GENERAL CONCLUSION
Building a European defence implies the acceptance of a certain interdependence , and therefore the establishment of relations of trust between European States. An attempt to push through a turnkey French concept would be doomed to failure. We need to start by getting to know and understand our partners' positions; but this must of course be reciprocal, so as to build trust, which must be based not only on mutual understanding but also on long-term compliance with the commitments made.
We must never fall into the illusion or give the impression that we think Europe could ever become a kind of “France writ large” ; this can never be so, since our frames of reference and our ways of thinking, like those of our European partners, stem from our history and our collective instincts.
France must play a leading role in the EU : it has obviously been doing so for a long time, with numerous and fruitful proposals. It must further strengthen its role in NATO , where it has a key position to help balance approaches and advocate for the strengthening of European defence, not against the United States but with it. Everyone on both sides of the Atlantic can understand that this involves a process of strategic empowerment and a rebalancing of relationships.
“The NATO solidarity clause is called Article 5, not Article F-35” : 80 ( * ) the defence of Europe cannot be bought with equipment contracts ; that would contradict the values ??that have underpinned the solidity of the transatlantic relationship for more than two centuries. Euro-American solidarity must be unconditional, because its aim is to defend a set of values, our civilisation.
Finally, building trust also means getting the peoples of Europe to agree with the aims and methods of European defence. “A Europe that protects” must become a reality. For this purpose, we must begin by changing the “narrative” on European defence, so as to highlight our common interests and our collective actions; not by resorting to any kind of propaganda, of course, but by making an effort to respond to the spread of misinformation and rumours, old phenomena that today have proliferated thanks to digital networking.
It is urgently necessary to jumpstart European public opinion, to explain the security-defence continuum, to highlight Europe's strengths rather than always focusing on its weaknesses, and strive, ultimately, to make advances in European defence before being forced to do so by a major crisis that would make us realise, only all too late, how serious these issues really are.
EXAMINATION IN COMMITTEE
In its meeting held Wednesday 3 July 2019, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee, presided by Christian Cambon, Chairman, examined the Information Report on European Defence prepared by Ronan Le Gleut and Hélène Conway-Mouret.
Christian Cambon, Chairman. - This morning we will be discussing the Information Report prepared by Ronan Le Gleut and Hélène Conway-Mouret on European defence, the result of a long-term project involving many trips, meetings and hearings.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur. - European defence is like the proverbial glass: some say the glass is half empty, others say it's half full. My colleague Hélène Conway-Mouret and I spent six months working on these issues, conducting numerous hearings and making seven visits across Europe. This work has led us to cast our lot with those who see the glass half full.
It's true that European defence, which we have sometimes referred to as the “Europe of Defence” [ Europe de la défense ] (we refer you to the previous report of our Committee, which showed that this concept of a Europe of Defence wasn't working), is something of a chimera, which has been talked about a lot but has at times not seemed to be making much progress.
But when we look at all the initiatives that are underway, in all the various frameworks - European Union, NATO, bilateral, multilateral - it becomes clear that things are in fact moving forward. Of course, this is not taking place according to any careful plan, or as part of a larger overall political scheme, but we must admit that European defence is indeed evolving, in a multifaceted manner, at different speeds and in different configurations in different countries.
One of the first things that struck us was that the traditional French approach, which involves putting forth political concepts and then trying to fit reality to that theoretical framework, is not the best suited to this issue. We have to be pragmatic: if we want a European defence, we would likely be well-advised to pay attention to what other European nations think and take an interested in how our partners perceive the issues.
From this perspective, it seems to us that there are two false debates here that we have to avoid.
