SENAT
Report n° 132 (2008-2009) by M. Marcel-Pierre CLEACH, Senator (for the parliament office for the evaluation of scientific and technological choices)
Disponible au format Acrobat (822 Koctets)
III. THE FRENCH AND EUROPEAN FISHERIES: A POLICY FAILURE
The common fishing policy is one of Europe's oldest and most integrated policies. The earliest common measures adopted for the fishing sector date from 1970, when the European Community decided to grant equal fishing-zone access to the fishermen of all member states, while at the same time setting aside the coastal fishing zones for the smaller-scale, more "traditional" forms of fishing with historical rights. At the same time appeared a common market policy, as well as a coordinated policy for the modernization of Europe's fishing fleets.
These measures assumed a new dimension with the collective decision in 1976 to extend from 12 to 200 nautical miles the exclusive economic zones of the member states.
The common fishing policy appeared several years later, in 1983.
Without over-simplifying, it could be said that, inspired by the common agricultural policy and imbued with the spirit of the times marked by the development of fisheries and the extension of EEZs, the first objective of the CFP was to raise the capacity of the European Community's fishing industry . This seemed all the more necessary with a large trade deficit which appeared as though it could be absorbed, at least in part, by increasing the fishing effort in the waters of both the European Community and non-European countries. Therefore, the CFP initially pursued a policy of increased production. Only progressively and, above all, following the serious industry crisis of the 1990s, did the necessity become apparent to reduce capacities and seek a sustainable management of the halieutic resources rather than an increase in catches.
Since 1990, the European Commission is aware of the fact that the European fleet suffers from both a large overcapacity (estimated at 40% at the time) and serious difficulties with its stock-management method. In its 2003 report, the Académie des Sciences noted: "Unable to adjust production capacities to the halieutic stocks' potential for renewal, for the past ten years or so, European authorities have abandoned the Maximum Sustainable Yield objective, preferring - for safety's sake - to confine themselves to catch limits below which the stocks' survival would be in jeopardy".
While the turning point had been reached, it is not in the nature of European politicians to change direction so rapidly in such a short period of time, especially as the systems of governance encourage the member states to resist these changes and the fishermen, whose boats had been subsidized, find themselves obliged to fish in order to cover their increased expenses.
Your rapporteur will here return to an analysis of the common fishing policy via the green paper of 2001, the reform of 2002 and future prospects. I will also consider one of the most obvious European-fishery examples by turning my attention to the situation in the Mediterranean. Finally, I will draw a panoramic picture of the French fishing industry.
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The fishing industry within the European Union The fishing industry represents 1% of the European Union's GDP . This modest figure masks the fact that the EU is one of the world's largest fishing powers, second only to China, with a production of 7 million tonnes from fishing and aquaculture in 2005. Although the EU exports 2 million tonnes, it remains extremely dependent on foreign fishermen, importing 6 million tonnes, for a trade deficit of over €13 billion . There are some 88,000 fishing boats in the EU . While fishing is no longer very important in terms of jobs at the European level, it remains important in certain fishing-dependent regions (Galicia, the Algarve, the Azores, Scotland, etc.). In total, an estimated 190,000 fishermen work full- or part-time in Europe. Aquaculture represents 1.3 million tonnes for the same period. In 2006, the EU's most productive member state was Denmark (17.4%), followed by Spain (15.2%) and France (12%). |
A. THE 2001 GREEN PAPER: AN EVER-TOPICAL DOCUMENT
The "Green paper on the future of the common fisheries policy" was published in March 2001 by the European Commission as preparation for the reform of the CFP planned for 2002. It was meant to frame the European debate. In the opinion of your rapporteur , it constituted an important step, because, with its publication, the Commission demonstrated its capacity to present a lucid panoramic picture of the CFP and the necessity for its reform .
Published no less than eight years ago, this document remains astonishingly topical and could almost be republished word-for-word today. Not only is the diagnosis of the European fisheries as valid as ever, but most of the report's recommendations remain equally pertinent. While reading the green paper, one at times has the impression of having lost a decade. Your rapporteur has found in the report some of the same observations that I have collected during my various meetings.
Your rapporteur would here like to cursorily revisit this document, in order to measure, firstly, the "expert consensus" on the paper's analysis and proposals for reform, and, secondly, the report's topicality .
1. The observed failure
For the Commission, the CFP "faced great challenges", for "it did not allow for the attainment of its objective; namely, a sustainable exploitation of resources ". The Commission considered that "numerous stocks saw their volumes settle below reasonable biological limits" due to over-exploitation, the situation being particularly serious with regard to the demersal stocks, such as cod, hake and whiting. At the time, it estimated that "if the current trends continue, numerous stocks will collapse" and pointed out that "the European Community's various fishing fleets enjoy a capacity well above that which is necessary to carry out a sustainable form of fishing. The current reduction in stocks is largely due to the fixing of annual catch limits above those proposed by the European Commission based on scientific assessment and to insufficiently ambitious plans for the management of the fishing fleet. The weak application of the decisions made has also contributed to overfishing". The Commission added that "All over the world, concern is strong regarding the disastrous state of numerous fish stocks and the overcapacity of the fishing fleet".
In addition, "the fishing sector is characterized by its economic fragility resulting from overinvestment, a rapid rise in costs and a dwindling resource, an evolution reflected in the industry's mediocre profitability and constant decline in jobs".
Finally, "at the political level, fishing-industry actors feel that they are insufficiently involved in the CFP's management and many of them cite unfair treatment when it comes to respecting and applying the implemented measures."
After presenting this realistic if rather dismal summary, the Commission made a more positive observation: "However, not everything is negative. The CFP has provided a few positive results over the past twenty years. To a large extent, it has managed to check ocean conflicts, to lend a certain amount of stability to the fishing sector, and to forecast - at least, upon until today - the stocks' collapse, a phenomenon that has occasionally occurred in other parts of the world. However, we have paid dearly for these few positive results, if one considers the long-term viability of the fishing sector. The current situation requires immediate, deep-seated reform of the CFP, independent of the legal obligations linked to the 2002 deadline."
