III. WHITHER SYRIA?
Syria is a multiconfessional country with a Sunni majority and Christian, Alawite, Druze and Kurd minorities. That does not keep it from being very attached to its unity, which is imposed with an iron fist by one Alawite family, the Assads, who control the army and have gradually opened up and liberalized the economy.
A. SYRIA'S STRATEGY: REFORM ITS ECONOMY WHILE PRESERVING ITS UNITY
Economic development is gradually moving forward. Bashar el-Assad does not intend to be a "Syrian Gorbachev" whose reforms would shake the foundations of power. Syria expects economic openness to attract the investors its economy needs and would not like them to be from Iran. Europe is being courted but its big corporations, such as Alsthom, have bad memories of past experiences and are reluctant to make new commitments. Syria is more successful with certain small and medium-sized companies, such as BEL cheese, which has built one of its regional plants there. The European Investment Bank is also active in Syria. The country's trade is growing, in particular with Turkey, which has become its main economic partner. Although Syria's development is closely controlled, it has spawned social equality. Beautiful neighborhoods with luxury are alongside poverty. What's more, the country has approximately a million Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. Inflation is high and, in that context, ethnic tensions are emerging, in particular between the Arab majority and the large non-Arab-speaking Kurdish minority in the north, where most of the country's small oil reserves are located. The Syrian authorities take the tensions that could threaten the country's unity very seriously.
B. SYRIAN DIPLOMACY: HARD IN APPEARANCE, BALANCED IN REALITY
Syria belongs to the group of countries forming the "rejection front" but its hardline attitude towards Israel is primarily intended for domestic consumption. In a brightening but still tough economic context, it helps shift the public's frustrations to a foreign scapegoat.
Syrian diplomacy is actually less univocal than it seems. Damascus knows how to play its various hands depending on the circumstances.
Damascus gives Lebanon's Hezbollah important aid and the movement's weapons and money from Iran transit through Syria, which also hosts the political branch of Hamas and its leader, Khaled Meshaal. An old friendship links it with Iran and strong arguments will be necessary to convince the country to renounce it. The handover of the Golan Heights, which Israel annexed in 1967, would make a decisive contribution.
Damascus plays the France card with a great deal of realism. Syria has a complex relationship with France, made up of attraction to its republican, centralized model and hard feelings over the action our country conducted against its presence in Lebanon.
Syria plays one or another of those cards depending on the circumstances. If the situation eases it draws closer to France and urges Turkey to open talks with Israel over Golan. If the situation becomes tense, it becomes closer to Iran and brings its influence on Hezbollah and Hamas into play. Damascus walks a tightrope to look out for its national interests of the moment.
Today Syria is seeking détente in its relations with the West. The International Criminal Court's release of four pro-Syrian Lebanese generals incarcerated in August 2005 in the framework of the investigation of Rafik Hariri's assassination probably helped to warm up the climate. The appointment of a US ambassador and the prospect of a visit to Damascus by the king of Saudi Arabia can only accentuate the trend. On May 20, 2009 Syria released Michel Kilo and Mahmoud Issa, two important political prisoners who had served out their sentences.
Nevertheless, the domestic political situation is changing at a snail's pace. Signatories of the Damascus Declaration for Non-Violent National Democratic Change, who belong to a broad coalition of political parties created in 2005, have been in jail since participating in December 2008 in an assembly that wanted to set up a national council representing them. Observers believe the human rights situation in Syria has actually regressed rather than improved. Trials, when they take place at all, do not respect the rights of the defense. Abuse and torture remain common. The situation is reportedly worse than at the end of the Hafez el-Assad era, when many political prisoners were released.
Moreover, Damascus applauded Ahmadinejad's reelection in Iran and the official media did not mention the protests or accusations of vote fraud. They did recall his commitment to the poor and a peaceful nuclear program.
The rapporteurs nevertheless conclude that the president's decision to normalize France's relations with Syria was right and should be pursued, but that Syria should be pressured into releasing jailed human rights campaigners.