The first is the supposed opposition between the European Union and NATO that some have posited. In France, one often hears the assertion that we will need to choose between European defence and the defence provided by NATO. It is important to keep firmly in mind that this supposed opposition is basically an idea exclusive to France, and is not shared by any of our twenty-seven partners in the Union. So, for efficiency's sake, we need to choose our words and our attitudes carefully, so that we do not suggest that we might be hoping for an American withdrawal from Europe, because today the defence of Europe is essentially provided by the United States, which alone accounts for two-thirds of the total military expenditure of NATO countries. Within this budget, the military expenditures specifically devoted to the defence of Europe amount to $36 billion, almost as much as the defence budget of France.
I will not dwell on the issue of nuclear sharing arrangements or the Americans' deployment of ballistic missile defence systems in Europe, but we must look at those issues if we wish to understand the positions of many of our partners around Europe.
France is an exception in this landscape. To us, strategic autonomy goes without saying, and is ultimately guaranteed by our nuclear deterrence. Since the Chequers summit of 1995, several Presidents of the Republic have resolved to take the interests of our European partners into consideration as well in our definition of our vital interests as a nation.
Therefore, we must interpret the debate on burden sharing in the context of American preponderance. The investment that the NATO countries would need to make to ensure their collective defence in the event of a US withdrawal has been estimated at about $300 billion. The debate about strategic autonomy is therefore first and foremost a debate about our capability gaps.
The fact that we depend heavily on the United States for our collective defence is, historically, an anomaly. Since the collapse of the Roman Empire, European countries have always had to provide for their own defence. The current situation, then, is the historical legacy of the Second World War and the Cold War. It may seem paradoxical, but although the end of the Cold War should have put an end to this situation and resulted in the European countries taking charge of their own defence again, just the opposite happened; a time came when the European countries, thinking they could reap the dividends of peace, instead reduced their defence efforts.
Though this situation now seems to be evolving, it is only because of a radical change in context. No one believes in the End of History anymore; on the contrary, we are seeing a return to the traditional attitudes of power - in other words, the great powers tend to prefer power relations, or simply the use of force, over the rule of law.
In this context, the United States' priority is their competition with China, not the security of Europe. A review of defence budgets, furthermore, clearly shows that Russia is not strong enough to compete globally with the United States or China. That's the root of the Americans' drumbeat about burden sharing: the United States needs to be able to focus its resources on its competition with China.
On the other hand, as we have endeavoured to show in our report, there is a contradiction in the Americans' logic here, insofar as the US simultaneously demands that Europe buy American equipment and not develop a real European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). There is a conflict in the Americans' discourse between their strategic concerns - that Europe must defend itself rather than relying on the United States - and their economic and industrial concerns - Europe must buy American if it wants to be defended by the United States.
The European nations have understood that the American guarantee of protection, formalised in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, is ultimately neither unconditional nor eternal, to quote one parliamentarian from a highly Atlanticist country.
At the same time, Europe must face the threat on its eastern flank, showing renewed vigour in a series of events, including the war in Georgia, the action in Donbass, the annexation of Crimea, the testing of our air and sea borders, the various spying actions and the attempts to manipulate information or elections.
On the southern front, the threat has taken another form, resulting above all from the collapse of States - Iraq, Syria, Libya, Mali - with two key consequences: the long-term organisation of a jihadist terrorist threat capable of striking European soil, and migratory movements into Europe whose unprecedented speed and nature unprecedented have created a deep disturbance in European countries, promoting the growth of xenophobic and populist movements.
And that's the second false debate; there's no need to choose between focusing on the threat from the south or the threat from the east. European defence must be capable of confronting both the east and the south, otherwise there can be no common defence of the European nations. We think that we have partly put this debate behind us, and the expressions of solidarity we have received from our partners in Eastern Europe, in particular through NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, or EFP), have greatly contributed to that impression.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - The third element that has given new impetus to European defence is the pressure generated by Brexit. Indeed, the United Kingdom plays such an important role in the defence of the continent that its planned departure from the European Union has made many other countries aware of our need to do more for our own defence, and above all to do more together.