Following this general presentation, the Commission revisited the fundamental principles of the CFP. It considered the wide consensus in favour of the general goal of a responsible fishing industry as defined by the FAO: one which provides for the protection, management and development of marine resources, while respecting the ecosystems and biodiversity, allowing the current and future generations to continue to profit from the oceans' environmental services.
It also pointed out that, according to Article 174 of the treaty, the CFP, interacting with the environment, must be founded upon the principle of precaution .
However, the Commission observed that the objectives forced upon the CFP were contradictory, even incompatible:
- Ensure the protection of increasingly fragile stocks, while encouraging the pursuit of fishing.
- Modernize the means of production, while limiting the fishing effort.
- Appropriately implement protective measures, it being understood, however, that the member states retain the upper hand with regard to monitoring and the imposition of sanctions.
- Maintain jobs, while reducing the capacity of the fishing fleet.
- Ensure fishermen a decent revenue, even while the Community imports more and more fish products.
2. The prospects without CFP reform
The Commission then analyzed the prospects without reform of the CFP and this from several perspectives: the protection of stocks, the environmental aspect, the fishing fleet, the decision-making process, monitoring, the socio-economic aspect, and fishing in the Mediterranean.
The state of the principal fish stocks was a cause of alarm. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) was able to demonstrate that the quantities of adult demersal fish have decreased significantly over the past 25 years; between 1970 and 1990, their stocks diminished by 90%. Commercialized tonnages posted similar decreases. Pelagic fish, on the other hand, saw their numbers increase, due in large part to the restoration of the herring stock, as well as, no doubt, the decreased numbers of predators. The continuity of many stocks was all the more in jeopardy due to a lower-than-predicted regeneration rate, necessitating specific measures for the stocks' reconstitution.
This situation was to be explained by shortcomings in the management of the CFP. The CFP relied almost exclusively on yearly catch limits (Total Allowable Catches or TACs and national quotas), combined with technical measures and the controlling of the fishing effort. "These measures have largely failed."
In addition, the Commission observed that "nor was it possible to sufficiently involve the fishermen in the implemented policy, though this would have made it possible to win their adherence and take advantage of their savoir-faire" . Furthermore, the tools proved largely ineffective for managing the multispecific fish stocks and numerous technical measures went unheeded, especially in the Mediterranean.
The environmental aspect was also worrying. The Commission estimated that the CFP should, in the future, integrate environmental concerns in a much more vigorous manner. Habitat degradation due to fishing activities was a source of ever greater anxiety, while our knowledge of how marine ecosystems work and the side effects of fishing remained insufficiently complete.
In this respect, the Commission admitted that: "To be fair, it should be pointed out that many questions raised with regard to the marine environment are not linked to the fishing industry, which itself has suffered from environmental degradation. Pollution is detrimental to the quality of fish offered consumers. Pollution and climate change have also contributed to the decrease in stock and the increased scarcity of fish in certain zones. In addition to these factors, there are the effects of tourism."
With regard to the fleet, the Commission estimated that "the current fleet is much too large . Technological advances increase fishing-boat efficiency, while reducing the effectiveness of efforts tending towards a scheduled reduction in capacity". It observed that reports published in 1990 and 1995 recommended an average reduction in the mortality-by-fishing rate of 40% (and sometimes much higher) and, therefore, a strong decrease in the fishing effort. In particular, it regretted that following an effort of around 15% between 1992 and 1996, the single goal of a 3% reduction from 1997 to 2001 in reality led to an increase in the catch rate due to significant technological advances having been made. For this reason, the Commission deemed that "If the course currently being pursued is not corrected, not only will it prove impossible to reduce the fleet's excessive catch, but the fishing effort will again increase, even though it is already too great with regard to the state of the stocks".
The decision-making process did not seem well suited to the necessity of reacting to local problems or to crisis situations, such as the immediate closure of fishing zones. What is more, "the fishing-industry actors have the impression of being insufficiently involved in certain important aspects of the CFP (for instance, the elaboration of scientific assessments or the adoption of technical measures). In particular, many fishermen feel that their opinions and knowledge are not given the consideration they deserve by the decision makers and scientists. This lack of participation weakens their adherence to the protective measures adopted. " Once again, the Commission concluded that " the CFP cannot be successfully reformed if the fishermen feel that their interests, viewpoints and experience are neglected ".
With regard to surveillance and monitoring , the "current" measures were judged insufficient and their effectiveness not up to task vis-à-vis the needs of the European Union .
The assessment was rather serious: "The surveillance and monitoring actions implemented for the CFP's objectives are considered by many as being insufficient and discriminatory. In almost all member states, the fishermen request that a more centralized and harmonious monitoring system be set up at the European Community level; this, they feel, would allow for more effective action and ensure fair treatment throughout the Community." Once again, the Commission underlined the seriousness of the situation: "If this opportunity is not taken advantage of, the CFP could lose all credibility".
Socio-economic considerations were not absent from the green paper, but these were limited to pointing out the importance of government subsidies provided to the sector, the "regrettable" effects of overcapacity on the fleet's profitability, an ever declining employment, and that "if the current policies and approaches are not reconsidered, the economic sustainability and viability of the fishing industry will increasingly deteriorate."
The Commission very clearly pointed out the strong correlation between overcapacity, the fleet's profitability and the halieutic resources available: "In a situation of overcapacity, the more-or-less-constant total commercialized fish catch must be shared among a greater number of actors. Overcapacity has a certain number of regrettable economic consequences: each ship, considered separately, is less able to procure an adequate revenue; fleet profitability suffers from the underuse of investments; concomitantly, the insufficient return on investment delays modernization and further weakens competitiveness."
Its judgement of government subsidies was severe: "Regarding the subsidies today benefitting investments carried out in the fishing sector and certain fiscal measures such as a reduction of the fuel tax, they certainly do not contribute to the attainment of these goals; by artificially reducing the costs, as well as the risks inherent to investment, they in fact aggravate the difficulties of a sector already suffering from overcapitalization. When a ship is granted a subsidy, every ship in the concerned fleet sees its productivity and profitability suffer. The policy of granting subsidies also has a perverse effect on competition, given the fact that the ships, both subsidized and non-subsidized, share the same fishing zones and the same market."
