B. GERMANY: AN INDISPENSABLE PARTNER
Unlike the United Kingdom, Germany is not a natural partner of France with regard to defence. This is essentially due to various historical reasons. That said, a pragmatic and coherent approach inevitably leads to the conclusion that Germany must play an important role in European defence.
1. Germany and defence, a complex issue
As your rapporteurs have already indicated, it is pointless to seek to build a credible European defence without considering the points of view of the various European nations. An examination of Germany's role in European defence first and foremost means looking at how the notion is perceived in that country.
The primary defining element of the issue is first of all the Federal Republic's deliberate choice, assumed and claimed, to turn its back on the German militarist tradition. It is important to emphasise this point, because when some in France criticise the notion of a “parliamentary army” in which no significant military decision can be made without prior authorisation from the Bundestag, they forget that this is a fundamental aspect of the identity of modern democratic Germany. It is not only an institutional reality, but a political and social reality as well: the German population has an instinctive mistrust of military operations, a sentiment that deserves respect because it is the fruit of hard historical lessons.
The second historical element is that Germany was at the heart of the Cold War. On the one hand, it was divided into two States for more than 50 years, and deprived of its capital, which was itself divided. As a result, these two States were integrated into larger defence systems, and thus were in a way relieved of any independent responsibility for their own defence. In particular, there remains at this time a particularly strong American presence in Germany. This American protection is undoubtedly one factor that helps explain the relatively low German budget for NATO defence spending : indeed, it amounted to only 1.36% of GDP in 2019.
In addition, Cold War tensions posed a direct threat to the security of Germany and its people, in particular including the fear of a major conflict involving the use of atomic weapons, which contributed to the emergence in West Germany of a powerful pacifist movement that remains a major presence today in a broad segment of the German left.
Finally, Germany today is a major industrial power in Europe and the world; this is nothing new, but in the new context of German defence it has become a natural expression of Germany's standing and influence, which undoubtedly contributes to its reduced concern for military matters in regard to international affairs.
To sum up, as one interviewee put it, “when someone says European defence, the French hear the word `Defence' and the Germans hear the word `Europe.'“
2. Germany's natural role in European defence
With 83 million inhabitants, Germany is the most populous country in the European Union, and the second largest in Europe after Russia, on a par with Turkey.
Germany is also the fourth biggest economy in the world 63 ( * ) and the biggest in Europe. Its economic strength, furthermore, is largely based on its top-tier industrial capabilities. Lastly, according to NATO statistics, Germany's defence budget exceeded that of France for the first time in 2019. 64 ( * )
For these reasons, it is clear that Germany necessarily has a major role to play in European defence, even if it is not its natural inclination. For the time being, it has been very involved in NATO, in particular through the framework nations concept, which brings several NATO countries together around common equipment standards. It goes without saying that the use of the framework nation concept is also a considerable asset for its DTIB, which thus finds guaranteed outlets in its partner countries.
3. The imperative to overcome the difficulties of implementing a Franco-German partnership
a) The strong symbols of Franco-German friendship
The Franco-German relationship has been at the foundation of European integration since the beginning. Since the idea of Union integration came from the desire to prohibit any future war between European States, and since our two countries fought three wars in 70 years, Franco-German defence cooperation clearly has a special meaning.
This relationship is marked by strong symbolic elements, such as the Franco-German brigade (FGB), created in 1989. This unit, under binational command, is made up of 5,000 soldiers from both countries.
Though it has been deployed on several occasions, the FGB is nonetheless limited in its action by rules of engagement that differ profoundly in both countries. For this reason, the French and German units attached to the FGB work side by side rather than together, which is already an expression of real operational solidarity.
b) A context transformed by Brexit
The magnitude of Franco-German defence cooperation has necessarily changed as a result of Brexit. Indeed, defence issues within the Union were hitherto strongly marked by the positions of the two primary military powers, France and the United Kingdom, which as we have pointed out also share a great cultural and operational similarity in this domain.