But, paradoxically, Brexit has also led to a renewed interest by the United Kingdom in European cooperation arrangements. The geographical reality is unavoidable. In order to defend Europe, we need the United Kingdom. That's why we advocate a close relationship between the United Kingdom and European defence, even if it means a departure from the usual frameworks.
We will need to establish a security and defence treaty between the European Union and the United Kingdom to involve it as much as possible, and permit it to participate in European systems, including the European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation and Galileo.
We will also have to make sure that any positions France may take with regard to Brexit do not impede our bilateral defence cooperation. In London, several of our interviewees mentioned that there may be some “resentment.” It is essential for the exit of the United Kingdom on 31 October - if it does in fact take place on this date - to go smoothly, so that our bilateral relations can be given new impetus as we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Lancaster House treaties next year.
Now we come to the second part of our report. Here I would like to point out that rather than relying on the many reports that have been published so far, we wanted to contact our partners directly; and they were very happy to receive us, being somewhat unaccustomed to us actually listening to them.
European defence is multifaceted: it is provided through NATO, but more and more by the European Union as well, and by a multiplicity of operational and capability cooperation arrangements, of which our report gives several examples.
The European Union has become a major player in European defence. This is a historic turning point. The Lisbon Treaty made this development possible, but what really triggered it was Europe's “strategic awakening” after 2014.
First of all, in 2015, France activated the mutual assistance clause of Article 42 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union.
In response, our European partners made numerous contributions to French operations or to EU and UN missions in several theatres of operation, particularly in the Levant and Africa, but also in Lebanon, with the assignment of a Finnish company to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) so as to permit French soldiers to return to France.
This was an unprecedented affirmation of European solidarity.
Before 2015, the activation of that clause was never really considered by the European institutions. At this time it would be beneficial to specify the cases where such an activation might be possible and the application procedures for Article 42 Paragraph 7 based on France's field experience.
In 2016, the Union created a Global Strategy. It explicitly includes an ambition for strategic autonomy, which is thus not just some French fantasy but a goal that our partners also share.
Paradoxically, only three missions and operations have been conducted under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since 2015; these have nevertheless had tangible results, particularly in the case of Operation Sophia. The partial suspension of this operation is unfortunate, and makes no sense since it is a direct illustration of the security-defence continuum and of a “Europe that protects.” We don't need to go back over the political conflicts that resulted in the vessels being taken out of service, thus depriving the mission of its information sources and capacity to act, and preventing it from implementing the arms embargo against Libya.
The development of the Global Strategy was followed by the March 2018 launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by twenty-five Member States with regard to thirty-four projects.
This more inclusive PESCO is not what France had in mind, and does not comply with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which had stipulated that it would be limited to “Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria.”
So while this is not the vanguard group initially envisioned, all our contacts in Europe told us that their opinion about it is positive, and that in itself is already an accomplishment.
PESCO is simply lacking comprehensive policy guidance to make it an orderly process for filling the Union's capacity gaps. It must be part of an overall planning process, and not correspond exclusively to a process of industrial return for Member States.
Moreover, we advocate a clear reaffirmation of the binding nature of the commitments made by States in the context of PESCO. The participating countries agreed on a list of twenty commitments, in which they undertake in particular to increase their investment and research expenditure in the defence domain and develop the interoperability of their forces, but also to reinforce Europe's strategic autonomy and its defence technological and industrial base.
I would now like to touch on a point that was of great interest to us in our work, and which many of the people we heard considered to be revolutionary: the European Commission's initiative to create a European Defence Fund (EDF). This initiative was launched in 2016 and formalised in 2018; it was approved by the Council in February and by Parliament in April. It will involve the provision of a fund to support defence research; it has been proposed that €13 billion be earmarked for this purpose for the period 2021-2027. These amounts, which still need to be confirmed by the new European Parliament, would break down into €4.1 billion for the pure research segment, and €8.9 billion for the R&D segment.