According to the Commission, using subsidies to protect fishing jobs is just as detrimental and doomed to failure. Subsidies have not managed to prevent a 2%-per-year decrease in employment due to the combined effect of an ever-scarcer resource and technological advances; what is more, the fleet's low profitability prevents an increase in remuneration.
Once again, the Commission's conclusion was unambiguous: "The economic policies so far carried out in the fishing industry at the European and national levels leave much to be desired."
Finally, with regard to fishing in the Mediterranean, the Commission observed that: "It has proven difficult to apply and enforce minimum catch sizes. The existence of a market for the smallest fish, the absence - traditional, in certain regions of the Mediterranean - of rigorous controls, and the widespread feeling among fishermen of not having been sufficiently involved in the decision-making process" together have resulted in a particularly unsatisfactory situation, especially considering that the non-EU fleets were far from being subject to the same regulations.
3. The desirable reforms
Backed by this analysis - which remains, it should once again be emphasized, strikingly topical - the Commission put forward in 2001 a certain number of proposals for strengthening and improving the CFP with regard to the various aspects considered .
To strengthen resource protection, the Commission proposed, first and foremost, a multiyear, multispecific and ecosystemic management of the stocks . Multiyear plans based upon the principle of precaution should serve as the basis of stock management, no matter the state of the stocks, in order to escape the serious disadvantages resulting from the annual fixing of TACs and quotas, in particular, the postponement of difficult decisions and, "back to the wall", sudden changes. The Commission recommended a duration of 3 to 5 years , as is the case with agreements made with non-EU states such as Norway.
Among the other measures meant to remedy the stock situation, the Commission put forward banning rejections in certain fisheries or closing certain zones and fixing a percentage for those species the victims of incidental catches. While there was a need for a new debate on technical measures, it was also necessary to involve the fishermen in the rule-defining process, to encourage closer cooperation between fishermen and scientists, and to promote greater transparency with regard to scientific assessments .
With regard to the fleet, the Commission deemed it necessary to accept the fact that technological progress was, each year, automatically increasing the fishing effort and that it would therefore be necessary to establish a reduction rate of sufficient magnitude to, at the very least, neutralize this effect , while at the same time specifying the outlines according to the member states and the different fisheries. The Commission also advocated abolishing all government aid likely to increase fleet capacity .
In addition, improving the governance of the CFP seemed an important line of reform to be carried out, via the promotion of greater involvement on the part of concerned actors by their closer and earlier involvement in the process.
This objective also implied according greater consideration to scientific assessments . In this regard, the Commission believed that "A healthy scientific foundation is necessary to be able to help the fishing-sector representatives and other concerned parties to finalize their decision. The CFP must be based upon assessments that are the fruit of a multidisciplinary approach that combines, in particular, biology, ecology and the socio-economic sciences. "
More generally, in terms of research, the Commission called for a much deeper knowledge and understanding of ecosystems to take into account all implications of the measures taken within the framework of the CFP. The Commission rightly pointed out that this research could not be purely instrumental insofar as it would only serve to justify technical measures . It insisted on the fact that it must also be enriched with the knowledge and understanding of the fishermen themselves. While remaining independent, it would have to both remain credible and act as a source of consensus.
In light of this correct analysis and these ambitious proposals, the reform of 2002 proved unsuccessful.
B. 2002: AN UNSUCCESSFUL REFORM
Following the reform of 2002, the CFP's current objective is to guarantee the sustainable exploitation of halieutic resources; to this end, the European Community is attempting to apply the principle of precaution.
Armed with such tools as Total Allowable Catches (TAC), the limitation of the fishing effort, technical measures, and the obligation to declare all catches (both commercialized and rejected), the European Community tries to prevent an excessive pressure on the stocks.
The European Fisheries Fund is the financial and structural instrument of this policy and follows the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). It was adopted on 19 June 2006 by the Council of the European Union for a sever-year period (2007-2013). It is endowed with €3.8 billion, 33% less than the FIFG.
With regard to fisheries control, an EU inspection body was set up in 2007: the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA), whose mission is to enforce the rules and regulations in a more effective and homogeneous manner. Its headquarters are in Spain.
As concerns the fleet, the reform of 2002 essentially led to the halt of subsidies for the construction of new boats starting 1 January 2005 . The current objective is that each new construction be compensated for by the destruction of an equivalent or greater capacity. Government subsidies can now only be devoted to improving the safety, selectivity and quality of production.
1. TACs and quotas
EU-level TACs and quantitative catch limits remain an important CFP tool. In accordance with halieutic research, they seek to maximize fishery yield by removing as much as is possible without compromising the stock's equilibrium and renewal.
These TACs are divided among the member countries in the form of national quotas that obey historic allocation rates based upon the fishing precedence of each state and the rule of "relative stability"; in other words, the maintenance of each state's share.
They are fixed according to a yearly or two-yearly schedule following a long process during which the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), an international scientific authority overseeing the Northeast Atlantic and headquartered in Copenhagen, furnishes a scientific assessment for all fish stocks, excepting those of the Mediterranean. French scientists, for the most part from IFREMER, are well represented in the formulation of these assessments, which are then submitted to the European Union's Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). Of the 32 members chosen by the Commission, two are French. Backed by this double scientific examination, the Commission then proposes TACs and quotas to the member states and submits them to negotiation during a Council of Fisheries Ministers during the month of December. During the following year, the states manage and control their assigned quotas. They also keep the Commission informed, so that it is able to follow the situation at the global European Union level.
Since 2002, the Commission has set up multiyear management plans that can also act as restoration plans if needed by the stocks. In addition, these plans seek to acquire a multispecific dimension as soon as interdependent stocks are concerned.
