B. A FEW POSSIBLE MEANS OF IMPROVING OVERALL COHERENCE
1. The “European army”: a utopian, even counterproductive project
The idea of ??a European army has been mentioned at the highest level by the leaders of the European Union, on several occasions:
- in 2015 by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission;
- on 6 November 2018 by Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic ( “We will not be able to protect the Europeans unless we decide to have a true European army.” );
- on 12 November 2018 by German Chancellor Angela Merkel ( “We have to work on a vision to establish a real European army one day” );
- on 16 January 2019 by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez.
But an analysis of existing devices shows that we are far from a utopian “European army,” a logical idea, doubtless attractive to some, but unachievable even in the medium term, because such an army would be a sign of highly advanced political unity, which is unlikely to come about very quickly.
The European army is “a dream, which could turn out to be a nightmare,” writes General Pierre de Villiers, former Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces. 78 ( * ) Your rapporteurs share this opinion. What leader would such a European army obey? What rules of engagement would it follow? Are the people of Europe prepared to risk their lives in such an army? Might it not risk creating an entity that would be more bureaucratic than operational, due to the divisions within the EU?
If the intention is to encourage cooperation agreements and explain them to the general public in simplified terms, it would be better to avoid terms such as “European army,” which are perceived abroad as troubling ; your rapporteurs are only all too aware of this fact, because their contacts asked them about it in all the countries they visited.
The essentially federalist idea of ??a European army is of concern to all Europeans who feel an attachment to national sovereignty. But beyond that, these terms are of concern because they provoke a fear that the protection of NATO that is considered to be effective might be progressively replaced by a system that is still not clearly defined, and the fear that American disengagement in a virtual sense may end up leading to American disengagement in a real sense. This is, implicitly, the question that several of our contacts asked.
2. Possible improvements to the existing arrangements
The proliferation of initiatives is at this time a positive state of affairs; it would be illusory to hope to fuse the whole into one completely rationalised system. A progressive, pragmatic approach should instead be preferred, in diversified frameworks (EU or non-EU), whilst maintaining dialogue with all our partners.
a) A new European defence and security treaty?
The idea of ??a Franco-German-British treaty was launched after the referendum on Brexit, in particular to tie British defence to the Franco-German driving force behind the EU, and in so doing to draw in other European countries, rather than exclude them.
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Could a Franco-German-British treaty revitalise European defence? Jean-Dominique Giuliani, President of the Robert Schuman Foundation, has made the following proposal: “This draft treaty puts forward three innovative suggestions which a Anglo-Franco-German treaty might introduce for the defence and security of Europe: - To reinforce the effective solidarity of the three leading European powers, which must be the forerunners, but remain open to other European States joining them to provide mutual assistance if they are ever obliged to engage their armed forces; - To make a concrete commitment to increase their defence efforts to prevent any instability resulting from disarmament, - To overcome NATO-EU opposition by recognising the liberty of all parties to take such action as they see fit, whether on a bilateral basis or within the European Union framework.” Source: Fondation Robert Schuman |
The participation of the UK in EU defence projects will in any case need to be regulated in the context of a treaty. This treaty, and the treaty that will be established to govern their economic relations, together must comprise the two pillars of the relationship between the EU and the UK.
This treaty could serve to establish the European Security Council that has been called for by both the German Chancellor and the President of the French Republic, a key contribution of which could be to serve as a means for involving the United Kingdom in the handling of foreign and policy and defence issues. The operating procedures such a “Security Council” would follow, however, remain to be defined. How could all interested nations of the EU be made able to participate without causing blockages, i.e., allowing those who want and are able to do so to move forward? Such is the key issue the “Security Council” would need to resolve.
b) Possible focus areas for streamlining
First of all, it must be reaffirmed that the ambitions of NATO and the EU are not contradictory but complementary, and mutually reinforcing. This is clearly apparent from an examination of the complementary nature of art. 42 (7) (EU Treaty) and art. 5 (NATO Treaty) , which should prevent any misunderstanding.
In addition to the difference in geographical scope (NATO includes 22 members of the EU), the EU and NATO are set up to intervene in different types of situations, or in support of one another; this must be clearly established and explained , so as to never give the impression that the EU seeks to assume a responsibility that for the time being it is unable to assume, or that European defence is intended to be built against the Americans, which would be absurd.
Among the areas where the respective roles of the EU and NATO differ, the following are noteworthy:
- “High-end” threats, in particular the collective defence of the continent, would seem logically to be a NATO issue, while EU action would seem more appropriate for crisis management matters;
- Situations in which the United States wishes to intervene logically call for NATO action; when the US does not wish to intervene, EU action is in the interest of both the European nations and the Americans.
Security issues in Africa for example may be of greater interest to European countries, where these issues may have direct consequences (terrorism, migration). Furthermore, the EU has a significant advantage for interventions in Africa because of its ability to implement a comprehensive approach, including not only a military dimension but also diplomatic, economic, and development aid dimensions, etc.
From the capability perspective, NATO and EU defence planning needs to be better articulated ; the former is a long-standing structured process (the NATO Defence Planning Process, or NDPP), while the second is progressively coming together, but lacks comprehensive policy guidance.
NATO and EU processes in general need to be better articulated. This is an old concern, and one that was expressed by Madeleine Albright when she was Secretary of State of the United States, who emphasised the importance of avoiding the three Ds: “de-linking,” “duplicating” and “discriminating.”
European planning is still governed by a bottom-up rather than a top-down logic - that is, it responds first to the needs of the Member States, rather than systematically acting to fill European capability gaps. Also, European planning is not currently cyclical: it must become so, and align with NATO's planning cycles. 79 ( * )
Between the Global Strategy, the capability processes and the existing operational arrangements in the European Union, there is obviously a missing link, needed to ensure a minimum of overall coherence. The indispensable next step, for which your rapporteurs advocate, is that a White Paper must be prepared. This should be one of the priorities of the new European executive.
* 78 “Qu'est-ce qu'un chef ?”, Pierre de Villiers, Fayard, 2018.
* 79 “Défense de l'Union européenne : le processus de mise en oeuvre du Livre blanc”, a study by Frédéric Mauro, prepared upon request by the European Parliament Subcommittee on “Security and Defence,” December 2018.