Community funding for this R&D segment would be around 20%. There would therefore be a leverage effect, since Member States would contribute the remaining 80%.
This scheme includes preparatory action on defence research on the one hand, and the European defence industrial development programme on the other; these two arrangements have served as prototype projects for the EDF.
There are two fundamental peculiarities in these arrangements: it is the first time that Community money will be used to finance a defence policy, and this is a major turning point that brings the European Union back to its original vocation, i.e., as an organisation intended to protect the peoples of Europe from war; in addition, to be eligible, a project must be submitted by companies from at least three different countries, which means that the Community money will go to finance the construction of a true EDTIB. In addition, projects will have to compete for credits assessed on the basis of these criteria, including the extent to which they constitute breakthrough innovations or contribute to European strategic autonomy.
As one analyst pointed out, as a result of this leverage effect, the funding would ultimately come to quite a significant amount. For the R&D segment, funding from Member States would come to €35.6 billion, for a total of €44.5 billion in defence R&D funding for the period, all toward funding cooperation amongst European countries.
Quite a remarkable system. Nevertheless, a few critical checks will be necessary: first of all, the new European Parliament will have to validate these credits; secondly, the projects will have to be selected for their effectiveness, not just to ensure cohesion; and lastly, national parliamentarians will have to remain vigilant to ensure that this new contribution of funds for defence R&D does not become an excuse for budget ministries to correspondingly reduce credits of a purely national nature.
Finally, there remains the particularly sensitive issue of the status of third States, i.e., countries that are not members of the Union. This would concern two countries in particular, for different reasons: the United States and the United Kingdom.
As for the United States, the situation is simple: they are naturally extremely hostile to this device because they do not have access to it. Nevertheless, it is perfectly logical: there's certainly no reason why European taxpayers should finance the R&D of American companies! The explanation for this hostility lies rather in the Americans' fear about the possible emergence of a real EDTIB, built around European industry leaders who would in the future find it easier to appeal to European clients, insofar as they would necessarily bring together several EU countries, and for larger projects even a majority of those countries. And our American friends are fully aware that this will mean tougher competition! The fight still isn't over, but this is an unprecedented step forward for European defence.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - A last point we thought it would be useful to provide some perspective on is our strategic partnership with Germany in regard to capabilities.
As you know, France is committed to building the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the future Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) in cooperation with Germany. Doubtless like many of you here today, we have become aware of several serious difficulties that have arisen in the course of these projects. These difficulties have primarily to do with some of our German counterparts' questioning of the distribution of tasks and control responsibilities for these projects.
We must be clear: these projects cannot serve as an opportunity for Germany to gain skills that it lacks and are currently possessed by France, or present an opportunity for Rheinmetall, in the case of MGCS, to take control of KMW+Nexter Defence Systems (KNDS). According to the information we have gathered, these difficulties originate less in the executive as in the Bundestag, probably as a reflection of local interests.
And lastly, I would like once again to go back over the difficulties we have encountered with our German partners in terms of exports, as we discussed in committee last week.
These two projects are very ambitious and long-term. They will only succeed if they are balanced and beneficial to both partners. It will be up to us as parliamentarians to make sure that the Government holds this line, and also to relay this message to our colleagues and friends in the Bundestag.
Mr Chairman, last week you informed us that you intend to take up this issue with your counterpart: your rapporteurs assigned to the “European Defence” project fully support you in this.
According to a document published by NATO on 25 June 2019, Germany's defence budget has now for the first time exceeded that of France: €47.3 billion compared to €44.3 billion. This is explained by the increase in German GDP: the expenditures represent 1.35% of their GDP, compared to 1.84% of ours.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - In conclusion, I would like to emphasise the significance and novelty of the developments we are witnessing. European defence has progressed more in the last three years than in the previous twenty. As one researcher we interviewed put it, twenty years ago no one could have imagined that today we would be having these kinds of discussions about European strategic autonomy and European defence.