2. The management of deepwater species
One of the most striking examples of this new approach is the case of deepwater species , which are fished for at depths of over 400 metres . These species are characterized by a long longevity, slow growth rate and late maturity . They are therefore highly vulnerable to overfishing , for their stocks can only recover at a very slow rate.
In Europe, five species are particularly concerned: the cusk, the blue ling, the roundnose grenadier, the orange roughy and the black scabbardfish. These fish live several decades (up to 150 years for the roughy) and usually reach reproductive maturity after 10 years, though sometimes later.
The exploitation of these fish grew especially starting in the early 1990s, in order to compensate for resource losses due essentially to the poor state of the North Sea demersal fish stocks.
Forming aggregations, these species can be subjected to intense exploitation, while remaining limited in quantity; in other words, their geographical zones are exhausted one after the other, just like mineral deposits.
This state of affairs has led scientists to recommend a strong decrease in the fishing effort and a ban on the development of any new fisheries without prior scientific approval. Stock by stock, ICES recommendations range from a 30% reduction to a complete ban on fishing, for certain species are simply incapable of withstanding such pressure.
Faced with this situation, Europe has set up specific permits, raised the number of stocks subject to quota, and has taken measures for the reduction or closure of fishing activities in certain zones or for certain species; however, it has not acted as rapidly as requested by scientists.
3. Selectivity and reducing rejections
Another goal of the CFP is to limit the environmental impact of fishing, in particular to protect non-targeted species that can constitute incidental catches.
The Commission continued to highlight the selectivity of fishing devices .
Selectivity is a particularly complex subject. It, of course, seeks to preserve a stock's "spawning capital" by minimizing the juvenile catch. Its goal is also to limit catches of non-targeted species, both commercialized and non-commercialized species of fish, mammals and birds, not to mention those animals that are the subject of protective measures. This policy is necessarily a compromise, for European fisheries (allowing for exceptions) do not lend themselves to monospecific management; rather, catches always consist of a combination of species co-existing within the same zone and which may hardly be fished separately.
It results in the imposition of not only mesh sizes, but also particular mesh forms (such as the trawl nets' square mesh which remain open), as well as the installation of selection grids.
Selectivity can also lead to seasonal or geographic fishery closures, in particular to preserve juveniles and nurseries.
This attempt at selectivity increasingly seeks to reduce or even eliminate rejections; in other words, all organic, animal-based materials caught by the fishing machinery and which are then rejected (thrown back into the sea), more often than not dead. While these rejections can be involuntary, they are often voluntary, because a well-known pernicious effect of fishery management is the fact that it is in the fishermen's interest to maximize the commercial value of their holds. Finally, rejections can be due to differences in consumer taste, with certain fish failing to find buyers on the local market.
In Europe, rejections account for an estimated 10-60% of the catch, depending on the fishery. In certain cases, this percentage is even higher. At the global level, the FAO's estimation is 8% of the total catch weight and 7.3 million tonnes in 2005.
Such rejection levels reduce the impact of any measure taken to manage and protect the ecosystem, for these rejections include juveniles, over-the-quota catches and protected species.
This unutilized resource represents a veritable economic, ecological and food waste.
In Europe, the problem of rejections has become all the more acute with the poor state of the stocks. Indeed, the more fragile the stock, the greater the percentage of juveniles and other species rejected due to the target fish becoming increasingly rare.
Following the example of foreign countries, it is becoming increasingly necessary to transform this objective of limiting rejections, from a procedural or means-based obligation into a results-based obligation, via the progressive elimination and banning of rejections (the entire catch having to be brought back to port) with the implementation of a maximum percentage of authorized incidental catches.
Although particularly restrictive and costly in the short term, this policy's economic impact is usually not as great as professionals fear and, above all, ensures the latter medium-term profits.
4. Fishermen's involvement in the decision-making process
A final aspect is the greater involvement in the decision-making process of all concerned parties . Created in 1970, the Advisory Committee on Fisheries was first expanded in 2000 to include NGOs and aquaculturalists. This reform was accompanied by a much more extensive information campaign targeting professionals and the financing of their participation in the Community dialogue. However, centralized at the European level, it could not really guarantee their involvement in the decision-making process. The reflections that led to the reform of 2002 had strongly emphasized this shortcoming; that is why a network of Regional Advisory Councils was created . Their mission is to provide assessments and, in certain cases, they must be consulted. There are 7 such councils for all of Europe. Having only recently been set up, they no doubt have yet to prove their full effectiveness.
However, your rapporteur feels that greater dialogue is still needed. These councils remain too distant from the field and still cover fishing zones that are too large with too many actors. It would seem necessary to create a lower level of greater pertinence with regard to the fishing grounds.
Your rapporteur also believes that, if we want to treat the various industry actors as being truly responsible for the management and future of the industry, then we must certainly consider giving these councils additional powers. Limited to a strictly advisory role, they can only be expected to adopt an anti-establishment and corporatist position vis-à-vis Brussels. Your rapporteur proposes that these councils be granted real management and decision-making powers over the fisheries located within their geographical zones.
Despite these evolutions and the fact that the reform has undoubtedly prevented a catastrophic evolution of the fisheries, it is clear that most of the problems identified in 2001 are still around in 2008.
For Commissioner Joe Borg, while there is no alternative to the Common Fisheries Policy, the resource being shared and mobile, nevertheless " in its current form, the CFP does not encourage responsible behaviour on the part of fishermen or policy decision-makers. The instruments [...] favour a partial, short-term decision-making process". This results in a vicious cycle that penalizes those fishermen that respect the rules, the industry's economic profitability, and the health of the oceans.
At this stage and looking to the publication of a future document laying the groundwork for a new, extensive reform of the CFP, the Commission has identified the following main obstacles:
- The overcapacity of the fleet, which today is capable of capturing two to three times the maximum constant yield.
- Accountability on the part of fishermen faced with the objective of ecological sustainability.
- The complexity of the rules and regulations and the necessity to develop subsidiarity.
C. EXAMPLE OF FISHING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, IN PARTICULAR BLUEFIN TUNA FISHING
Fishing in the Mediterranean stands out for the high level of specificity in its management and its examination must distinguish between the general situation and tuna fishing in particular.