Although Franco-British cooperation is essentially intergovernmental in nature, Brexit has had concrete consequences for the cooperation of the two countries, both for political and budgetary reasons. For example, the United Kingdom decided not to continue the work that had begun on the Future Air Combat System (FCAS).
In these conditions, France had no choice in regard to its capability ambitions but to turn to its other major partner, with which it had already been working in the aeronautics field via Airbus.
c) A partnership relaunched around major capabilities projects: FCAS and MGCS
(1) The Future Air Combat System (FCAS), a foundational project
In all respects, FCAS is a major programme and, from the French point of view, a vital one . Indeed, the French military doctrine is articulated around nuclear deterrence, which itself includes two components: an airborne component and a naval component. The airborne component has a fundamental role in the political implementation of deterrence, since it offers the President of the Republic flexibility of use. These are classic elements, but while they are well known in France, they are often misunderstood by our European partners, for whom the notion of deterrence is not in common use. It is thus relevant to point out that the airborne component allows the President of the Republic to hold back from striking until the last moment, while also showing any enemy threatening our vital interests that our ability to fight back and our determination are very real.
This is why France has always needed total autonomy in regard to the carriers of this airborne component. It is also the reason why it developed a high level fourth-generation aircraft on its own: the Rafale .
With FCAS, France and Germany will work together to equip themselves directly with a sixth-generation aircraft.
Naturally, this raises profound conceptual issues , since at present the needs of the two countries are significantly different . France needs an air superiority fighter capable of entering heavily-defended enemy territory to deliver a nuclear strike if necessary. Germany does not share the same aims, although its air force today does handle NATO's atomic deterrence weapons. Moreover, German Air Force missions focus more on police aviation activity than on the kinds of operational engagements and war missions conducted by French pilots, particularly in the context of operations Chammal and Barkhane.
In addition, it is clear that FCAS will be a comprehensive combat system, which is to be built around a sixth-generation fighter jet, referred to for the time being as a Next Generation Fighter (NGF), but which will include numerous other elements as well, in particular drones that will serve as remote avatars for the primary fighter.
This considerable project thus requires mastery of a very broad range of advanced technologies, combining skills in the aeronautical, optronic, communication and artificial intelligence fields.
Obviously, an alliance around this project, headed by France and Germany , and joined as well by Spain, should allow the development of a truly European fighter jet, naturally suited to equip the greatest possible number of European armies.
Of course, this will also raise the question of the role of the United Kingdom , which has announced the development of a competing project called Tempest . As previously indicated, it is very unlikely that the European countries will have the capacity to develop two sixth-generation fighter jets. Your rapporteurs are therefore convinced that at some point it will be necessary for these two projects to converge, and for the United Kingdom to contribute to the development of the FCAS.
(2) The other component of the comprehensive agreement: the future ground combat system (MGCS)
Along the same lines as for the FCAS, France and Germany have agreed to jointly develop a future ground combat system known in English as the Main Ground Combat System , or MGCS. The principle is in a way comparable to that of the FCAS: rather than a tank, it will be a set of connected platforms communicating with one another, which will include land combat robots. As in the aerospace domain, this will be a major technological and conceptual leap forward.
d) Implementation difficulties
The Franco-German political accord on FCAS and MGCS provided for a division of roles. In the aerospace domain, France would take the leadership role, particularly reflecting Dassault's pre-eminence in the production of the NGF. In the terrestrial domain, Germany would lead the project, which would be handled by the joint venture KNDS, made up of the French firm Nexter and the German firm KMW.
The idea was therefore one of balanced division, with a 50/50 industrial distribution, but with French leadership for the aerospace component and German leadership for the terrestrial component.
It is apparent that from the German side, this political agreement would at present seem difficult to implement, in particular at the Bundestag. Some German parliamentarians are exerting strong pressure to increase Germany's share in this division of tasks. At the same time, German manufacturers are also seeking to ensure a presence that would permit them to acquire the skills they lack, particularly in the aerospace domain.
This context has been further complicated by the offensive of the German industrial firm Rheinmetall, which has sought to take over both the MGCS project and its German competitor KMW at the same time.