Much remains to be done, but undoubtedly things are moving in the right direction.
We have come up with twelve proposals, which we will now present.
To reinforce the commitments of each country and to forge the elements of a European defence based on existing initiatives, work must be done for the collective preparation of a European White Paper on Defence, a link that is currently missing in the chain between the EU's Global Strategy, its capacity processes, and its existing operational mechanisms.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - We should create the conditions for a greater visibility of defence issues within European institutions, by establishing a Directorate-General for Defence and Space, or creating a post of European Commissioner or Deputy to the High Representative in these domains, and by recognising a “Defence” format of the Council, which today handles defence issues in its “Foreign Affairs” format.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - Multiply exchanges and training systems as well as joint military exercises across all of Europe, which is essential to building a shared strategic culture. At the military level, France should participate in the military Erasmus system, and create a European session on a basis provided by the Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHEDN) to develop a common strategic vision for future decision-makers, and progressively increase the enrolment capacity of our military colleges in order to facilitate joint officer training, and step up contact with our European partners, for example by setting up a European defence summer school, which could provide a forum for reflection and parliamentary exchange.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - As a result of Brexit, a new position should be created at NATO, a Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), assigned to a representative of an EU Member State in addition to the already existing post, traditionally held by a representative of Britain.
Mme Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur - Better articulate European capacity planning processes, rendering them cyclical and consistent with the long-established, structured process of NATO.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should be revitalised, by concentrating resources where the European Union has the highest added value, as is the case in Africa thanks to the EU's “global approach,” combining a military component with diplomatic, economic and development assistance components. Expand the resources allocated to the recently created Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC).
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - Defend the budget proposed for the European Defence Fund (EDF) in the next multiannual financial framework 2021-2027, i.e., €13 billion. These credits will need to be granted to projects of excellence chosen for their contribution to the European strategic autonomy and the consolidation of the EDTIB, and should not be allocated in small amounts to a variety of recipients in view of promoting cohesion. Ensure that the EDF serves only the industrial interests of Europe. Plan a project specifically focussed on Artificial Intelligence, a cross-cutting concern that may also involve States with little or no defence industry.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur. - Act to ensure to the extent possible that permanent structured cooperation will be an approach capable of filling the capacity gaps of the European Union, consistent with the White Paper proposed above, and reaffirm the binding nature of the commitments made by States in that framework, particularly with regard to their procurement strategies, which must be favourable to the development of the EDTIB.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur. - Clarify the functioning of Article 42 Paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union by assigning an informational and coordinating role to a specific European Union body, for example the High Representative. Conduct an upstream analysis of the possibilities for the activation of this article, as well as the procedures for providing the assistance requested, in consideration of the lessons learned from France's activation of the article in 2015.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur. - Propose as a top priority for the EU the establishment of a defence and security treaty with the UK, as a vital partner of European defence to which we must offer flexible solutions to enable it to participate as much as possible in EU systems - EDF, PESCO, Galileo, etc.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - Major Franco-German industrial projects are key elements in the future of European defence. But for those projects to succeed, we must be frank and candid in our discussions with our German partner, because unless we have a clear agreement on export rules and maintain a balanced industrial distribution in the long term - in other words, unless legal and economic security is ensured - these projects will not be able to continue. These projects must serve as a starting point to allow other European partners to join in and help build a veritable European consortium.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur. - Preference and encouragement should be given to adaptable mechanisms, whether inside or outside the EU, i.e., spontaneous cooperation or pooling mechanisms, like those established in the field of military air transport, i.e., the European Air Transport Command at Eindhoven (EATC), whose underlying principle should be extended to other areas - helicopters and medical support, for example.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - We wanted to approach this subject on a political level rather than on a capability level, so as to make this report different from the many others that have been published previously, and instead to make it an extension of the excellent report published in 2013.