1. General set of issues concerning fishing in the Mediterranean
At the European level, fishing in the Mediterranean stands out for its different management measures. There are no EEZs, no TACs and no quotas. Fishing is regulated via technical measures, except for the bluefin tuna. The Mediterranean's continental shelves are relatively small, the shared stocks limited in number, and the dominant form of fishing is small in scale and multispecific (the exception, once again, being bluefin-tuna fishing).
The Mediterranean fishing fleet consists of around 100,000 boats, 45% of which are European and 90% of which are small crafts.
The catch volume accounts for some 1 million tonnes, or around 1% of the world fish catch . Of the European catch, which account for 60% of the total Mediterranean catch, Italy accounts for 53%, Spain for 25%, Greece for 15% and France for 7%.
While this fishery represents only 20% of the European catch volume, it accounts for 35% of its value.
Small pelagic species and demersal fish each make up of 35% of the total commercialized volume, with crustaceans and molluscs accounting for 25% and the large migratory fish (tuna and swordfish) accounting for 5%.
The French Mediterranean fleet consists of 1,600 boats, 21% of the national total . This fleet is made up of small crafts (1,500), trawlers (90) and tuna seiners (35).
The fleet's production is concentrated in the Gulf of Lion (90%) and around Sète (48%).
Half of the Gulf of Lion catch, excepting tuna, is made up of demersal species (80% fish and 20% molluscs and crustaceans), with the other half consisting of small pelagic fish (75% sardines and 25% anchovies). The total catch volume is 35,000 tonnes (5.6% of the national volume), for a value of €100 million (10% of the national total).
In the absence of TACs and quotas, fishing is limited only by technical measures, initially issued by elected industrial tribunals.
The General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) oversees fishing for the entire Mediterranean basin. This body is responsible for fishery management and must decree management measures. 23 countries belong to the commission. It would seem to function far from perfectly, insofar as the member states are hardly determined to communicate their scientific data and apply the commonly undertaken measures . The Mediterranean is characterized by the weakness of its fishing controls and the frequency of its illegal fishing activities. During his meetings, your rapporteur had the strong impression that the authorities did not feel authorized to sanction their fishermen insofar as they feared being the only ones to apply such strict management measures.
However, the narrowness of the continental shelves and the meagre number of shared resources make Mediterranean fishing an essentially national issue.
More than elsewhere, it would therefore be necessary to make fishermen more aware of their responsibility and increase their involvement in management . To this end, one must increase the links with the scientific community and significantly strengthen the means of the fishing committees and industrial tribunals , whose actions would be rendered all the more effective to the extent that the states fully carry out their monitoring and sanctioning mission.
In the Mediterranean as in other geographical zones, the fisheries are regressing . The analysis of commercialized catches since 1970 shows that the Mediterranean-wide maximum catch was reached during the 1995-1996 period and that catches have diminished ever since then. At the European level, the maximum was reached in 1986 (750,000 tonnes), with today's catches amounting to 563,000 tonnes.
According to scientists, while the stocks of small pelagic fish are generally under-exploited, demersal-fish stocks are being fully exploited in a largely unsustainable manner. Indeed, there exists a large market for fish measuring around 10 cm, far below the mature size . This situation's relative longevity could be explained by the preservation of large sires in the underwater canyons, allowing for a reasonable extraction of juvenile fish. However, this situation continues to worry both scientists and fishermen. The former because they fear that by over-fishing juveniles, too few fish will reach maturity; the latter because they denounce the Spanish fleet's destructive fishing of underwater canyons located outside this country's territorial waters.
2. Bluefin tuna: the predicted catastrophe
Bluefin tuna has become at once the focal point of all international attention with regard to fishing management, symbolic of an international malaise, and the great taboo wherever it can be avoided so as not to speak only about the bluefin tuna, so as not to discuss such a contentious subject, or simply, and above all, because the reality of the situation can hardly be contested - but such an acknowledgement would necessitate action .
The bluefin is one of many species of tuna, along with albacore, skipjack and bonito. Bluefin tuna can grow up to 3 metres in length, weigh up to 700 kg, and live as long as 40 years. This great migratory fish lives throughout the Atlantic Ocean and adjoining seas. Its two reproduction zones are the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. In the Mediterranean, the bluefin reaches sexual maturity at the age of 4, for a weight of 35 kg and a length of 1 m. In the Caribbean, sexual maturity is reached at the age of 8, for a weight of 130 kg and a length of 2 m. The fish spawn in open water, resulting in large concentrations that coincide with the traditional fishing periods and make the species very vulnerable.
As is the case with many marine species, the biology of the bluefin tuna remains quite mysterious. The number of independent or interdependent stocks making up the tuna population remains unknown. Traditionally - and this forms the basis of the species' international management - it has been thought that two distinct stocks exist: one in the west, reproducing in the Gulf of Mexico, and the other in the east, reproducing in the Mediterranean. This division is a management convention and undoubtedly not a scientific fact. Indeed, by examining their otoliths 22 ( * ) , American researchers have demonstrated that many tuna from the Mediterranean are to be found off the east coast of North America. They have thereby shown that the stocks are much more porous than was previously thought. Many researchers consider that both Americans and Europeans exploit this debate for their own ends, with the former long defending the stock's uniqueness and the latter its division due to differences over preferred fishery management, for if the stock were unique, the United States would have a say in the Mediterranean fishery. However, here American and European interests diverge because bluefin tuna are, in particular, the subject of a large sports-fishing industry in North America.
This quarrel is perhaps outdated, because the existence of a third stock has recently been hypothesized. Reproducing in the western Mediterranean, this stock would migrate, while the eastern Mediterranean stock would migrate but little or not at all.
Bluefin migrations themselves remain mysterious. Do they follow an unchanging cycle or, on the contrary, are they influenced by currents and climate changes? Are they linked to the populations of small pelagic fish? Do they depend on the size of the stock? These hypotheses are likely with regard to the now-extinct bluefin fisheries off the coasts of Brittany and Norway.