Your rapporteurs are of the opinion that it has now become necessary to warn all stakeholders in this matter of the risks that this approach poses to these two projects, which are essential to the reinforcement of the European defence. These risks are now quite real.
With regard to the FCAS, first of all, this project cannot be seen as an opportunity for those who lack the mastery of certain skills to acquire them. This is indeed the stumbling block on which European armaments cooperation has all too often faltered: participating countries taking responsibility for domains in which they have no specific competence so as to thus acquire it. This logic of industrial conquest is untenable in such a highly competitive context where the technological and industrial challenges will already be considerable.
As far as the MGCS is concerned, while it is certainly legitimate for Rheinmetall to take part in the project, ultimately this question is up to the German State. It is incumbent upon Germany to decide how much of its half of the project it wishes to give to Rheinmetall. It would seem that certain German parliamentarians have taken the position that KNDS should not be seen as validly representing the share due to the German side. This statement is obviously difficult to support, however, since KNDS is 50% owned by the German company KMW, which is directly owned by a German family. It is therefore clear that even if the MGCS were to be entrusted to KNDS in its entirety, Franco-German parity would still be respected. Moreover, from this perspective, we note in passing that Rheinmetall is in fact much less German than KMW, since its majority shareholder is a US pension fund.
It is to be hoped that these tensions are only temporary and that considerations of common interest will encourage their prompt resolution.
This issue is made even more complex by the extremely sensitive issue of exports. At the present time, it is Germany's position that it can block the export of weapons equipment when such equipment includes German parts, sometimes even in very small proportions. Naturally, this poses a risk to the equilibrium of the two projects and, more generally, to the cooperation of the two countries in the armaments field. The two governments are therefore engaged in a timely effort to define rules for the export of jointly produced equipment. In a sense this reproduces the aim of the Debré-Schmidt agreements, which set rules covering half a dozen subjects in this domain. Discussions are currently on a minimum threshold, below which each country would be free to export.
Your rapporteurs are obliged to point out here that the difficulties concerning exports are somewhat paradoxical , because even if this fact is perhaps not very clearly perceived by public opinion, Germany is in fact quite a major arms exporter : according to SIPRI, German arms exports are now almost equal to French arms exports. German arms exports were in fact even higher than French arms exports from 2008 to 2012. It is also established that a significant share of these exports are by subsidiaries of German companies established outside Germany and sometimes even outside Europe, for example in South Africa.
These are difficult issues, but if they are not addressed promptly, they may dangerously encumber the major projects underway.
e) Is it possible to reconcile the French and German conceptions of defence?
Behind the ad hoc difficulties posed by the issues involved in the industrial share-out of projects and exports, the question naturally arises of whether the French and German conceptions of defence might be brought closer together in due course. The primary disagreement has to do with the relationship to the operational dimensions of defence matters. In this regard, the two conceptions remain quite divergent .
Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine that once France and Germany have spent 20 years jointly building the FCAS and MGCS, the experience will necessarily lead their approaches to converge. It would seem impossible for a common equipment project to be defined , after all, unless there is a shared threat analysis and a shared doctrine of use.
It is also conceivable that the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) might usefully contribute to bringing these conceptions closer together, since that forum is specifically intended to develop a common strategic culture amongst European nations, including those that are not or are no longer members of the Union.
France and Germany will also need to arrive at an agreement on what their real, mutually accepted and assumed mutual dependencies will be, as France, the United Kingdom and Italy have managed to do in regard to MBDA.
There is however one fundamental motive that will very likely drive progress in a favourable direction: external constraints. Certain non-European powers harbour the hope that European nations can be divided, which would prevent them from defending their interests properly. But defence , in this respect, is only one aspect of strategic autonomy, which is also expressed on the industrial, commercial and digital levels. In these areas, vital to the German economy, we can expect that country to be fully mobilised. The major capacity-building projects launched by France and Germany will therefore be borne forward in Germany by the awareness that those projects will also help build the capacity of European nations to develop industrial products independently, and to master their design, technology, use and their sale in foreign markets.
* 63 After the United States, China and Japan.
* 64 NATO Press Release (2019) 069 of 25 June 2019.