Christian Cambon, Chairman . - I thank our rapporteurs for their thorough work and for providing updates for a good amount of data concerning the Europe of Defence. We endorse your proposals. We appreciate how pertinent and productive the regular meetings we had with our English colleagues were in helping us to understand Brexit better. We observe that in contrast, communication with our German friends has been somewhat lacking. I will be meeting with my German counterpart next Monday, and I hope we will be able to iron out our difficulties in this area.
The EDF, likewise, must serve to benefit the EDTIB; indeed, manufacturers have pointed out the increased risk that Americans, amongst others, may win contracts through subsidiaries based in Europe.
A new defence treaty will inevitably be signed with the United Kingdom after Brexit; all signs suggest that this intention is shared.
As for experimenting with sharing mechanisms such as the EATC, I support the idea. We should build Europe like we did with the Motorised Capabilities agreement (CAMO): that's what I'd call brick and mortar politics. I spoke this week on the subject of the MALE drone: to compete with the Reaper, we need a light drone; the Germans have proposed a drone for urban surveillance use weighing eleven tons and equipped with two engines, which would make it difficult to export.
Before anyone else speaks now, I have to remind you all that I have been ordered by the Bureau to strictly enforce speaking time. However, we have unanimously agreed that we will only use the one speaker per group procedure when there are time constraints.
Joel Guerriau . - This presentation breaks with the pessimistic atmosphere we have seen in previous years. A number of indications would seem to suggest that we are finally headed in the right direction. The creation of the European fund is a major event. Beyond that, what else have you heard in the discussions you have held with your contacts that would be likely to reinforce this optimism?
Olivier Cigolotti . - Thank you for the foresight shown in this report and the objectivity of your proposals. You stated that no European State is capable of supporting its own DTIB, hence the interest of a EDTIB to rise to the challenge posed by States like Russia and China. However, we get the sense that European defence is a source of fear as much externally - Mr Trump regularly refers to a possible exit from NATO, and Washington accuses the European Union of excluding American firms from defence projects - as internally, with Member States still harbouring illusions as to their sovereignty. Can these fears be overcome?
André Vallini . - European Defence, a Europe of Defence: all this brings to mind the issue of arms exports, especially to Saudi Arabia. Europe needs to harmonise its positions; between Germany declaring that it no longer exports any, but does so through intermediary nations, and France continuing its exports when it is no longer supposed to do so.
As for the European Defence Fund, will every country be able to undertake initiatives in the military equipment, armaments and defence research and development fields whilst being subsidised by Europe, or will a minimum number of countries need to be involved?
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - At least three countries.
Ladislas Poniatowski . - You say that the Germans' defence budget is superior to ours. Where are these €47 billion going? Half of their submarine fleet is sitting in their ports!
Christian Cambon, Chairman. - All of it!
Ladislas Poniatowski . - Is there not perhaps a hidden subsidy going to German arms manufacturers, which are particularly successful, sometimes even beating our own?
Richard Yung . - Maybe they're using it to pay retirement pensions!
As has been pointed out, the British wish to continue participating in the European defence effort. But it's hard to imagine what that participation would look like. We tried to build an aircraft carrier with them, and it didn't work out.
Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam. - Thank you for this very interesting report, following in the wake of the report from 2013, which referred to the “Europe of Defence” as a “conceptual hodgepodge, untranslatable for our European partners.” That's still the case, in a way; the European nations don't want anything to do with it, and the Americans have been exerting considerable pressure, again recently on the European Parliament regarding procurement.
At the last meeting of the board of directors of the Institute of Advanced Studies of National Defence (IHEDN), it was announced that some downsizing was on the horizon, especially internationally. How then must we move forward?
On the subject of the FCAS, it will include some nuclear components. Germany has taken an antinuclear position. How can this contradiction be overcome?
Robert del Picchia . - Part of the German military budget is intended to go to fund civilian research centres with a dual activity that may be of benefit to the military. I am thinking of one example in particular, near Munich.
