III. THE GAP BETWEEN PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS

When a crowd pulled down the statue of Saddam Hussein, the quintessential Arab tyrant, in downtown Baghdad in April 2003, hopes were running high that the Arab world was finally on the road to democracy. Most regimes displayed a desire for reform, held elections and made conciliatory gestures towards the opposition, but none can really be called democratic. Democracy is not just an operational method limited to elections. It is also a set of values based on human rights guaranteed by an impartial State and the rule of law.

A. THE REGION'S DIVERSE POLITICAL PICTURE

The region's political picture is actually fairly diversified. Even among the monarchies, there is a difference between those that ban all political activities or refuse to hold elections and those that have a veritable political arena and elected parliaments. Among the republics, there are those that are or aspire to become hereditary, those that totally rule out elections and political parties and those that grant the press and opposition a tightly muzzled freedom of expression.

B. DEMOCRACIES IN NAME ONLY

Instead of becoming a firmly established institution, democracy in the Middle East is mostly a sham. Elections, long reduced to being mere plebiscites, offer a particularly interesting illustration. In 2005 a wave of them took place in Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, where President Mubarak, in power since 1981, held the first apparently free and fair presidential elections under pressure from the United States. Then legislative elections made the Muslim Brotherhood the leading opposition force in a powerless parliament. But those elections are seldom pluralistic and competitive. They have been administered by regimes bent on controlling the results through manipulating voting laws, banning opposition parties and combining fraud with repression.

C. THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The many causes mainly involve some governments' lack of legitimacy, which allows people to accept an institution's authority without excessive constraint. However, most of the regimes in the Arab Orient are undergoing an acute crisis of legitimacy. Few have genuine historical or democratic legitimacy. Peoples submit to their power but hate them. All that is left are local solidarity networks: religious, tribal, clan, etc. Only "patriotic" legitimacy, granted to those who fight the foes of the (Arab) Nation, thereby restoring its dignity, seems to have any currency. But no head of State since Nasser has met the people's expectations in that regard 8 ( * ) .

IV. A DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST

The Arab States' resentment of Western countries has deep roots in the colonial period but grew with the creation of the State of Israel.

Their inability to militarily defeat Israel, combined with the separate peace treaties signed by that country with Egypt and Jordan, which allows it to dictate its terms to all the other parties, starting with the Palestinians, explains why the Arab-Israeli conflict has dragged on for 60 years. Arab peoples and governments have blamed, not wrongly, the Western powers. But that self-justifying discourse eventually reached its limits and the inability to win a war or make peace has been a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalist movements, which have re-appropriated the Arab nationalist discourse and replaced it with a religious one. That was made all the easier when religious references such as "crusade" and "axis of evil" peppered the speeches of the main Western power's leader, George W. Bush.

A. REJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Throughout the Middle East we encountered a blatant rejection of America's power, image and values, not only in the "Arab street" but also among the governing elites of the United States' most loyal allies.

Public opinion in all the Arab and Muslim countries denounce the Bush administration's moralizing policy, stigmatization of Arab regimes as "Islamo-terrorist", invasion of Iraq and unshakeable support for Israel's settlement policy. All Arab and Muslim rulers have had to take that into account.

Yes as soon as a threat looms those same rulers are the first to ask the United States to play the part of sponsor and protector. That is the perverse game of meddling and interference Henry Laurens denounced. Who do they call upon to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The United States. Who do they ask to pressure Iran? The United States. The Americans are requested to become involved, but criticized for their interfering as soon as they do. The Arab States have a schizophrenic relationship with the United States, and it is to escape from that oppressive tête-à-tête that they have asked Europe to increase its presence.

B. HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPE

The Arab States praise Europe for its light-handed approach, willingness to dialogue and emphasis on values, compared to the United States, which puts too much importance on a procedural definition of democracy. They like Europeans for their culture and historical ties with the region. France is especially appreciated for its long-standing sensitivity to Arab demands.

But let there be no mistake. If the Arab elites want more Europe, it is primarily because they want less America. If they praise European soft power, it is because they have had enough of the previous administration's unilateralism. If President Obama shows more sensitivity, culture and open-mindedness, as he did with remarkable talent in Cairo, the Arab elites will soon be knocking on Washington's door again. But mistrust of the West and the desire to preserve a threatened identity will continue strewing stumbling blocks on the road to better relations.

* 8 Voir Amin Maalouf - Le dérèglement du monde - Grasset 2009