Traditionally, bluefin tuna were fished using the "tunny net" technique, a sort of labyrinth of nets near the coasts. This limited-impact method accounted for 90% of the bluefin tuna catch up until the early 20 th century and today represents no more than 5%. Today, the purse seine accounts for 60% of the bluefin catch; these immense circular seines, 2 km long and 250 m deep, are closed from the bottom up. Long-lining still accounts for one fifth of the catch; long-lines can be over 100 km in length, with more than 3,000 hooks attached.
Bluefin fishing is essentially carried out in the Mediterranean, the other zones being much smaller and, in certain cases, exhausted, such as the Antarctic bluefin fishery. While the actual catch volume for the Mediterranean is a source of contention, this figure likely exceeds 50,000 tonnes.
European fishermen account for the greater part of this catch: 20% for France, 16% for Spain, 14% for Italy and 1% for Greece. Japan accounts for only 9% of the catch and the United States 7%. Although carried out in international waters, bluefin fishing is mostly a European problem.
The development of bluefin fishing is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was only in the 1980s that the export market to Japan was developed and the practice of eating raw fish spread. At the same time, prices sharply increased, making bluefin tuna a highly sought-after, luxury product. To meet demand, compensate for the smaller catches, and guarantee the provision of fresh fish of excellent quality all year round, the practice of bluefin fattening developed starting in the mid-1990s. Between 1996 and 2006, the number of fattening pens increased 25 fold and production grew from 200 to 25,000 tonnes .
The consequences of this practice are very serious, for not only does fattening further blur fishing statistics and interfere with controls, it is also disastrous for the environment, as are most methods for the intensive farming of carnivorous fish. According to IFREMER researchers, 20 kg of wild fish are required to produce 1 kg of bluefin tuna.
But the greatest cause of concern is overfishing.
As is the case for all marine species, the bluefin tuna population is subject to short- and long-term interannual variations, depending on factors all the more mysterious as reliable historic data are lacking. This analysis has led scientists to estimate that, since the 1950s, the stock's average natural production amounts to some 25,000 tonnes . According to these same scientists, since 1990 and the doubling of the catch which officially reached 50,000 tonnes in 1998, we have surpassed this natural limit , for the current period is not one of natural "over-productivity" for bluefin tuna. To ensure this growth, the tuna fleet's catch capacity has grown exponentially for the past 30 years. In France, engine power has tripled over the past 20 years, while advances in technology have provided fishermen with sonar, aeroplanes, etc.
What is more, the international management system complicates attempts at analyzing the situation of the bluefin tuna.
Bluefin tuna are managed by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), which has fixed, since 1996, a TAC and national quotas which are meant to be respected. However, the official and fallacious respect of quotas results in an under-declaration of catch volumes, which was already the subject of a 20% correction in 1998. In addition, it is often estimated that the bluefin catch, despite the lowered quota, has remained unchanged since this period (in other words, between 50,000 and 60,000 tonnes).
Up until recently, no Mediterranean state has considered these quotas as obligatory, which in fact they are.
No state has incurred sanctions for surpassing these quotas.
In Europe, this was made all the more difficult by the fact that all modern ships were acquired via European subsidies following ministerial authorization, even though the problem of overfishing was already a recognized fact.
A recent exception was France , which admitted to having greatly surpassed its quota. This action was well received and France hoped to attract a following among its closest partners, beginning with Italy and Spain, but this effort failed. France remained isolated in its attempt at truthfulness. At the same time, it is likely that French seiners are far from being exemplary. It is common knowledge, following several news reports in the written press and on television, that laid up ships replaced by the most modern, subsidized vessels are thought to have been registered in Libya, while remaining the property of the same financial interests. Likewise, in the summer, the Commission clearly expressed its suspicions concerning a French fleet that had declared having used up only half of its quota and several of whose ships had supposedly fished nothing after three weeks at sea.
Such a situation cannot be sustainable. Scientists observe a mortality-by-fishing rate 2.5 times greater than the optimal value and a collapse of the spawner population , though it remains for the time being capable of providing a sufficient recruitment . The population pyramid for bluefin tuna increasingly resembles an upside down hammer: a wide base made up of the yet-to-be-fished young and a handle made up of the very small number of surviving adults.
For the past several years, scientists have issued very conservative assessments regarding the bluefin tuna and have called for a great decrease in quotas. For 2009, the bracket was fixed between 8,000 and 15,000 tonnes. ICCAT decided to fix the quota at 22,000 tonnes. It was 28,500 tonnes in 2008, but actual catch volumes would remain at their previous levels. In fact, the Mediterranean tuna fleet is growing and it must fish to remain profitable. The WWF has estimated the capacity of the 617 identified ships at 42,000 tonnes. The fishing capacity of France's seiners has been estimated at 15,000 tonnes, while their quota is fixed at 4,800 tonnes.
The bluefin tuna situation would perhaps be less serious if it were reversible and concerned only this one species.
However, it has today been shown that the collapse of a superior-predator stock in an ecosystem is liable to entail an irreversible regime change , with the species in question incapable of ever recovering its initial state.
But, there is perhaps already evidence of this regime change in the Mediterranean , with an abundance of tuna prey, the small pelagic species and jellyfish.
If the bluefin tuna population were to collapse (as can now be expected), this would not only have economic consequences on the fishing industry, which would then call for government assistance, it would also affect the entire ecosystem, which would become less rich, less productive and less resistant to outside aggressions. The loss of value in the Mediterranean would therefore be much greater than a lower turnover for the tuna boats!
All things considered, the Mediterranean would appear to be a basin in which the absence of any real cooperation with regard to the management of marine resources represents an obstacle to their protection and even their simple scientific understanding . In the Mediterranean, the decrease in catches and the occasional spikes in the jellyfish population are plausible evidence of a degradation of the marine environment. However, such an evolution is not inevitable, the Mediterranean is not doomed to become, like the Black Sea, a collapsed ecosystem.