As for a White Paper, sure, but it'd be quite a massive undertaking! Just as one example, what would Austria want to see in it, given that permanent neutrality is written into its constitution?
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - Many of our interviewees were surprised that we came to listen to them, since they had long been accustomed to France being proactive as a source of proposals. The overall feeling was positive. But we were surprised by some of our meetings. Our contact at the Bundestag, a spokesperson for defence issues with the SPD, upheld the idea of ??a European army, which we hadn't expected. In Poland, our interviewees' position can be explained by history. The Poles believe no European defence is possible without the Americans. So they hope to build an American base, to be managed by the Americans, with missiles whose deployment would be decided by the Americans. One of our contacts remarked that Poland acts as if it were an American state on European territory.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - We had surprises on all our trips. The ideas put forth by some of our interviewees had us nearly falling out of our seats. The SPD MP mentioned by Hélène Conway-Mouret told us he would be in favour of a European army created from scratch. That is an idea we absolutely do not support. The SPD is part of the ruling coalition in Germany, but he did specify that this was simply his personal opinion. It should be emphasised that a profound pacifist movement exists within the SPD, which has a considerable influence on German policy. Later, an MP with the CSU told us that his party had publicly put forth the opinion that it was in favour of a European army.
In Romania and Poland our interviewees told us that they are worried about the threat from their eastern flank.
Christian Cambon, Chairman . - Wolfgang Hellmich, Chairman of the Bundestag Defence Committee, has told us that according to a recent poll, 86% of Germans want to see the repatriation of German forces deployed abroad, particularly in the context of United Nations operations, to be brought home. The positions of German MPs are fragmented, contrary to what we see here.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - In response to Olivier Cigolotti, we did observe a willingness to move forward on the EDTIB. Admittedly, there is some reluctance for economic reasons - certain countries have neither an armament industry nor the ability to invest. Similarly, some eastern European countries fear irritating the Americans - Donald Trump, who is very unpredictable, has already threatened to leave NATO. The EDF will allow assistance to be provided to a number of countries. If the projects in the innovation and research fields, which must be presented by at least three countries - one lead nation and two others - are ultimately approved, they will be provided with support from the EDF for up to 20% of their costs. We have emphasised the importance of artificial intelligence and digital technology, which require an investment that is less significant at the outset.
The feeling of being part of a greater European family may also help allay fears.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - Indeed, some of our interviewees did give us the sense that European defence might be seen as intimidating. Ever since Barack Obama's speech on the Asia Pivot, US policy has gone in this new direction, and has been unchanged since. The statements made by Donald Trump, which seemed to indicate that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would not automatically be applied in the event of an attack on Montenegro, loomed large in all our interviewees' minds. One response to this, and this has been the position taken by France, is to consider that Europe will not be able to count on the United States to ensure its security forever, and will one day have to take more control of it. Other States want to do everything possible to prevent this trend, considering that the promotion of European defence might accelerate a possible American withdrawal. How can these differences be overcome? We mentioned the thirty-four permanent structured cooperation projects that are now moving forward, or the European Defence Fund - for which the European Commission has proposed to earmark €13 billion over the period 2021-2027. The idea of ??this fund is to create a European base, based on projects handled by manufacturers from at least three different countries. If the project is among the thirty-four projects we just mentioned, it will receive an additional bonus. The same applies if manufacturers enlist the services of SMEs or mid-size companies from other countries, in which case that investment may come to 50%.
Ladislas Poniatowski has raised a very significant point: manufacturing is the most important thing for Germany. One in seven German people work for the automotive industry! We should also point out that German soldiers are generally paid more than French soldiers, and enjoy a higher level of comfort in their military barracks. The Germans don't spend their money on external operations - Germany has only 3,300 men assigned to overseas operations, while France has 10,000.
