank which, above all, allowed us to understand the role that we will not have in this field.
Our technological excellence has a hard time translating into market share, so we must never lose our expertise and our head start. I also make the connection with the position given to ONERA. ONERA's wind tunnel unit, an excellent, state-of-the-art facility, is in my département , and it has been modernised at the cost of significant investment. However, this did not prevent ONERA from being side-lined from some previous projects. This must not be the case for the FCAS: we must be vigilant on this contract.
Mr Olivier Cadic . - The issue of whether or not a pilot was to be present came up during the creation of the first Rafale. You remember that we hesitated on whether to equip the aircraft with one or two pilots. In December 1985, just before the presentation to President Mitterrand, I observed that the demonstrator ultimately had a single pilot seat, but the manufacturers confided in me that this pilot seat could be removed, and that a pilot's involvement was already no longer necessarily a part of all missions. This issue is also present for the FCAS's design.
It is difficult to work on such an ambitious project with several countries. When the Eurofighter's design was being considered, Dassault warned the public authorities of the losses that our country would see if we chose that path. After participating in some of your hearings, I am wondering why we are doing something complicated when it could be simple; French manufacturers have confirmed that they could complete the FCAS project by themselves. While I am a convinced European, I would like a review of the costs and benefits of these two possible approaches to producing the FCAS: a national approach and European cooperation. We are approaching this politically when this project should be examined from a perspective of its technological capabilities. Ultimately, it is soldiers and not members of parliament who will use this weapons system. Let us not forget that if we had chosen the Eurofighter, we would still not be satisfied. The initial technological specifications meeting military needs still has not been achieved as yet.
Ultimately, should we not consider a plan B? If our partners blocked the project at a moment in its development, what do we have planned to face it? I would like the recommendations in our report to include a consideration of a plan that guarantees that the FCAS will be completed should the partner countries leave or block the project. Assessing the possibility of a national alternative makes sense and would have consequences for the national defence industrial base. How would we respond to a similar call for tender once the FCAS is complete?
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret . - We would not be selling an aircraft but a system of systems.
Mr Olivier Cadic . - Certainly, but at some point the issue of knowing whether we will be able to export it will come up and will have a decisive impact on our national industry and maintaining our current advantage in aviation technology and project management.
Mr Pierre Laurent . - What is the status of the negotiation of this multi-year contract that would be decisive?
Mr Bruno Sido . - I, for one, am worried. There are the examples of the A400M and Ariane 6. This does not correspond, technologically and financially, to the needs of the future. I hope there will be a single FCAS so as not to restart the A400M. I hope that everyone works on what they do best, not like on Ariane 6, and that we take great care on the costs, otherwise we will only be able to buy four or five aircraft... Additionally, with the increase in the debt, the perspectives are gloomy.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut . - The size and weight of the aircraft will indeed have an impact on the aircraft carrier. With the requirements for stealth and the carrying capacity, we are going from 15-metres long and 24 tonnes maximum for the Rafale to maybe 30 tonnes for the FCAS. The F22 measures 19-metres long and 35 tonnes at most. The model NGF is 18-metres long. Admiral Prazuck told the Senate about a weight of 30 tonnes.
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret . - We were surprised by ONERA's absence. Of course, the aircraft is important, but it can only work if connected to all the other platforms. It must also be interoperable with European platforms. We are at the first stage. It is normal that manufacturers are positioning themselves, but we must also ask ourselves what influence France and Europe will have in 2040. We are developing a system that will be operational in 20 years: there are a lot of unknowns in the equation! The DGA told us that ONERA will have a role to play: we think it should be central.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut . - The DGA and the air force told us that work had continued during the lockdown. The real issue is about political schedules: September 2021 for the German parliamentary elections and 2022 for the French presidential. Hence our insistence on the first half of 2021.
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret . - Germany is making a new contract conditional upon an agreement on industrial property. If we go to a billion in investment, it will be harder to step back. Furthermore, the British Minister for Defence Procurement told us that the Tempest was of existential importance for his country, as the FCAS is for us. The British need to maintain their skills even in the framework of their cooperation with the Americans. So they approach the issue globally and with great care for innovation. They do not plan on a demonstrator. I do not know if their method is the right one, but it is worth studying.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut . - There is no doubt that France has a technological advantage. We don't want to sell the family jewels. But costs are also skyrocketing. Indeed, the point is to create not just an aircraft but an entire swarm with the remote carriers. It is a considerable technological breakthrough. It will be much more expensive than the Rafale, and France's resources alone will not be enough. If we do not make a success of this technological breakthrough, we will lose our superiority on the battlefield. Beyond industrial competition, it is a question of operational superiority. This is the real order of priorities. The question of industrial property is essential in this field. We must protect the background and share the foreground in balanced conditions. Also, the expertise is above all in the brains of the engineers!
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret . - Obviously, we must be concerned with the issue of exportability. It would be a mistake to dwell on the difficulties between manufacturers. We must think about these questions: who will we sell the FCAS to and why? If we do not advance at the European level, we will never do it. It is currently the most promising project for the future, if only because of the technologies' dual nature. Additionally, the innovations within the framework of the FCAS could be used to modernise current equipment.
We have always believed in European defence. The official stances are evolving gradually. We must not stop with the cooperation with the Germans and the Spanish. It is no doubt a shame to have missed the boat with the Italians. After the demonstrator, we must enlarge cooperation.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut . - One of the principles set for the FCAS is the "best athlete". This comes from experience on the A400M, where this principle did not prevail. Today, everyone agrees on this principle, and it shows in how the pillars are divided up. It is encouraging. And France is the leader on the FCAS: the DGA is steering it.
Mr Jean-Pierre Vial . - It is a dream that we want to realise together, but let's not forget about the extra costs due to German complexities on the EPR! On the FCAS, should we not be thinking about a European aircraft carrier for the FCAS to land on?
Ms Hélène Conway-Mouret . - That is a relevant question. When Jean Monnet started the European cooperation, he chose a step-by-step policy. He advanced little by little.
Mr Ronan Le Gleut . - All our proposals express prudent optimism.
Mr Christian Cambon, Chairman . - Are the British totally opposed to a convergence of the FCAS and the Tempest? We should investigate this question.
The committee adopts the information report.