For this reason, your rapporteur proposes that fishery management and halieutic research become a federative theme of the Union for the Mediterranean . Such an initiative would likely be welcomed by several countries, beginning with Italy, the basin's principal fishing power.
I also propose that Europe, which accounts for half of the bluefin catch and is largely to blame for overcapacities, take its full share of responsibility for the management of this fishery . Important fleet reductions must be carried out, quotas must be drastically reduced, and control measures significantly reinforced .
Those European states which do not cooperate must be heavily sanctioned by the Commission, which must initiate the necessary disciplinary procedures. Likewise, the Commission must apply effective pressure on southern Mediterranean countries which act irresponsibly.
To prevent other fishermen from benefitting from a strict European policy, the EU could close its territory to illegal fishing practices, by closing its market to commercialization or its coasts to fattening . It should also unilaterally decree marine reserves , in particular sanctuaries for tuna reproduction, modelled after those which already exist for the protection of marine mammals and in which the EU would enforce its fishing policy. Ideally, the entire Mediterranean should be closed to tuna fishing for several years during the reproductive period of May and June.
At the same time, it will also be necessary to strongly support research to further our understanding of bluefin biology, essential for the future sustainable management of this species .
To this end, it would seem equally essential to locate reliable fishing statistics . The gap between officially declared catches and estimated catches has never ceased to grow since the establishment of a fishing quota for the species in 1996. The ratio for 2007 is estimated at 1:2; this discrepancy will perhaps increase if we continue to lower quotas without imposing other measures for their enforcement. This obviously makes it problematic to know the fishery's real situation.
D. THE FRENCH FISHING INDUSTRY AT THE TIME FOR MAKING CHOICES
1. The analysis of the Poseidon Report: a sector in difficulty
The Poseidon Report of December 2006 analyzed the French fishing industry, which it described as being "confronted with new issues", "at the time for making choices ", with its "industry-based approach - which implies a policy of supporting structures, ship owners and crews - [being] insufficient". 23 ( * )
a) The analysis of the International and European framework
The report judged that the international studies converged to demonstrate:
- That the catch had ceilinged out, despite an ever-greater fishing effort.
- Above all, the insufficient application of regional regulations meant to bring fishing practices back to their optimal quotas, thereby harming "reasonable" fishermen and encouraging illegal fishing whose production, for certain stocks, outweighs the authorized catch.
- The growing dependence on aquaculture to meet our needs, thereby provoking collateral problems such as increased pressure on the so-called "fish-meal species" 24 ( * ) , local pollution and the contamination of wild species.
The report also pointed out the growing contamination risk posed by terrestrial pollutants to fish and seafood, making them dangerous for consumption.
At the European level, the constant modernization of fishing capacities over the previous 30 years had, according to the report, progressively entailed the over-exploitation of a large share of the principal halieutic stocks present in European waters. "The Common Fisheries Policy has so far failed to check this serious trend".
For this reason, the report observed that "Much of the sector is, as a result, currently losing its profitability, aggravated by the constant rise in fuel prices. The very viability, in the short- and medium-term, of the fishing industry is therefore in danger" .
Faced with this situation, the report observed that the European Commission "rightly imposes ever greater constraints and ever more catch limits" , thereby provoking conflicts with and between fishing professionals due to the shortage. It concluded that a "true European fishery policy" had to be voluntarist and will necessarily be difficult to assume by the states .
The Poseidon Report pointed out the particularly topical case of the end-of-the-year negotiations over TACs and quotas, which gives "a deplorable image" of Europe and leads the Commission to accept compromises that are "precarious and sometimes unenforceable".
For the past several years, the Commission has, in addition, sought to ensure the states' proper application of fishing regulations - as a respect for the shared rules is the essential starting point for any fishery policy - thanks to the creation of the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) and increased European inspection missions.
The report concluded that:
" The uncertainty of annual decisions centered on stock management today penalizes all industry actors. Therefore, it would be best for the scientific models to produce multiyear recommendations that take into account the economic perspectives.
"Otherwise, fishing-industry decisions will remain the fruit of a conflictual conjuncture of scientific recommendations, economic worries and political issues linked to the current economic climate , during bitter annual negotiations between the European countries. The shift to sustainable management will make profitability possible and result in a serene European climate. The central issue is determining the nonbiased direction to be taken in order to attain more profitable conditions (restoring the potential of the halieutic stocks, an appropriate fishing effort).
"In this regard, [...] the economically-necessary industry evolutions [are]: balancing the fleet with the exploited resources, favouring the technical evolution toward more selective fishing devices and greater safety, and improving the supervision of fishery access. "
b) The difficulties facing the French fishing industry
Within this European framework, of which France is an integral part, our national fisheries appear to be in particular difficulty .
The French fishing industry currently produces only 15% of the fish and seafood consumed nationally , and the processing centres of Lorient and Boulogne now depend more upon import-export than upon French fisheries. In Boulogne, 350,000 tonnes are processed annually, while only 60,000 tonnes are actually fished.
The report also observed overcapacities that are to blame for profitability and overfishing problems.
This situation results in a high level of government aid, which "naturally" led the authors to "question the pertinence of maintaining such assistance: more than €800 million including social assistance - more if one also includes temporary subsidies linked to the rise in fuel prices - compared to a turnover of €1.1 billion at the first sale in 2004. Other European countries have chosen to abandon this sector, especially as imports are competitive and meet the market's demands [...]. Various reports (by the OECD, for example) note the perverse effect of permanent assistance. The ever-shrinking leeway to preserve jobs and competitiveness foretells the inexorable erosion of activities within the sector, an evolution liable to generate social conflict. Certain technical choices favoured in France (trawl netting) are becoming handicaps with the rise in energy prices. Fuel can represent one third of a small-scale fishing operation's turnover. This statement of fact should serve as an impetus for work, research, innovation and modification of practices to produce fishing devices suited to the new constraints".
2. The evolution of the French fishing industry over the past 20 years
To continue further in this analysis, one must reconsider the overall state and evolution of the French fishing industry over the past 20 years. Your rapporteur will here rely on statistical data furnished by IFREMER and, more particularly, on a paper I was presented with by Patrick Berthou.