We also need to discuss the Eurodrone, now being worked on by France, Italy, Spain and Germany, with each of those countries having committed to advance orders so as to help finance the project: seven for Germany, five for Italy and Spain and four for France.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - The Director General of the European Defence Agency told us that the United Kingdom has never been more proactive in presenting defence projects than it has been since the Brexit vote! By leaving the European Union, the British will lose all their access to the systems in place. The idea of establishing a treaty is to help the British army - with which we are very familiar thanks to overseas operations missions and joint training actions - be given access to these systems, so as to help bind the United Kingdom to the European continent.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - The United Kingdom is France's natural partner in many ways. We are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and we possess atomic weapons, with similar doctrines of use. We do not have such a degree of similarity with any other country.
We endorse the idea of the United Kingdom participating in a European security council, an idea developed by French and German leaders. We must ensure that the UK remains anchored in European security and defence policy, if only for geographical reasons.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - We work closely with the United Kingdom in the intelligence field, and must not dissociate security and defence.
Ms Garriaud-Maylam, you are quite familiar with the IHEDN, as an administrator at that Institute. Our proposal would be to create a kind of European IHEDN in Brussels, based on the French model, which would bring together members of the armed forces, senior officials and civilians for a one-year period. The system works very well and helps to raise the awareness of future decision-makers of defence and security issues.
Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam. - Most countries would tell you that such a structure would be useless given the existence of NATO. In any case, that was the answer its Secretary General gave me when I asked him about complementarity between the European Union and NATO in defence matters. He told me that after Brexit, 85% of European defence would be provided by countries outside the European Union.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - Nothing would prevent us from starting with two or three countries.
Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam. - We must nevertheless keep in mind that Brexit is going to significantly reduce the United Kingdom's budget, and it may not have the resources to keep advancing.
Ronan Le Gleut, Rapporteur . - On the subject of the FCAS, we should point out that although few Germans are aware of this, German pilots could end up required to fly jets carrying nuclear weapons stored on their territory, and that training is taking place on a daily basis.
Mr Robert del Picchia's remarks are entirely reasonable. We often use terms that are untranslatable or difficult to translate, such as “ Europe de la défense ,” and others may not understand them in the same way from one country to the next. This is why we must work to clear up this hazy situation, which would be the object of this European White Paper: we need to define a set of terms that everyone can agree on.
We previously thought that European nations could be classified into two categories: those who fear a southern threat and those who fear an eastern threat. We have observed that there is a third category: those who do not feel threatened at all. It will be difficult, then, to find common solutions on that basis.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur. - The idea of ??the White Paper is to get everyone to come to the table, so as to avoid duplication with NATO. The Sorbonne speech of the President of France and his statements on the subject of a European army led us to discuss this subject. This White Paper must also help keep France from being perceived as wanting to impose its vision on all other countries. We need to start thinking strategically at the European level: in a number of countries, strategic autonomy is seen as a real red flag, and as synonymous with independence from the United States.
Christian Cambon, Chairman . - Thank you again for this work, which updates the Committee's knowledge and does it credit. A summary of this report will be translated.
André Vallini. - This report reminds me of the one we prepared in 2013 with our former colleagues Xavier Pintat, Jacques Gautier and Daniel Reiner.
Hélène Conway-Mouret, Rapporteur . - You all feature prominently in our report!
Christine Prunaud. - I congratulate you on this work and the interest it has attracted. Nevertheless, we will vote against it. I did appreciate the reservations you expressed in regard to a European defence being run by France and Germany only; it would be desirable for other countries to have decision-making power. My group's concern is that we would want to know how independent this European defence would be from NATO, an organisation whose utility we dispute. Who will be in command? Who will handle the governance of this future European defence? NATO? What strategic independence from NATO would it provide?
Christian Cambon, Chairman . - A constructive opposition, then...
Gisèle Jourda . - For my part, I abstain.
The Committee authorises the publication of the Information Report.
* 80 Expression used by Florence Parly, Minister for the Armed Forces, in March 2019.