The French fishing industry provides some 16,000 fulltime jobs, with an estimated 24,000 people at sea .
The Atlantic, English Channel and North Sea fleet is largely concentrated along the coast of Brittany , which accounts for 41% of the industry's ships, 45% of its nominal on-board power, 55% of its gross tonnage and 41% of its direct at-sea employment. The Pays de la Loire and Basse-Normandie regions each constitute around 15% of the national fleet.
Since 1983, the number of metropolitan ships has fallen by 54%, from nearly 12,000 to around 5,000 vessels ; this drop was especially sudden between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The fleet remains essentially made up of boats under 12 metres in length (4,000), but it was this category that was the most affected, for there were over 9,400 such boats in 1983. Ships over 12 metres in length have also decreased significantly, dropping by 39%, from 2,200 to 1,400 vessels.
However, the average nominal power has, over this same period which saw the fleet's size shrink, grown by 68%. Considering the fleet in its entirety , this evolution resulted in an increase in total power up until 1989 (+8%), followed by a decrease over the remaining period. In total, the drop in power amounted to -26%; however, this decrease has been compensated for by advances in technology.
Despite these major evolutions, the fleet's geographic distribution has remained stable over the past ten years. The metropolitan fleet - 70% of which is stationed along the western seaboard - represents 70% of the French fleet.
Since 1990, this North Sea/English Channel/Atlantic fleet has decreased in number by 36% (3,900 in 2003), though average ship size has grown by 6% (12.3 metres) and average power by 19%.
This fleet has also aged, with average vessel age rising from 15 to 20 years and the percentage of ships more than 25 years old rising from 14 to 28%. However, in the "Europe of fifteen", the French fleet remains by far the youngest.
While the western fleet's activity is concentrated along the coast, more and more fishing is being done on the high sea. In number, coastal ships represent 72% of the fleet (compared to 16% for open-sea vessels), in number of sailors 46% (compared to 38%) and in total power 37% (compared to 48%).
In terms of production value, the high-sea catch represents 54% of the western-seaboard total, compared to only 30% for the coastal ships.
This fleet practices an especially wide variety of fishing types , the four most important of which utilize trawlers, nets, pots and dragnets. High-sea fishing relies principally upon trawlers. The French fleet is also highly versatile ; while 1,800 ships are equipped with only one mechanical harvesting device (most of the high-sea fishery), more than 1,200 have two and 600 have three such devices.
If one separates the fleet's turnover into different fishing types, the prominence of trawl netting becomes clear; out of a total of a little more than €1 billion, dedicated trawlers account for nearly €600 million, nearly €500 million of which is produced by high-sea trawling. If one also considers non-dedicated trawlers, then this fishing method alone represents nearly 70% of the value of the western seaboard fishery .
Finally, excepting a few high-sea fisheries (in particular, for langoustines), the greater part of the fishing value is produced within the 12-mile strip and, in all cases, within the EEZ .
On the western seaboard, 53 stocks represent 90% of the commercialized catch from the Bay of Biscay and 50% from the English Channel.
Of these 53 stocks, 10 are deemed to be in good condition, 33 to be at risk and 10 to be in critical danger.
The above overview explains the difficult situation of the French fishing industry.
The situation of these resources is not better than elsewhere in Europe; however, due to the predominance of trawling, the French industry is much more vulnerable to the rise in energy costs (as has been demonstrated these past few months) and to the desire to increase selectivity .
The fleet's organization also shows the greatly divergent interests separating French fishermen, depending on their particular fishing method and, therefore, their targeted species. Likewise, the gap is growing between high-sea fishing, which accounts for the greater part of production, and the important small-scale fishing sector, although the French fleet provides only a small share of the national fish-and-seafood market.
Another obvious question concerns the concentration and evolution of the various fishing methods. For instance, shifting to the Danish-seine method, which is much more energy efficient, would imply a significant reduction of the fleet.
To help alleviate the difficulties plaguing the sector, the government set up a 2-year, €310 million assistance plan which came into effect in early 2008 and which is financed, in part, by a new tax on the retail sale of fish (product estimated at €80 million per year).
It mainly consists of fleet reductions . It also includes other assistance measures liable to improve the sector's long-term orientation: modernization in favour of safety and energy efficiency, the creation of a minimum monthly salary to move away from catch-based remuneration, assistance dealing with stock-restoration measures, help in setting up young workers, and the creation of an ecolabel.
Well received by the profession, this plan has above all revealed a deep unrest, for destruction and retirement requests were double the expected amount .
It includes a research section placed at the forefront of the group of measures, but provided with €2.6 million; your rapporteur was puzzled by this section's formulation in the electronic flyer sent out by Michel Barnier to the Members of Parliament : "The amendments will target sensitive stocks to which French fisheries are constrained, in order to strengthen the arguments of the French delegation during negotiations pertaining to the fixing of Total Allowable Catches"!
Concurrent with the announcement of this plan, the President of the Republic gave a speech on 19 January in Boulogne-sur-Mer which appeared to advocate the abolition of TACs and fishing quotas. This speech was very poorly received in Europe.
Taken overall, this plan remains a temporary economic adjustment that ignores the four fundamental issues explaining the French fleet's deficient profitability :
- The insufficient halieutic resource.
- The overcapacity maintained by advances in technology.
- The dependency on subsidies.
- The specialization in trawling.
* 22 Otoliths are bones located in the inner ears of fish. They are marked by annual - sometimes intra-annual or even daily - stria that allow scientists to determine the fish's age. Their isotopic composition also allows scientists to determine their geographic origin.
* 23 P. 52 and following pages, Poseidon Group report, Une ambition maritime pour la France ("A maritime goal for France"), Centre d'Analyse Stratégique ("Strategic Analysis Centre") and Secrétariat Général à la Mer ("General Secretariat for the French Action at Sea"), Paris, La Documentation Française, no. 5-2006, 160 pp.
* 24 Species targeted by the fishing industry for the manufacture, in particular, of fish meals and oils.